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ABSTRACT
The Silent Holocaust and Other Myths: The Jewish Body and Intermarriage in the Fiction of
Saul Bellow and Philip Roth
by
Samuel Gold
Advisor: Wayne Koestenbaum
This dissertation concerns the legacy within the Jewish American imagination of two
related ideas: the pseudoscientific belief in the Jewish body’s inherent physical difference, and
the conviction, shared by rabbis, sociologists, and Jewish advocacy organizations in the second
half of the 20th century, that Jewish-gentile intermarriage threatened Jewish survival in America.
The Jew’s association with illness and debility is central to the Nazi race theories that undergird
the Holocaust; the postwar American anxiety over intermarriage responds to that destruction.
Fearing that intermarriage may yield a second, “silent” Holocaust through assimilation,
American Jewish leaders metaphorically equate exogamy (out-marriage) with genocide.
I argue that the postwar fiction of Saul Bellow and Philip Roth attempts—not always
successfully—to imagine a Jewish American life freed from the self-hatred traditionally directed
toward the Jew’s body and his presumed inclination toward intermarriage. In chapter one, I
demonstrate that Bellow’s fiction after Augie March overcomes his early squeamishness about
representing the Jewish body; a noted caricaturist of the human form, the mature Bellow creates
flamboyantly flawed, pained Jewish characters whose defiant bodies replace the antisemitic
stereotype of Jewish inferiority with positive images of an embodied Jewish identity. In chapter
two, I argue that Roth offers a model of Jewish identity that accepts intermarriage, assimilation,
and other forms of attenuated Jewishness. While postwar sociologists and Jewish leaders fret that
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intermarriage signals the end of one’s Jewish belonging, Roth creates a cast of protagonists who
remain Jewish despite their detachment from traditional institutions of Judaism.
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Introduction: The Jewish Body and Intermarriage after World War II
This dissertation concerns the legacy within the Jewish American imagination of two
related ideas: the pseudoscientific belief in the Jewish body’s inherent physical difference, and
the conviction, shared by rabbis, sociologists, and Jewish advocacy organizations in the second
half of the 20th century, that Jewish-gentile intermarriage threatened Jewish survival in America.
The idea of the Jewish body’s essential difference may be as old as the Jews themselves,
dating back to the moment a gentile first laid eyes on a Jew’s circumcised penis. The history of
the Jewish body’s visibility and its place in the gentile imagination is long and varied.1 For the
purposes of this project, I am interested in the race-based mode of inter-religious body scrutiny
which historian Sander L. Gilman traces to the period of Jewish emancipation in Europe (The
Jew’s Body 39-40). Within the discourse of nineteenth-century science, Gilman argues, the
Jewish body emerges as pathologically distinct from that of the non-Jew: weak, ugly, and
constitutionally inferior, the Jewish body is prone to illness and deformity (39). In the first
decades of the twentieth century, a generation of American nativists, resentful of the tattered
immigrants flooding their shores, adopted these arguments, elaborated on them, and volleyed
them back to Europe, where they became the backbone of Nazi race science. To the Nazis, the
Jewish body was not merely prone to illness, but illness itself—a “bacillus” whose very
existence threatened Germany’s “public health” (Konner 70). The only cure was the eradication
of the Jews.

1

“The difference of the Jewish body is absolute within the Western tradition,” writes Sander L. Gilman in The Jew’s
Body (38). For a historical overview of the Jewish body’s many meanings, see Melvin Konner’s The Jewish Body
(2009). For a collection of essays on the body in Judaism and Jewish thought, see Howard Eilberg-Schwartz’s
People of the Body (1999). For medieval Christian attitudes toward the Jewish body, see Joshua Trachtenberg’s The
Devil and the Jews (1943) and Sara Lipton’s Dark Mirror: the Medieval Origins of Anti-Jewish Iconography (2014).
For a wide-ranging account of the Jewish body’s association with blackness, see Tudor Parfitt’s Hybrid Hate:
Conflations of Antisemitism and Anti-Black Racism (2020).
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The second concept—that the postwar American Jew was intermarrying himself into
statistical oblivion—is domestic, a belated, homegrown reaction to the destruction of European
Jewry. Suddenly the “dominant center of diaspora Jewish life” (Diner 7), American Jews placed
themselves under intense sociological scrutiny.2 Throughout the 60s and 70s, a series of articles
on Jewish demography revealed that intermarriage rates were rising. This fact had catastrophic
consequences for a subsection of the population that was already shrinking due to belowreplacement fertility rates (“Studies of Jewish Intermarriage” 53).3 The American Jew, declared a
1964 Look magazine cover story, was “vanishing.”4 By the 1980s and 1990s, the genocide
abroad had become metaphorically linked to the potential loss of Jews at home (Diner 308);
intermarriage had developed from a crisis into a “second” or “silent” Holocaust (Novick 185).
My interest in intermarriage and the Jewish body is shamelessly autobiographical. I was
born in 1989 to a Jewish father and a Catholic mother. In this way, my family participated into
the so-called silent Holocaust. My genealogy and my physiology coax me toward the fiction of
Saul Bellow and Philip Roth in search of less damning models of attenuated Jewishness and of
the Jewish body. Bellow and Roth are less my subjects than my guides, cheeky Jewish Virgils
who light the way for this stumbling, suburban half-Jew with an aching back.
Why Bellow and Roth? What do these bygone Jews—Roth of my grandfather’s
generation, Bellow of my great-grandfather’s—have to teach to me? Two more recent texts
illustrate Bellow’s and Roth’s continued relevance and the necessity of their ironizing visions of
American Jewish life.

2

For an account of the role sociological discourse played in framing the postwar intermarriage debates, see Lila
Corwin Berman’s “Sociology, Jews, and Intermarriage in Twentieth Century America” (2008).
3
See Rosenthal’s “Studies of Jewish Intermarriage in the United States” (1963) and “Jewish Fertility in the United
States” (1961), published in the American Jewish Year Book, volumes 64 and 62, respectively.
4
See Thomas B. Morgan, “The Vanishing American Jew,” Look 28 (5 May 1964): 42-6.
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An episode of Larry David’s punctilious, pun-laden comedy series Curb Your
Enthusiasm offers a useful introduction to the symbolic interplay between intermarriage, the
Jewish body, and Jewish identification. One of the most successful, influential sitcom writers of
his time, Larry David co-created the NBC mega-hit Seinfeld (1989-1998) before developing
Curb Your Enthusiasm (2000-present) for HBO. Seinfeld, a self-described “show about nothing,”
is, in fact, a show about kibitzing, which follows the misadventures of comedian Jerry Seinfeld
and his three closest friends. The favorite pastime of this wordplay-prone New York quartet is
sitting at a local coffee shop and gabbing about their own peccadillos, quotidian anxieties, and
humiliating gaffes. In Curb Your Enthusiasm, Seinfeld’s spiritual successor, David plays an
exaggerated version of himself: bored and stinking rich after Seinfeld, Larry fills his hours
theorizing and policing the “unwritten rules” of everyday life. Curb also provides David with a
vehicle for engaging explicitly with matters of Jewish American identity that Seinfeld addresses
indirectly through its talky, digressive style and quasi-rabbinical dissections of social mores.
Curb shares this encoded, formal Jewishness with its predecessor, while leading deeper comic
excursions into the boundaries of Larry’s Jewish commitment.
In “The Ski Lift,” an episode from Curb’s fifth season, Larry must secure a kidney
transplant for an ailing friend. This requires him to ingratiate himself with the head of a local
kidney donor’s consortium, an Orthodox Jew named Heineman. Assuming a pious Jew won’t
refuse another Jew in need, Larry schemes to mimic Heineman’s religious Orthodoxy. He dons a
yarmulke and invites Heineman to a kosher deli—so far so good. Trouble arises when Larry
invites Heineman and his daughter on a weekend ski trip. To play the part of the good, observant
Jew, Larry must hide the fact of his intermarriage from his guests. Desperate, Larry convinces
his manager’s wife, Susie (played by the hot-tempered comedienne Susie Essman), to pose as his
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Jewish wife. Susie obliges, covering her hair and shmaltzing up her conversation with globs of
Yiddish. But Heineman’s daughter, already suspicious of her hosts, expresses disbelief when
Larry claims to have played in a Jewish folk band. She calls Larry’s bluff: what songs did his
group perform? Forced to affirm his Jewish credentials, Larry fabricates the names of two
traditional-sounding Jewish songs: “Gefilte Fish Blues” and “My Freaking Back Is Killing Me
and It’s Making It Hard to Kvell.” The deception fails. A bad Jew like Larry—who elsewhere in
the series offends a fellow Jew by whistling Wagner—cannot fake being a good Jew.
Larry’s fictitious song list, like the wife-swapping ruse, reveals his patchy understanding
of the markers of Jewish identification. “Gefilte Fish Blues” is self-explanatory; all cultures
identify with their traditional foods. The second title has more to chew on. To kvell, of course, is
to swell with pride. Like the reference to gefilte fish, Larry’s Yiddish communicates his
familiarity with what Gilman calls “the hidden language of the Jews” (Jewish Self-Hatred 17).
What’s more, the title’s hyperbolic allusion to lumbago signals Larry’s knowledge of the Jewish
body’s long-standing association with pain, illness, and debility. (My own Jewish bodyknowledge is inborn: my grandmother, my great-aunt, my uncle, my father, and I have all
endured spinal surgeries. The Shafransky family inheritance is a fakakta spine.) Faced with
exposing himself as an impostor, Larry alludes to the Jew’s suffering body, the trump card of his
Jewish identification. This is another secret language, the counterweight to his forbidden
intermarriage. Larry knows that good Jews have bad backs and bad Jews have gentile wives.
A darker vision of intermarriage, the ailing Jewish body, and their connection to Jewish
identification bursts from the comics of Eli Valley, collected as Diaspora Boy: Comics on Crisis
in America and Israel (2017). Born in 1970 to Jewish parents, Eli Valley creates shocking comic
art which articulates the concerns of my generation of American Jews—largely progressive-
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minded, secular, critical of Netanyahu’s Israel and the right-wing Americans who are its most
vocal supporters, Valley’s readers seek a mode of Jewish identification that is detached from the
orthodoxies of postwar Jewish American life. The comics in Diaspora Boy were originally
published in left-leaning Jewish media outlets like The Forward, Jewcy (a self-described
“platform for ideas that matter to young Jews today”), and the Tel Aviv-based +972 Magazine.
Today, Valley is a contributing writer for Jewish Currents, “a magazine committed to the rich
tradition of thought, activism, and culture of the Jewish left.” The audience of Valley’s anxious,
claustrophobic ink-and-paper universe, it is important to remember, consists of American Jews
familiar enough with recent American-Jewish debates to distinguish Valley’s irony and satire
from mere crassness or Jew-hatred.
Valley’s preferred means of satire is to refract the fears of Jewish leaders through pop
culture figures, especially characters from the history of comic art.5 In the collection’s title
comic, “Israel Man and Diaspora Boy,” Valley builds a superhero duo according to Hungarianborn physician Max Nordau’s theories of the ideal Zionist body. A colleague of Theodor Herzl
and founding member of the World Zionist Organization, Nordau believed that European ghetto
life had “atrophied” Jewish “muscles” and “minds” (Jewish Self-Hatred 291). Nordau’s
prescription for the diaspora Jew’s sickliness and over-reliance on intellect was the promotion of
Jewish physical fitness, an idea he called Muskeljudentum, or “muscular Judaism.” Within
Nordau’s embodied Judaism, the good Jew becomes the healthy Jew, and the bad Jew becomes
the ill Jew.
5

Bucky Shvitz, a hardboiled detective turned sociologist, is hired to discover why young Jews are “losing their
[Jewish] identities” (71); Batman and Robin warn a schoolboy not to socialize with gentiles, lest he one day
intermarry and jeopardize the future of the Jewish people (23); Darth Vader, a half-Jew, constructs a Death Star for
intermarried couples and their “half-breed children” (67); Stuart the Jewish Turtle, the cynical house pet of liberal,
assimilated Jews, interprets his owners’ every actions as antisemitic (49); a rabid Abe Foxman, former national
director of the Anti-Defamation League, froths with Jew-hatred when he encounters American Jews critical of Israel
(103).
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Valley uses Diaspora Boy and Israel Man to visualize the before-and-after of Nordau’s
vision. Israel Man, that stand-in for muscular Judaism, is almost identical to Superman—he has
the same bulging pectorals, the same cape and tights, the same Hollywood good looks, the same
strong chin and iconic spit-curl. On the comic’s opening page, Israel Man proudly shows off his
virile biceps. Beside him at waist height stands Diaspora Boy, a fanged, bespectacled, hooknosed relic of Nazi caricature. He is monstrously ugly, a bald, sickly little man covered in warts
and boils. An aura of flies and stink-lines surrounds him. His bulbous nose leaks mucus. His
twisted cricket legs cannot support his weight, so he leans on a crutch. As Valley’s cover
declares, Diaspora Boy is a “cripple within, and a counterfeit without, so that like everything
unreal, he is ridiculous and hateful to all men of high standards” (qtd. in 33).
Valley shocks the reader by rendering Diaspora Boy as a wretched creature out of
Streicher’s Der Stürmer; he transforms shock into satire by linking that antisemitic imagery to
early Zionist descriptions of the diaspora Jew. When Valley identifies Diaspora Boy as a
“cripple,” his source is not Nazi race science, but Nordau’s speech at the first Zionist Congress
(Hertzberg 239). Similarly, Israel Man quotes the German-Jewish philosopher Jacob Klatzkin:
the diaspora “sustain[s] the existence of a people disfigured in both body and soul” (qtd. in
Valley 35). The diaspora Jew as envisioned by fin-de-siècle Zionists, Valley suggests, is identical
to the Nazi’s loathed scapegoat. In this sense, Valley works in the tradition of Gilman, who
argues in his seminal study, Jewish Self-Hatred (1986), that Nordau’s Muskeljudentum attempts
to “co-opt the underlying premises of anti-Semitic rhetoric”—in this case, the rhetoric of the
Jew’s deformed body and mind—“and use its strong political message for [its] own ends”
(Jewish Self-Hatred 291).6 By tracing the good Jew’s transformation into the healthy, Zionist

6

Both “Jewish nationalism” and “German nationalism” operate according to the “code” of “mens sana in corpore
sano,” or a healthy mind in a healthy body, Gilman writes (291). Elsewhere, Gilman notes that Nordau’s
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Jew and the bad Jew’s deformation into the ill diaspora Jew, Valley exposes the self-hatred at the
heart of the Zionist project.
Yet Valley’s comic also makes clear that he is addressing contemporary American issues.
Israel Man, who promises to “put it an end, once and for all, to anti-semitism” (35), becomes a
stand-in for Israeli military might; Diaspora Boy, by contrast, represents the pathetic,
assimilated, American schlemiel. On the comic’s second page, a detailed “Anatomy of Our
Heroes” catalogues these physical and psychological differences. Israel Man has a
“perfect...Greco-Roman” nose, virile genitalia, and a “spine straightened with pride and selfconfidence”; he “moves his bowels with optimum regularity” (34). By contrast, Diaspora Boy is
a pastiche of late-19th century stereotypes about the Jewish body: he has a “repulsively
enlarged” nose, a hunched posture (“spine crushed from centuries of servility and self-hatred”),
and suffers from respiratory illnesses, skin conditions, and constipation.7 He is impotent, with
“man-breasts” that leak milk—an allusion to the Jew’s feminized body.8 In order to stand at
Israel Man’s eye-line, dwarfish Diaspora Boy perches on a stack of books, the titles of which
reinforce his cultural and mental degradation: How to Love Your Anti-Semitic Gentile Wife,
Dwindling Population Studies Vol. MCCLXXIII, Exile: the Religion of Self-Hatred, Woody
Allen’s Collected Oeuvre, Encyclopedia of Fear and Paranoia, and How to Live Without a
National Culture (34).
Diaspora Boy’s books raise a particularly American set of Jewish concerns, and the threat
posed by intermarriage and low birth-rates holds pride of place. Later in the comic, Israel Man
internalization of Jewish physical stereotypes makes him similar to “most...Jewish physicians of the fin de siècle,”
who believe Jews to be “at special risk for specific forms of mental and neurological disease” (The Jew’s Body 54).
7
For an account on the Jewish nose and the Jew’s association with skin diseases, see chapter seven of Gilman’s The
Jew’s Body. For a history of the Jewish body’s association with tuberculous, see chapter four of Gilman’s Franz
Kafka, the Jewish Patient. Diaspora Boy’s constipation may be an allusion to Alexander Portnoy’s perennially
blocked father.
8
Gilman writes that the Jew’s body is viewed as “effeminate, castrated, [and] potentially ill” (Franz Kafka 36).
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berates his side-kick as a “weak, cowering untermensch,” identifiable by his “intermarriage” and
“self-hatred” (35). Diaspora Boy’s inclination toward intermarriage is as much a sign of his
impurity as his sickly, deformed body. Each reveals that he is, in Israel Man’s words, a
“disgusting pariah on the verge of extinction” (35). The association of Israel Man and Diaspora
Boy with purity and impurity, respectively, has corollaries in other Valley comics. In “What If
Batman and Robin Worked in the American Jewish Community?”, Valley’s panic-stricken Boy
Wonder fears that intermarriage will lead to an “ethnic dissolution.” The children of
intermarriage, he warns, are destined to be “bastards” (23). Similarly, in the Star Wars parody
“Vader: Half-Jew,” Yoda instructs Luke Skywalker that Judaism cannot “[e]xist without racial
ethnocentrism”: “Superior, you must feel, to all who Jewish mother have not!” (67). These racial
defenses of endogamy, like Israel Man’s celebration of the diaspora Jew’s “extinction” (and his
characterization of Diaspora Boy as an “untermensch”), suggest that American Jewish life has
inherited traces of the Nazi rhetoric it abhors.
“With friends like these, who needs antisemites?” asks Diaspora Boy after Israel Man
concludes a particularly virulent rant. The question—which implies that American Jews have
internalized antisemitism—motivates Valley’s art; so does it animate my own project. If I am
both repulsed and fascinated by Valley’s caustic representation of the issues dividing American
Jews, this feeling recalls my attitude toward my subjects. The metaphor of the “silent Holocaust”
sickens me no less than antisemitic caricature, yet I am compelled to meditate over both. I read
and write about the Jewish body and intermarriage because as a lumbago-ridden half-Jew I
cannot afford to look away.
Enter Saul Bellow and Philip Roth, whom I select for their capacity to imagine an
American Jewish life outside the confining self-hatred traditionally directed toward the Jew’s
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body and his presumed inclination toward intermarriage. As we will see in the pages to follow,
Bellow’s fiction shows his gradual acceptance of the diaspora body. Beginning with The
Adventures of Augie March (1953), the novel that marks his entrance into literary maturity,
Bellow represents Jewish bodies that are flamboyantly, shamelessly flawed. Bellow’s heroes are
limping, aching Jews whose physical ailments attest to their strength of character. Within
Bellow’s postwar fiction, the Jewish body is no longer something to hide or correct through a
regimen of physical self-improvement. In Bellow’s imagination, Nordau’s “cripple” becomes the
“gimpy Galitzianer” Harry Fonstein (36), heroic protagonist of The Bellarosa Connection
(1989), who escapes the Nazis, “dragging one foot” (37).
Similarly, Roth offers a model of Jewish identity that accepts intermarriage, assimilation,
and other forms of attenuated Jewishness. While postwar sociologists and Jewish leaders fret that
intermarriage signals the end of one’s Jewish belonging, Roth creates a cast of protagonists who
remain “inextinguishably Jewish” despite their detachment from traditional institutions of
Judaism (The Facts 127). The irony of Roth’s many versions of “the Jew who got away” is that
each untethered Jew becomes more Jewish in his solitude (Ghost Writer 50). In America, Roth
writes in The Anatomy Lesson (1983), the “alienated” diaspora Jew becomes the “Jew set free.”
The “thrillingly paradoxical kicker” is that the American Jew is “set free even from Jews—yet
only by steadily maintaining consciousness as a Jew” (480). I am reminded of being a child and
asking my father why he didn’t “practice” the Jewish faith. “No need to practice,” he said. “I’ve
mastered everything.” For Roth’s protagonists (if not my father), the scene of mastery is the
writing desk. Literary experience becomes the wellspring of their Jewish memories and Jewish
attachments.
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The following dissertation consists of two long chapters. In “Saul Bellow, Somatological
Moralist,” I argue that Bellow’s fiction appropriates and undermines the prewar stereotypes of
the Jewish body that he would have known from his youth and his undergraduate work in
anthropology. Born in Canada in 1915, Bellow moved to Chicago with his family in 1924 and
came of age in what historian Leonard Dinnerstein calls a “period of antisemitic fervor” (105). In
America, Bellow encountered a homegrown antisemitism bearing the name of “Nordicism,”
which insisted on the Jewish body’s constitutional inferiority to that of white men. This theory of
white supremacy, advanced in books such as Madison Grant’s The Passing of the Great Race
(1916) and Lothrop Stoddard’s The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy
(1920), divided the races of men into an incontrovertible hierarchy and promoted the
preservation of a pure American bloodline at all costs. Natural xenophobes, Nordicism’s
advocates were staunch defenders of eugenics who shaped the country’s restrictive Immigration
Act of 1924. (It should come as no surprise that Hitler called Grant’s book “my bible,” and
corresponded with Grant and his fellow eugenicists [Spiro 357].) As an anthropology student,
Bellow studied under Melville J. Herskovits, whose mentor, the German-Jewish anthropologist
Franz Boas, had effectively debunked Grant’s work as pseudoscience. Within this context,
Bellow’s creation of flamboyantly ailing Jewish protagonists extends Boas’s work, replacing
antisemitic theories of Jewish inferiority with positive images of an embodied Jewish identity.
In “A Glass or an Apple: Exogamous Fathers and Their Children,” I use the history of the
postwar intermarriage crisis as a backdrop for discussing Philip Roth’s representation of
exogamous Jews and intermarried families. Based on readings from Portnoy’s Complaint (1969),
The Counterlife (1986), and American Pastoral (1997), I demonstrate how Roth ironizes the
Jewish fear of intermarriage and “the vanishing American Jew.” Through his stand-in Nathan
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Zuckerman, Roth offers a theory of Jewish continuity that is untethered to traditional Jewish
institutions such as the temple or the Jewish family. For Zuckerman, as for Roth, the writing
desk becomes his site of Jewish belonging, his books his Jewish progeny. I also draw parallels
between the intermarriage crisis and contemporaneous, equally apocalyptic predictions by
Jewish literary critics that Jewish American literature had reached its apex and would soon
vanish into obscurity.
Taken together, my Bellow and Roth chapters demonstrate how two major Jewish
American writers contend with two legacies of the Holocaust. Bellow’s fiction undermines the
physiognomic assumptions of Nazism by foregrounding the pains and imperfections of his
Jewish protagonists’ bodies—imperfections that ultimately grant them an emboldened Jewish
identity. In a sense, Bellow’s flawed bodies constitute a bold retort to American Jewry’s postwar
self-consciousness. Rather than replace the stereotype of the weak and sickly Jew with a literary
muscle-Jew, inflated with his own bravery and pugnacity,9 Bellow re-imagines the maligned
Jewish body as a storehouse of ancestral memory. Similarly, Roth’s representation of Zuckerman
as a “Jew without Jews” (The Counterlife 324), as a writer whose Jewish legacy is his fiction,
defies the postwar belief that intermarriage means the end of a Jewish line.
Each writer’s achievement stems from a special brand of chutzpah, a cheeky refusal to
accept the unmediated gravity of an American Jewish conundrum. To borrow Roth’s
formulation, these writers wed “deadly seriousness” to “sheer playfulness” (Reading Myself and
Others 96). The novels born of this mixture are delightfully brazen, packed so tightly with
ironies that readers can be forgiven for missing the underlying tenderness and sincerity. The
achievement of Bellow’s Augie March, writes Roth, is its embrace of a world that is “manifold

9

Such is Roth’s complaint about Leon Uris’s novel Exodus, as articulated in his essay, “Some New Jewish
Stereotypes.”
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with contradiction and ambiguity.” In Bellow’s fiction, as in Roth’s, “the ‘mixed character’ of
everything is bracing” (Why Write? 293). Thus, Bellow and Roth reject the purity to which both
prewar nativism and postwar Jewish life aspire. In matters of form and content, their fiction
remains “gloriously impure.”10
Bellow’s and Roth’s investment in the flawed particularity of the Jewish body and Jewish
identity is an extension of their aesthetic concerns. Both artists are enraptured by the “richly
rendered surface” (Why Write? 293). In his final novel, Ravelstein, Bellow reflects that “in the
surface of things you saw the heart of things” (753). No detail is superficial—thus, Bellow’s
fascination with the peculiarities of the human face and body and with his adopted city of
Chicago. Every building, every smokestack spewing filth, every train and bus and streetcar—
those graceless, mechanical beasts which Bellow loves to capture in motion!—every bit of coal
or scrap of iron is alive, humming with meaning. Bellow satisfies his own litmus test for what
constitutes Jewish storytelling: a narrative in which “the world, and even the universe, [has] a
human meaning” (Simply Too Much 112). But even in a world of overabundant signification, it is
the human body that Bellow obsessively interprets. And Roth, who worshipped Bellow, learned
from his master not only the comic value of telling American stories in a propulsive, Yiddishinflected English, but the aesthetics of representing pained and ailing Jewish bodies.
A vast critical literature on Bellow and Roth precedes me. Though they were born
eighteen years apart—Bellow in 1915, Roth in 1933—it is easy to consider them contemporaries.
Since Roth started his career early with Goodbye, Columbus (1959), and Bellow concluded his
own at the age of eighty-five with Ravelstein (2000), they shared forty years on the American

10

Anthony Burgess uses this phrase to describe the English of “outsider” or “alien” writers—that is, writers who
learn English as a second language, as (post)colonial subjects, or as members of a minority group. Bellow applies
this category to Jewish American literature in his lecture, “The Jewish Writer in America” (Simply Too Much 3612).
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literary stage. Each writer garnered fame, fortune, and notoriety in his lifetime. If Bellow and
Roth were consummate literary successes—the winners of Pulitzers, National Book Awards,
and, in Bellow’s case, a Nobel—they were also yoked together as examples of postwar American
literature’s sexism and ego-driven maleness. They share an ambivalent legacy.
The circumstances of Roth’s popular reception are more well-known, if only because he
wrote extensively about the fraught early years of his career.11 Roth’s first supporters were the
Jewish critics and writers whose work he read in magazines like Commentary and Partisan
Review; they praised Goodbye, Columbus as the work of a precocious satirist of suburban Jewish
life.12 His first detractors were rabbis and Jewish leaders, who wrote to the Anti-Defamation
League demanding to know what was “being done to silence this man” following the publication
of “Defender of the Faith” in the March 7, 1959 issue of the New Yorker (Reading Myself and
Others 204).13 The publication of Portnoy’s Complaint (1969) made Roth a bestseller, but
reignited accusations that he was a self-hating Jew and a danger to the Jewish people. For
example, the German-Israeli scholar Gershom Scholem called Portnoy “the book for which all
anti-Semites have been praying” (qtd in Pierpont 61).14 By 1972 Irving Howe, an elder statesman
of Jewish American letters and one-time supporter of Roth’s fiction, dismissed Roth’s oeuvre as
the product of a “thin personal culture.” Roth, Howe claimed, had arrived “at the end of a
tradition which [could] no longer nourish his imagination” (“Philip Roth Reconsidered” 73).
Roth’s attenuated Jewishness meant he lacked the knowledge necessary to create convincing
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See Roth’s 1963 essay “Writing about Jews” (reprinted in Reading Myself and Others) and his memoir, The
Facts.
12
See Saul Bellow, “The Swamp of Prosperity,” Leslie Fiedler, “The Image of Newark and the Indignities of Love:
Notes on Philip Roth,” and Irving Howe, “The Suburbs of Babylon.”
13
In Philip Roth: the Biography, Blake Bailey identifies the author of this letter as Modern Orthodox rabbi Emanuel
Rackman (168).
14
For a thorough account of Roth’s response to his Jewish critics, see Alan Cooper, Philip Roth and the Jews
(1996).
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portraits of American Jews. Within Roth’s world, Howe claimed, American Jewish life was little
more than a nasty joke.
Howe’s argument about Roth’s “thin personal culture” found a vital afterlife in the hands
of feminist-minded critics, who dismissed Roth’s early work on the basis of its representation of
women. In a 1976 essay titled “Why Do These Men Hate Women?”, Vivian Gornick condemns
Roth’s fiction as an “obsessive, eaten-up alive exercise in self-absorption,” whose “chief
element” is “the hatred of women” (196).15 Gornick argues that the self-absorption of writers like
Roth and Bellow leads to an “emotional stupidity” that is incompatible with meaningful
literature (195). Setting aside the matter of Gornick’s hyperbole—Roth’s “hatred of women” is
his fiction’s chief element?—it is hard to disagree with the charge that Roth’s representation of
women in his early novels is stiff and tedious. But the post-Portnoy novels that Gornick
discusses are the weakest of Roth’s career. If the women in My Life as a Man (1974) are unlively
and incredible, so, too, are its men. One may say, with some accuracy, that Peter Tarnopol’s
hatred of his wife, Maureen, may be the chief element of that tiresome novel. Similarly, it is easy
to assert that Roth’s representation Maureen Tarnopol is, by extension, unfair, cruel, even
misogynistic; it is harder to make that same claim about Amy Bellette in The Ghost Writer
(1979), a vastly superior novel which tries earnestly to articulate the consciousness of its titular
female character.
Scholarly reconsiderations emerge in the eighties and nineties as Roth matures and
develops as a writer. For Hermione Lee, whose short book Philip Roth (1982) provides a useful
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early assessment of Roth’s literary achievement, Roth is not merely a puerile jokester, but an
artist whose fiction alternates between “high seriousness and vaudeville, between restraint and
letting go” (22). Lee is also the first scholar to take seriously Roth’s fascination with the body’s
desires and failures. Her prescient contention that Roth is a “novelist of orifices and blockages,
of frustrated gratification” connects the libidinal concerns of his early work to later portraits of
pain and physical decay in The Anatomy Lesson (1983), Sabbath’s Theater (1995), Everyman
(2006), and Exit Ghost (2007) (14).
Debra Shostak’s Philip Roth: Countertexts, Counterlives (2004) argues that Roth’s
narrative reliance on masks, ventriloquism, and competing voices demonstrates that his true
subject is postmodern subjectivity. Within Shostak’s theory-based rescue operation, the apparent
egotism or male chauvinism of Roth’s protagonists is merely a performance, part of the
“countertextual book of voices” that constitutes his work (5). More relevant to my own work is
Shostak’s contention that Roth’s interest in the suffering body functions as a “profound critique
of the mythology of masculine power” otherwise associated with his male characters (22).
Ross Posnock arrives at a similar conclusion in Philip Roth’s Rude Truth: the Art of
Immaturity (2006). In addition to convincingly arguing for Roth’s indebtedness to Ralph Waldo
Emerson, Mark Twain, and Henry James, Posnock demonstrates that “immaturity” is both
Roth’s subject and his guiding aesthetic principle. For Posnock, immaturity is an expansive
principle which explains Roth’s antagonism, his attraction to prurient subject matter, his
unselfconscious appropriation of American and European literary traditions, and his fascination
with performativity and constructed selves. In Posnock’s hands, Roth’s immaturity—in fact,
“playfulness” may be a more accurate, if less thought-provoking, name for this concept—
becomes a moral position. This is a less jargon-laden version of Shostak’s argument, one that
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offers insights into Roth’s refusal to take seriously the charges of Jewish self-hatred directed
towards him or, as I discuss below, the apparent gravity of the so-called intermarriage crisis.
If Posnock’s study demonstrates the necessity of reframing Roth’s immaturity, then
Bellow is overdue for a reconsideration of his work’s seriousness. Identified as a precocious
talent following the publication of Dangling Man (1944) and The Victim (1947), Bellow emerged
as an invigorating and distinctly Jewish American voice after The Adventures of Augie March
(1953). Herzog (1964) cemented his position among the country’s foremost writers.16 Then came
the first scholarly monographs: Tony Tanner’s Saul Bellow (1965), Keith Opdahl’s The Novels of
Saul Bellow: an Introduction (1967), and John J. Clayton’s Saul Bellow: In Defense of Man
(1968). These early critical works emphasized the bookish Bellovian hero’s thwarted efforts to
philosophize his way out of crises both personal (divorce, heartbreak, betrayal) and worldhistorical (wars abroad, cultural upheaval at home). For these critics, Bellow’s world is
organized around a dichotomy: the impulse to contemplate Big Ideas runs aground on drab,
mucky Life. The flaw in this interpretation does not rest in the dichotomy itself—as Ellen Pifer
notes, “[t]he tension between polarities…is the one aspect of Bellow’s work on which virtually
all his critics agree” (444)—but in the scholar’s hapless, clumsy impulse to freeze, through
abstraction, the thematic vectors that Bellow’s novels leave in motion. Thus Opdahl, who defines
Bellow’s heroes by their “need for religious experience,” awkwardly concludes that Bellow’s
narrators are “estrange[d] from physical experience” and the “material world”—a cockeyed
argument, given Bellow’s attraction to details, surfaces, and physical forms (Eisinger 486).
Similarly, Clayton, who presents Bellow as a humanist beleaguered by “cultural nihilism,”
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counterintuitively asserts that Bellow’s ego-swollen, Whitmanic heroes are “forced to discard
individuality” in their search for “brotherhood and community” (3-4).
In 1976, Bellow received the Nobel Prize in Literature. While the Nobel Committee
praised Bellow for creating “antiheroes” who try “to find a foothold during [their] wanderings in
a tottering world” (qtd. in Field 4), critics of the 80s and 90s emphasized his cynicism and
pessimism. A streak of gloomy, heavy-hearted novels—Mr. Sammler’s Planet (1970), The
Dean’s December (1982), and More Die of Heartbreak (1987)—goaded critics into reassessing
what Tanner had labeled Bellow’s “brave optimism in the teeth of all negations” (5). In Saul
Bellow and the Decline in Humanism (1990), Michael K. Glenday argues that the “honest
confrontation” with “American darkness” which characterizes Bellow’s finest work includes a
“rejection of the humanist ethic” (11). Similarly, Jonathan Wilson’s On Bellow’s Planet:
Readings from the Dark Side (1985) repudiates the critical commonplace that Bellow’s work is
“life-affirming” by tracing a vein of pessimism back to his earliest fiction (Schulz 119). These
arguments are merely minor-key variations of previous Bellow scholarship; as early as 1968,
Clayton insists that Bellow’s humanist “affirmation hides negation and despair” (26). Presenting
that despair as a primary characteristic of Bellow’s art is ultimately unsatisfying. Once again
scholarship forcibly hardens conflicts that Bellow leaves unset in their molds. What’s more, the
scholarly efforts to explain Bellow’s philosophy rarely distinguish between Bellow and his
heroes, an absence that effectively robs Bellow’s world of irony.17
A more flexible understanding of Bellow’s fiction, narrators, and ideological positions
emerges under the auspices of post-structuralist theory. In A Room of His Own: In Search of the
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Feminine in the Novels of Saul Bellow (2001), Gloria L. Cronin considers how Bellow’s texts,
though “often perpetrators of misogynistic stereotypes…can also be suspicious, analytic
deconstructors of them” (1). Cronin’s argument rests on the belief that Bellow’s apparently
“monologic texts” are, in fact, dialogic: ironic, self-questioning, even self-sabotaging (8).18 The
scholarly tradition which uncritically accepts Bellow as “an antimodernist who romantically,
even archaically clings to notions of soul, transcendence, and a belief in the universality of the
Western humanist Self” misses his novels’ engagement with “split subjectivity, cultural
locatedness, gender, and issues of difference” (1). While Bellow’s problematic representations of
women are outside the scope of this project, I am interested in exploring the particularity and
cultural locatedness of Bellow’s idiosyncratic Jewish sensibilities.
Do I wish to coax a fresh reading out of Bellow’s novels by substituting Bellow-as-Jew
for Bellow-as-Western-man—an act of theoretical castling, a swapping of king and rook? No.
On the contrary, I am drawn to the specificity of Bellow’s mosaic Jewishness. In a 1984 speech,
Bellow writes:
I never felt it necessary to sacrifice one identification for another. I’ve never had to say
that I was not a Canadian. I never had to say I was not Jewish. I never had to say I was
not an American. I took all these things for granted and in me you see a sort of virtuoso
act of integration of all these diverse elements and I feel no particular conflict…I think a
human being has to be faithful to his unique history. If that history is mixed, scrambled,
anomalous, difficult for any outsider less exotic to put together for himself, that’s not my
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fault…I was faithful to what I was. I lived that way and I tried to write that way. (qtd. in
To Fame and Fortune 69)
Bellow’s professed responsibility to remain “faithful to [his] unique history” explains his welldocumented resentment towards being ghettoized as a Jewish-American writer.19 Worldhistorical circumstances complicate Bellow’s Jewishness even further. I am referring not only to
the destruction of European Jewry and the establishment of the state of Israel, but to
contemporaneous (and not unrelated) changes in American Jewry’s racial self-identification. As
Eric L. Goldstein writes in The Price of Whiteness: Jews, Race, and American Identity (2006),
the postwar years saw a “growing American consensus” among both Jews and non-Jews that the
country’s “only true racial distinctions were those based in color” (203).20 Put another way: born
a Jew, Bellow died a white man.
Bellow insisted that questions about his “proportions”—the ratio of his Jewishness to his
Americanness—were unimportant. “That’s for others to determine with their measuring sticks,”
he said, displaying his characteristic disdain for the critical enterprise, “I have no sticks myself”
(qtd. in Siegel 49). Well, I have no sticks either, nor a ruler or even a tailor’s tape. I am armed
only with books and a curiosity about what it means to write from a personal history that is, in
Bellow’s words, “mixed, scrambled, [and] anomalous.” My goal is to consider Bellow and Roth
in terms of a fluid, variegated, and idiosyncratic Jewishness.
My interest in Roth’s exogamous fathers and Bellow’s proud Jewish limpers bears some
resemblance to recent meta-critiques of the study of Jewish American literature. In The
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Impossible Jew: Identity and the Reconstruction of Jewish American Literary History (2015),
Benjamin Schreier argues that Jewish American literary studies have become “overdetermined,”
too fixed on matters of “religion, nation, race, ethnicity, or culture” (qtd. in Sutherland 103).21
Schreier reserves a special skepticism about the field’s apparent attachment to a “biological
nationalism” which runs counter to recent theoretical developments about the mutability of
identity (Schreier 96). Studies of Jewish American literature, he suggests, should hypothesize
about alternative “model[s] of identification” (Schreier 157). My own project is a partial, perhaps
equivocal contribution to this work. While I understand Schreier’s exhaustion with Jewish
identities rooted in biology (that is, rooted in race)—here Schreier approaches Valley’s argument
in “Diaspora Boy”—I am not ready to cast off a consideration of the Jewish body. Disturbed as I
am by theories of the Jew’s racial difference—disturbed and, as I write this, tired, so very tired—
I can’t avoid the historical significance of these ideas. Nor can I deny the salutary, restorative
images of Jewish-American identity that follow from Bellow’s and Roth’s cheeky, iconoclastic
exploration of the stereotypes of the Jewish body and the significance of postwar intermarriage.
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Chapter 1: Saul Bellow, Somatological Moralist
Prisoners of Perception
In “Rereading Saul Bellow,” Philip Roth describes his literary idol’s “impossible
undertaking” as “the struggle not only to infuse fiction with the mind but to make mentalness
itself central to the hero’s dilemma—to think, in books like Herzog, about the problem of
thinking” (Why Write? 299).22 Bellow’s first bestseller, Herzog (1964) was an unlikely avenue to
fame and fortune. The novel’s subject and its driving force is the mind of its protagonist, Moses
Herzog, a washed-up intellectual reeling from marital betrayal and divorce. Herzog (character
and novel) employs a potentially “cracked” psyche to assess its own cracked-ness. A Jewish
Ouroboros—Ouroborowitz?—Moses dines on his tail’s split ends and resigns himself to his
mental vicissitudes: “If I’m out of my mind, it’s all right with me,” he declares in the novel’s
opening lines (417).
Out of his mind? Fine with Herzog. But out of shape? Less so. Better known for
interrogating his inner turmoil, as represented by the droll letters he writes to family, friends, and
historical personages, Moses also bristles at the damage his misfortune has wrought upon his
body.23 After all, “one corner of his mind remained open to the external world” (418). In
Bellow’s fiction, the problem of thinking involves ruminating about the body’s imperfections
and pains, what Roth calls its “radical vincibility” (Why Write? 303). The mirrors and reflections
which abound in Herzog’s early pages expose the cracks on his face and soul (“His face revealed
what a beating he had taken” [419]).24 A self-described “prisoner of perception” (488), Herzog
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connects his hair loss and his “terrible, caved-in” look to his suffering at the hands of his wife
Madeleine, who cuckolded him with his best friend, Valentine Gersbach (434). Each gaze into
the looking glass sends Herzog into an interpretive frenzy that confirms the physical side-effects
of his mental anguish.
The perceptual power that becomes a curse during Herzog’s misery is part and parcel of
Bellow’s aesthetic project. A “famed noticer,” Bellow stuffed his fiction “with things perfectly
seen,” writes Zachary Leader, author of the two-volume Life of Saul Bellow (To Fame and
Fortune 12). Similarly, critic James Wood marvels at Bellow’s propensity for “noticing, with
unexpected tenderness of vision, what we have grown accustomed to overlooking” (xv). Seeing
the familiar anew is an intellectual imperative for Bellow and his bookish heroes. In Mr.
Sammler’s Planet (1970), Polish-born historian and Holocaust survivor Artur Sammler describes
himself as “trained by the best writers to divert himself with perceptions.” Sammler’s “aesthetic
consumption” of his New York environs yields “delicate, even piercing observation,” but this
high-minded habit brings degrading consequences (34). Unable to mind his own business on an
uptown bus, Sammler spots a dapper pickpocket at work; when the thief sees Sammler noticing
him, he corners the old lookie-loo and forces him, as punishment, to behold his prodigious penis.
Here’s something you can look at, old man, the silent criminal seems to say. Or perhaps: Hey,
Mr. Aesthetics, consume this!
Most of Bellow’s fiction ignores the warning of Sammler’s pickpocket or Herzog’s
mirror: be careful where you look, and of what conclusions you draw from appearances. Though
Bellow’s work teems with meticulous descriptions of city streets, buildings, buses and trains
(modes of transportation are a particular object of fascination), machinery and construction sites,
his greatest gift is for representing the human form. Whether beautiful or homely, the Bellovian
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body is alluringly imperfect. Its oddities swell with meaning. Bellow’s “universe is physical,”
writes critic David Mikics in Bellow’s People (2016), a study of the real-life figures Bellow
transformed into fiction; his characters “are their bodies and their faces, and their souls shine
through their flesh” (12). The “metaphysics” of Bellow’s portraiture, Wood argues, rests on the
correspondence of physical form and inner being. Bodies are “confessions,” and Bellow’s
characters “have the bodies they deserve” (Wood xv). In a 1990 interview, Bellow describes his
innate sense that the body speaks a discernible language. Even as a “very small child,” Bellow
recalls, “the look of [people] and their gestures...spoke to me. That is, a nose was also a speaking
member, and so were a pair of eyes. And so was the way your hair grew and the set of your ears,
the condition of your teeth, the emanations of the body” (qtd. in To Fame and Fortune 59). The
novelist’s distinctive style of literary portraiture grew from this child’s intuition.
The naive musings of little Schloimke (as Bellow’s family called him in his infancy)
reproduced the ancient practice of physiognomy. Narrowly defined as “the study of facial traits
and their relationship to character” (Pearl 1), physiognomy has been variously applied to
philosophy, medicine, divination, psychology, and the arts. Its earliest texts are attributed, likely
in error, to Aristotle (Gray xviii), though physiognomic ideas are identifiable in the works of
Pythagoras and Hippocrates (Tytler 36). Writing in 1588, Michel de Montaigne finds
justification for the “conformity and relation of the body to the spirit” in Socrates, Plato, and
Cicero, and concludes that “we cannot go wrong by following Nature” (810-1). Historians
consider the father of modern physiognomy to be the Swiss theologian Johann Kaspar Lavater,
whose Physiognomische Fragmente (1775-8) sought to elevate physiognomy from its occult
status (akin to palm-reading or dream-interpretation) to a “strictly positive and empirical
science” (Gray xix). Lavater’s physiognomic theories “commandeer[ed] the fantasies” of post-
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Enlightenment Germany’s “most prominent thinkers” (xix) and shaped the conventions of
literary portraiture associated with nineteenth-century novelists such as Dickens, Zola, and
Tolstoy (Tytler xvi, 4). When Bellow describes the Russian master as a “somatological moralist”
in a 1966 letter, he is referring to Tolstoy’s use of physiognomy in constructing character (qtd. in
To Fame and Fortune 681n21).
Over the past century, physiognomy’s appeal has waned as a literary tool and a way of
interpreting other people. Writing in 1982, Graeme Tytler takes for granted a “marked
diminution of interest in the outward man” in twentieth-century fiction (xvi). Similarly, novelist
Charles Baxter argues in a 2003 essay, “Loss of Face,” that the literary description of faces has
“fallen off the shelf”; contemporary writers seem to be “post-face.” Though Baxter concedes that
“in ordinary life people continue to scan the faces of others as much as they ever did,” he argues
that the history of racism has “invalidated” physiognomy as an “epistemological project.” After
World War II and the Civil Rights Movement, who in their right mind would want to draw moral
conclusions about a person’s character from the shape of their nose, texture of their hair, or color
of their skin? In About Faces: Physiognomy in Nineteenth-Century Britain (2010), Sharonna
Pearl identifies a “pattern of physiognomic objectification,” wherein “those with great social
power” use the tools of physiognomy “as a form of belittlement and dehumanization” (10). The
trajectory of English face-reading in the nineteenth century begins as a “technology used to make
decisions about individual others” before devolving into a “way to talk about groups rather than
individuals, and to paint communities in broad strokes rather than specific detail” (2). In his
study of German physiognomy from Lavater to the Final Solution, Richard T. Gray notes the
same trend: Nazi racial theorists replaced the Swiss theologian’s interest in interpreting
individual faces with a systematic method for identifying the characteristics of impure “races” or
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“peoples” (240). By encouraging its citizens to participate in “physiognomic spectatorship,”
Gray argues, the Nazi government created a “community of self-policing...subjects able to stylize
itself as the ‘master race’” (xxiii).
Given this unseemly history, why does physiognomic thought play such an active part in
Bellow’s literary imagination, especially his construction of character? Leader’s biographical
explanation only explains so much, ignoring what Baxter identifies as the “predatory” quality of
Bellow’s “gaze.” What’s to be made of the fact that Bellow employs a way of seeing that had
within his lifetime been used to identify and destroy European Jewry? “A nose was also a
speaking member,” Bellow said, but did he recognize whose company he kept as an interpreter
of nose-talk? The nose, of course, has a long history as a signifier of Jewish difference; so,
argues cultural historian Sander Gilman, does the Jew’s speech, which the Germans called
mauscheln—a word whose connotations include speaking like a Jew, speaking in a Yiddish
accent, speaking in a nasal voice, speaking like a mouse, haggling, and swindling (Franz Kafka
31).
Of the critics who discuss Bellow’s use of literary portraiture, none connect this to his
work’s engagement with the events of recent Jewish history—an odd omission, considering
nearly all of Bellow’s protagonists are Jews, and most from Herzog-onward share Bellow’s
belief that “a Jew should take a deep interest in the history of the Jews” (Ravelstein 771). That
fraught history includes both physical and discursive assaults upon the Jewish body—the latter
through stereotypes of the Jewish body’s inherent inferiority and debility—both of which Bellow
draws from when molding his characteristically pained protagonists.
This is not to say that Bellow’s portraits stem from Jewish self-hatred. On the contrary,
his characters often possess bodies that break from a conventional understanding of
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physiognomy, in which physical beauty reveals virtue and ugliness, vice. Though Bellow
occasionally lets slip a quotidian mind-body connection—in A Theft (1989), Clara Verde has a
large head because “a mind like hers demanded space” (Collected Stories 117)—his most
memorable body-portraits are more idiosyncratic.25 Such is the case for Victor Wulpy of “What
Kind of Day Did You Have?” (1984), a monumental art critic, swollen with big ideas, whose
physical “oddities...had power”: “[e]ven the way he gimped was formidable, not as if he were
dragging his leg but as if he were kicking things out of his way” (306). I’ve long wondered at the
strength and determination Wulpy seems to acquire from (not in spite of) his ailment. Years ago,
when I raised this issue to the late Morris Dickstein, he assured me the virility in Wulpy’s limp
was mere verisimilitude. Bellow had modeled Wulpy on Harold Rosenberg, who walked that
way.26
While Bellow regularly based his characters on real-life figures who recognized
themselves in his pages, this fails to account fully for the emphasis Bellow places on physical
“oddities” as an expression of his characters’ spirits—often, of their distinctly Jewish spirits.
Critics agree that Bellow’s portraits transcend mimesis. Wood interprets Bellow’s “exuberant
physical sketches” as an invitation to “partake in a creative joy,” to enter the “realm of play” and
“the surreal” (xiv).27 In short, Bellow’s “swift creation of instant gargoyles” is an expression of
his comic talents (xiii). If Wood’s evocation of “gargoyles” is too strong—and Leader, who finds
in Bellow’s novels “characters who balloon into Dickensian or Balzacian monstrosity” (To Fame
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and Fortune 61), might argue that it isn’t—he correctly identifies the moral foundation of
Bellow’s comedy. I am not referring to Wood’s contention that Bellow’s characters’ “bodies are
their confessions,” which presupposes their guilt, but rather the following justification of
Bellow’s aesthetics: “Physical detail, exactly rendered, is memory’s quarry and makes its own
moral case” (xv). Bellow’s intense, bodily specificity is more than comic shorthand. The
meticulous representation of the body, in particular the extraordinary or aberrant body,
emphasizes that body’s connection to history (“memory’s quarry”)—that is the ethics of
Bellow’s so-called gargoyles.
Yet Bellow’s early novels demonstrate a palpable ambivalence about the physiognomic
gaze which becomes a hallmark of his mature work. In the following pages, I will track the
trajectory of Bellow’s use of physiognomy, beginning with his sophomore novel, The Victim
(1947), and ending with his 1989 novella, The Bellarosa Connection. These texts serve as
bookends to Bellow’s engagement with antisemitism, the Holocaust, and the representation of
the Jewish body.28 In The Victim, a novel about a Jew’s troubling encounter with a vengeful
antisemite, Bellow’s idea-driven exploration into Jew-hatred is eclipsed by dramas within the
writer himself: his ambivalence about representing the Jewish body (in a novel that otherwise
employs a consistently racialized gaze) and his own doubts, as a son of Jewish immigrants, about
his American literary credentials. Adventures of Augie March (1953) opens the period in which
Bellow casts off anxieties about his own authorial fitness and unselfconsciously employs
physiognomic tools in his construction of character—developments which, I argue, are related.
In the second section of this chapter, I explain how the novels after Herzog constitute a thorough
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revision of Bellow’s earlier ambivalence about representing the Jewish body. By the time he
writes Mr. Sammler’s Planet (1970) and the late novella The Bellarosa Connection, Bellow
comfortably addresses, even toys with, stereotypical images of the Jewish body—that maligned,
caricatured, and mass-murdered form—so that he may offer alternate theories about the Jewish
body’s significance and its connection to historical memory.

Antisemitism, Jewish visibility, and the racial gaze in The Victim
The Victim is a summer nightmare, a tale of two men yoked together by hatred, guilt, and
penance. On a day of unbearable heat, Asa Leventhal, a low-level editor of a trade magazine,
waits in line for a water fountain when he is accosted by a former acquaintance, Kirby Albee.
Bitter, haggard, stinking from drink, Albee demands that Leventhal pull him out of the gutter—
take him in, lend him a few dollars, find him work. Flabbergasted, Leventhal denies any
responsibility toward this man whom he barely recognizes. Then Albee details the elaborate,
paranoid scheme by which Leventhal ruined his life. Years earlier, before their fortunes were
reversed, Albee had arranged for Leventhal, then thin-heeled and struggling, to interview with
his employer. Leventhal deliberately botched the meeting, tarnishing Albee’s reputation. Why
would Leventhal do such a thing? Because, Albee explains, “You were sore at something I said
about Jews” (170).
Bellow’s short, tense sophomore novel was published on November 6, 1947, two years
after the defeat of the Axis powers and the liberation of Auschwitz and Buchenwald. Despite this
context, despite the novel’s sustained engagement with antisemitism, the Holocaust remains a
muted presence in The Victim. Leventhal alludes to the genocide but once, as retort to Albee’s
suggestion that money-obsessed Jews know nothing of emotional anguish: “Millions of us have
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been killed. What about that?” (261).29 Scholar Victoria Aarons interprets this absence as
symptomatic of the “failure” of Bellow’s generation of intellectuals to “lay claim to the burden
of moral testimony” during the postwar years, an argument Bellow would make as an older man
(56).30 The Holocaust, Aarons argues, is a “specter” that infiltrates Leventhal’s psyche through
the “noise and confusion of Bellow’s urban landscape”: a crowded, infernal New York of
smokestacks, foreboding clouds, and the menacing din of subway trains. In this reading, the fact
of the Holocaust, and of Leventhal’s inability to reckon with it, becomes the source of his browbeaten susceptibility to Albee’s hectoring (58). With this clever bit of prestidigitation, Aarons
coerces the Holocaust, that vanished rabbit, to reappear within The Victim.
But it would be a mistake to suggest that Albee stands in for Nazism. Nothing in the
novel identifies Albee’s antisemitism as a recent German import. On the contrary: Albee styles
himself a true American, one of the “old breeds,” and counts Governor John Winthrop as an
ancestor (259). His Jew-hatred is native-born, a reaction to decades of unprecedented
immigration that swiftly altered America’s demographic make-up. “When I was born, when I
was a boy, everything was different,” he recalls (259), though in fact Eastern European Jews
began their mass migration in the early 1880s, when the assassination of Russian Czar Alexander
II ignited a spate of bloody pogroms.31 Between 1881 and 1925, 2.5 million Jews had fled
Eastern Europe for American shores (Diner 88). By 1930, as many as 4.4 million Jews called
America home—a staggering growth, considering the first official US census, taken in 1877,
counted only 250,000 Jews (Sarna 375, 61). By 1915, the year of Bellow’s birth, one in four
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New Yorkers was Jewish (Goldstein 36). Nor were Jews the only new arrivals; “you’re just one
out of many,” Albee tells Leventhal (259). Between 1890 and 1920 some 18.2 million
immigrants, mainly southern and eastern Europeans, reached America (Archdeacon 113). “The
old breeds are out,” Albee laments, referring to the well-bred, blue-blooded Americans like
himself who have become “remnants” in America’s cities (259).
Albee’s complaint reproduces the arguments of Progressive Era nativists who shaped
American immigration policy and racial ideology in the early 20th century. Convinced that this
new wave of immigrants—mostly poor, many Jewish or Catholic—would irrevocably damage
the health and constitution of the Protestant nation, Congress passed the Johnson-Reed Act of
1924, which slowed immigration to a trickle. Proponents of closing America’s doors drew from
nascent sciences, buttressing their fear and hatred with the illusion of objectivity.32 In a 1901
speech delivered to the American Academy of Political and Social Science, sociologist and
eugenics advocate Edward Alsworth Ross warns that unfettered migration will bring about a
“race suicide” (“Causes of Race Superiority” 88). Using the tools of social science, Ross
demonstrates that the admission of the “lower races” into American borders is a multigenerational threat (85). Unlike native-born Americans, whose comparatively low birth-rates
reflect their “exacting standard of decency” (87), the “masses of beaten but fecund humanity
from the hovels of far Lombardy and Galicia”—Italians and Jews—who crowd American cities
continue to “multipl[y] on a lower plane” (89, 87). In a 1913 essay, Ross compares the
immigrant’s birth-rate to the “blind fecundity that characterizes the animal” (“Menace of
Migrating Peoples” 134). Mere weeks before the passage of the Immigration Act of 1924, Ross
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restates his concern: “Realizing immigration has brought us much chaff, we are putting up the
bars. But what of those already here?” (Ross and Baber 504). The problem remains that
America’s “superior strains” (Albee’s “old breeds”) cannot replace themselves at the rate of “the
pinheads and oafs” (504). Time had hardened Ross’s language and his certainty of the
immigrant’s inherent inferiority.
What permits Ross and Albee to claim superiority over America’s Leventhals is a protoHitlerian belief that they are descendants of the Nordics, a mythical race of northern European
supermen. Remarkable for his tall stature, fair hair, and light eyes as much as his industriousness
and bravery—conquering barbarian hordes requires a strong constitution—the Nordic man is
“the white man par excellence,” writes Madison Grant in The Passing of the Great Race, his
1916 work of racial anthropology (167). A lawyer by training, Grant emerged as America’s
“prophet of scientific racism,” and his book became a source-text for American anti-immigration
advocates and Nazi racial theorists (Spiro xii).33 Drawing from early (now debunked) works of
physical anthropology, Grant argues that a rigid, scientifically-verifiable racial hierarchy
separates men into distinct “subspecies,” each identifiable by ineluctable physical and
psychological characteristics (15).34 The Nordics—whom the Nazis rebrand as Aryan—stand
atop this hierarchy as a “a race of soldiers, sailors, adventurers and explorers, but above all, of
rulers, organizers and aristocrats” (228). They are the “master race” (87), responsible for
civilization’s greatest achievements, including the founding of the American republic (Spiro
150).35 The lesser European races that, to Grant’s chagrin, have been permitted to sully
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American shores over the preceding decades are the Mediterranean and the Alpine. The former,
who originates in southern Europe, is smaller and weaker than the Nordic, with dark features and
“swarthy” skin (Grant 20); he is artistically-inclined and creative, but prone to lassitude (229).
The latter, from eastern Europe, is a race of short, stocky, dark-haired people (21), natural
“peasants” who are “submissive to authority” (227). Below the Mediterranean and the Alpine are
the non-European races, which Grant characterizes as barbarous, atavistic, and quasi-human:
Blacks (“Negroes”), Asians (“Asiatics”), and Jews.These races exist as little more than
boogeymen; they threaten to destroy the social peace that Grant believes impossible in the
absence of racial homogeneity.36
Bellow never directly references Grant in The Victim, but he almost certainly encountered
Grantian ideas and their counter-arguments while studying anthropology at Northwestern
University under the tutelage of Melville J. Herskovitz. A child of Jewish immigrants,
Herskovitz was an authority on “the relations between African culture and African American
culture” and “the interrelationship of cultures in general” (To Fame and Fortune 159).
Herskovitz was a disciple of the German-Jewish anthropologist Franz Boas, a vociferous critic of
Grant, eugenics, and anthropology based in racial hierarchies (Spiro 297-8).37 In the face of
Grant’s insistence that the perpetuity of inherited racial characteristics was the “primary law of
nature” (Grant 90), Boas’s work demonstrated that all “races adapt themselves in their
physiological and mental functioning to the demands of the environment” (Boas 507). Boas

36

“Where two distinct species are located side by side history and biology teach that but one of two things can
happen; either one race drives the other out, as the Americans exterminated the Indians and as the Negroes are now
replacing whites in various parts of the South; or else they amalgamate and form a population of race bastards in
which the lower type ultimately predominates” (Grant 77).
37
For a biographical study of Boas, see Claudia Pierpont Roth’s 2004 New Yorker profile, “The Measure of
America.”

33
argued that Grant was a “charlatan,” his work wholly unscientific (qtd. in Spiro 298).38 It’s hard
to imagine that Herskovitz excluded this aspect of his mentor’s legacy when he taught a course
titled “The Races of Man,” which Bellow took in his senior year (To Fame and Fortune 195).
Bellow must have gotten an education in what Boas called “this Nordic nonsense” (502).
In The Victim, Bellow’s mournful drunkard repeatedly demonstrates an affinity for
Grantian ideas. An heir of Governor Winthrop, Albee wistfully explains to Leventhal that he had
grown up “on the assumption that I came out of the lords of the earth”—a remark steeped in
Nordic nonsense (Victim 329). Albee’s doleful admission that “[t]he world has changed hands”
confirms his belief that Grant’s great race has passed (329). And who has taken its place? Albee
expresses his contempt for the immigrant’s hideous barbarism with allusions to Shakespeare’s
The Tempest. He implores Leventhal:
[T]ry to imagine how New York affects me...It’s really as if the children of Caliban were
running everything. You go down in the subway and Caliban gives you two nickels for
your dime. You go home and he has a candy store in the street where you were born.
(259)
The “freckled whelp” of the witch Sycorax (1.2.285), Caliban is a grunting brute before the
wizard Prospero arrives on his island and takes “pains to make [him] speak” (1.2.357). Endowed
with language, Caliban nonetheless remains a creature of his “vile race” (1.2.361), vengeful and
murderous. To well-bred Albee, Leventhal and his ilk are the offspring of this deformed creature,
“half a fish and half a monster” (3.2.26). On Prospero’s island, Caliban tries but fails to “violate”
the wizard’s daughter Miranda (1.2.350), and thereby fill “this isle with Calibans” (1.2.354). But
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on Manhattan Island, Albee suggests, Caliban has succeeded. The signs of this grotesque victory
are on Leventhal’s face: “you look like Caliban,” Albee tells his nemesis (259).
The Jewish interloper who slithers into American life is a kind of monster, his frightful
ugliness a warning of his vileness, barbarism, and moral turpitude. Albee’s physiognomic logic
reveals his deep sympathies with Grant, whose racial ideology rests on the conviction that an
individual’s outward appearance reveals his racial ancestry and, by extension, his intellectual and
moral capacity. “The great lesson of the science of race,” writes Grant in the introduction to
Passing, “is the immutability of somatological or bodily characters, with which is closely
associated the immutability of psychical predispositions and impulses” (xix). Grant’s sentence
strains under the double weight of “immutability,” an ungainly expression of his vision’s ruthless
determinism. For Grant and Albee, heredity alone determines character. Neither “environment”
nor “education” nor “opportunity” can alter a lowly racial profile (16). Sentimental Americans
who play at being Prospero are doomed, like Shakespeare’s wizard, to find their beastly charges
unreformed. Contradicting Boas, Grant asserts that the children of immigrants do not become
American (17); instead, Americans start to look and act like Caliban.39 Thus, Grant warns
American readers that “Polish Jew[’s]...dwarf stature, peculiar mentality and ruthless
concentration on self-interest are being grafted upon the stock of the nation” (16).40 Tellingly,
Grant’s anxieties over the Jewish body, mind, and character come together in a cacophony of
aspersions.
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Working in this nativist tradition, Albee participates in what Richard T. Gray calls
“physiognomic spectatorship” (xxiii), and thereby adds to The Victim’s claustrophobic
atmosphere. His scrutinizing eye becomes as oppressive to Leventhal and as unavoidable as the
summer heat. (Leventhal constantly feels he is being watched; Albee manifests almost
supernaturally.) What does Albee see when his gaze falls on Leventhal? Simply put: a Jew, a
foreigner. Having wrangled his way into Leventhal’s apartment, Albee sees a photograph of
Leventhal’s wife and launches into a flurry of speculations over the couple’s origins:
“Is [your wife] first-generation?” [asks Albee.]
“Her mother is native-born, too. Further back than that I don’t know.”
“I’m willing to bet they came from Eastern Europe, originally,” said Albee.
“Why, that’s not so stupendous. You wouldn’t get any takers.”
“I know I wouldn’t get any takers in your case.” (201)
The reason Albee wouldn’t find a gambler for his phantom bet is that Leventhal’s origins are
“apparent enough” to an experienced eye: “Russia, Poland....I can see at a glance” (201, my
emphasis). Albee’s language emphasizes the role vision plays in his assessment of Leventhal;
sight is the physiognomist’s primary sense, the tool the attentive antisemite uses to out the Jew
passing as American. Leventhal naively assumes that Albee had done research, but Leventhal’s
background doesn’t “need any investigating.” Living in New York as long as Albee has, “a
person would have to be a pretty sloppy observer not to learn a lot about Jews,” he explains. In
matters of racial observation, Albee is as shrewd as they come (201).
Let’s consider the face that Albee judges. Bellow introduces his hero’s physiognomy
thus: “Leventhal’s figure was burly, his head large; his nose, too, was large” (153). Albee has not
yet entered the novel, but Leventhal has already overheard his first antisemitic remark. Forced to
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leave work for a family emergency, Leventhal catches his boss muttering that “his brethren” take
“unfair advantage” and “always please themselves first” (147). Does this early instance of Jewhatred explain the hesitancy with which Bellow admits the size of his hero’s nose? The same
passage describes Leventhal’s “coarse waves” of “black hair,” another marker of his deviation
from Nordic beauty (153). Late in the novel, a fair-haired Albee drunkenly subjects Leventhal’s
hair to his physiognomic scrutiny. He marvels at its texture, wonders whether it “break[s] the
teeth of combs.” “It’s like an animal’s hair,” Albee proclaims, having touched it over
Leventhal’s protestations (323). In a Grantian flourish, Albee speculates that Leventhal “must
have a terrific constitution”—thereby evoking the physiognomist’s belief in the unity of body
and spirit and the racial anthropologist’s belief that the so-called ancient races are closely
connected to beasts. But should that make Leventhal resemble Caliban, that “freckled whelp”?
Albee’s head-inspection of Leventhal anticipates a similar, more famous moment from
James Baldwin’s 1953 essay, “Stranger in the Village.” Baldwin describes traveling to a remote
Swiss village where, for the first time in his life, he lives “among people...who had never seen a
Negro” (163). There he becomes a begrudging object of fascination as villagers, both adult and
child, venture to touch his skin, “astonished that the color [does] not rub off,” or compare his
hair’s color to tar, its texture to wire, cotton, and wool. The suggestion that Baldwin might grow
his hair long and “make [himself] a winter coat” comes closest to Albee’s remarks on Leventhal
(273), for it implies that Baldwin’s hair is woolly, sheep-like. Baldwin, like Leventhal, seems to
possess animalistic traits. There is a continuum, Baldwin realizes, between the villagers’
“astonishment” over his physiognomy and the American slave-owner’s conviction that “black
men were not really men but cattle” (166, 172). The behavior of the villagers offers “no
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suggestion that I was a human: I was simply a living wonder”—an animal with the face of a
man, a beast with language (166).
That Leventhal and Baldwin share this experience of dehumanization is no coincidence.
Each represents an other against which white Christian tradition defines itself (Goldstein 16). As
historian Tudor Partiff demonstrates in Hybrid Hate (2020), antisemites and anti-Black racists
have for centuries conflated the objects of their hatred. For the nineteenth-century racialists who
inspired Grant and the American nativists, this “hybrid hate” manifested through arguments that
the “despised blood of the negro flowed freely in the veins of Jews” and that the Jew possessed
black “or, at least, ‘swarthy’” skin (Partiff 166, The Jew’s Body 171). Grantian precursor Robert
Knox, a Scottish physician, argued in 1850 that the “purest of the Jewish race” is a “dark tawny,
yellow-colored person with jet-black hair” (qtd. in Partiff 159). Arthur de Gobineau, the French
aristocrat whose Essay on the Inequality of Human Races (1853) introduced the myth of Aryan
superiority, believed that Jews had crossbred with Africans, leaving upon them the mark of
“African primitivism” (159).41 As late as 1910, the American theologian Dr. Arthur Talmage
Abernethy argued that the Jew, being a “descendant of the Negro,” remains “essentially a Negro
in habits, physical peculiarities and tendencies” (qtd. in 174). Within the framework of
nineteenth and early-twentieth century racial science, Gilman writes, the Jew had “crossed racial
boundaries,” and that “impurity [was] written on their physiognomy” (The Jew’s Body 174).
Bellow, the former anthropology student, incorporates these ideas into Leventhal’s
physiognomy and Albee’s booze-addled Jew-baiting. Leventhal possesses “dark skin” and, more
pointedly, a “swarthy face” (262, 222). The Jew’s swarthiness exposes him as part of a “mongrel
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race,” writes Houston Stewart Chamberlain (qtd in. The Jew’s Body 171). Thus, in Albee’s eyes,
Leventhal resembles Caliban, Shakespeare’s “freckled whelp.” He is a dark-skinned animal, a
disastrous mixture who, like the spawn of Sycorax (“half a fish half a monster”), “could not be
considered fully human” (Partiff 174).42 Another tradition deems the Jew “Asiatic” or
“Oriental”—ambiguous terms that refer alternately to Asia, Egypt, the Middle East, and Eastern
Europe itself. Knox, for example, writes that the Jew is “African and Asiatic” (qtd. in Partiff
159). Similarly, Grant refers to Eastern Europeans (Jews, presumably) as “half-Asiatic
mongrels” (qtd. in Okrent 208).43 Following this tradition, Albee describes Leventhal’s wife as
“positively Asiatic.” “Look at the eyes, and those cheekbones,” says the amateur physiognomist,
ever attentive to the alien particularities of the Jewish face. “You’re married to a woman and
don’t know she has slant eyes?” (200). Leventhal scoffs, yet Albee may have unknowingly
touched an Ashkenazi nerve. For the German Jews who emigrated to America in smaller
numbers beginning in the 1840s, Russian and Polish Jews like Leventhal (or Bellow) were
uncultured, impoverished, dogmatically religious, and, finally, embarrassing. Fearful of the
attention this flow of migration might attract, the more well-established German Jews dismissed
their Eastern European brethren as “uncouth Asiatics” (qtd in. Okrent 77).44
The Jew becomes linked to Africans and “Asiatics” through an act of “likening” that
historian Matthew Frye Jacobson identifies as characteristic of the “cognitive work of racial
perception” (173). The equivalence reinforces each group’s exclusion from whiteness. By
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rendering the Jew more alien—by revising how he sees the Jew—the American nativist confirms
his own suspicions about the Jew’s essential foreignness to American life. Albee performs this
cognitive work when he compares the arrival of late-comers like Leventhal to “a sort of Egyptian
darkness” (259). Albee’s “darkness” is akin to the “racial abyss” that Grant warns will be the
inevitable result of the American melting pot (Grant 263). Of course, the “darkness” also hints at
the swarthiness, the impure racial mixture, of the so-called new immigrants. Albee’s
symptomatic misreading of the ninth plague (Exodus 10:21-29) reveals more: “Moses,” he says,
“punished the Egyptians with darkness” (259). In fact, Exodus 10:21 reads, “And then the Lord
said to Moses, stretch out your hand to the sky so that darkness will spread over Egypt.” By
implicating Moses, leader of the Hebrews, and not an instructing God, Albee suggests that
twentieth-century immigration is a particularly Jewish scourge, one concocted to extinguish the
American “daylight”—the light of civilization, of tradition, of whiteness—that Albee and his ilk
had taken for granted (259).
Albee evokes his anxieties about immigration through repeated references to sight,
vision, and the eye. He practices a physiognomic epistemology, a tendency he shares, somewhat
ironically, with the mature Bellow. In this early novel, however, Bellow distances himself from
his own physiognomic impulses. The mouthpiece of body-knowledge is the drunken antisemite,
an irony that isn’t lost on Albee. “I’m a fine one to be talking about tradition, you must be
saying,” admits Albee after wrapping up his diatribe on darkness (259). If Albee’s stodgy ideas
about tradition are laughable (Leventhal: “I see how it is; you’re actually an aristocrat”), Bellow
nonetheless shares some of Albee’s concerns, though not his perspective, on the Jew’s visibility
in America.
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What’s at stake in The Victim—for Leventhal and Bellow as much as Albee—is what
Jacobson calls “Jewish visibility” (173). This is not merely a question of somatic characteristics,
but of the socio-political circumstances that encourage the racializing gaze that Albee practices.
The story of visible Jewishness is the transformation of “social value” into “perception.”
Jacobson writes:
[S]ocial and political meanings attached to Jewishness generate a kind of physiognomic
surveillance that renders Jewishness itself discernible as a pattern of physical traits (skin
color, nose shape, hair color and texture, and the like)...The visible marker may then be
interpreted as outer signs of an essential, immutable, inner moral-intellectual character;
and that character, in its turn—attested to by physical “difference”—is summoned up to
explain the social value attached to Jewishness in the first place. The circuit is
ineluctable. (174)
Grant’s racialist pseudoscience and Albee’s vision of Egyptian darkness follow this circular
trajectory. Similarly, Jacobson’s framework explains why the idea of “looking Jewish” —
possessing a set of recognizably Jewish features—is not transferable across historical periods.
For example, art historian Sara Lipton argues that the “Jewish face, characterized by a bony
hooked nose and a pointed beard” only enters Western Christian art in the mid-thirteenth
century. Before the emergence of these somatic signifiers, artists identified Jews by a hat and
beard—accoutrements rather than facial characteristics (Lipton 173). Similarly, Parfitt notes that
medieval Jews were forced to wear identifying yellow stars precisely because they were
otherwise indistinguishable from their Christian neighbors (222). Sander Gilman, ever attentive
to the “stereotype’s peculiar power to accommodate antitheses,” delights in locating the
contradictions within an age’s (or writer’s) image of the Jew—for example, that nineteenth-

41
century science believed Jews to be both “immune to and defined by tuberculosis” (Franz Kafka
59). This dense history of revisions and contradictions reveals that it is ultimately futile to
suggest that the Jewish body is in any way immutable.
Nonetheless, a recognizably Jewish body entered the American imagination in the early
twentieth century. The mass emigration of eastern European Jews was, Jacobson suggests, the
precise socio-political context in which “physiognomic surveillance” thrives. According to
historian Leonard Dinnerstein, these years saw antisemitism, once the province of the country’s
elites, grow widespread; as the Jew grew more visible, his “image...deteriorated” (42).
Entertainment and popular media proved effective carriers of Jewish stereotypes. The vulgar
“Hebrew” emerged as a stock figure in theater, vaudeville, novels, and caricature (Jacobson 183;
Goldstein 35). The last is worth special consideration as a “coherent chapter in the history of the
country’s visual culture,” argues art historian Matthew Baigell (16).45 What American caricature
advances, writes Dinnerstein, is “the image of the Jew with an outlandish nose, hoarding his
gold, gesticulating wildly” (36). Baigell points out other physical characteristics typical of
cartoon Jews: poor hygiene (5), pot bellies (suggesting the rapaciousness of the overfed),
malformed legs and feet (the Jew is alternately pigeon-toed, bowlegged, or knock-kneed), and
defective, accented speech (21-22).46 Jewish women are “ostentatiously overdressed,” though
men also wear gaudy, sparkling diamonds and ornate jewelry (22). The cartoon Jews of midcentury American caricature bear a startling resemblance to their counterparts in the newspapers
and magazines of fin-de-siècle Germany, and serve the same instructive end: “to reduce all those
45
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in the line of attack to creatures not fully qualified to become decent responsible citizens of the
country” (Baigell 3).47
In his mature fiction, Bellow develops a means of representing the Jewish body that
shorts the “circuit”-like continuity of Jewish visibility. But the author of The Victim remains
blocked, squeamish about rendering Jews more visible through portraiture. An early scene in The
Victim dramatizes this ambivalent attitude, providing an alternative model of representing
Jewishness that Bellow eventually adopts. The moment in question is also the scene of Albee’s
original antisemitic barb, the reason, in his mind, that Leventhal took revenge.
Here is what sets The Victim’s plot in motion. Years before Albee approaches Leventhal
at the water fountain, when he is employed and Leventhal desperate for work, both men attend a
party hosted by a mutual acquaintance. Also present is Leventhal’s friend Dan Harkavy, another
Jew and a bit of a showman, prone to break out in song. Albee, drunkenly scrutinizing the party
guests, plays a familiar role: “[h]e might have been asked by Williston [the host] to classify [the
other guests], he eyed them so.” The social taxonomist unabashedly “fix[es] his look” on
Harkavy, who drifts through the party “seemingly unaware” (173). Leventhal, already wary of
Albee’s eye, admits that his friend “attracted stares,” a fact that he connects, with an element of
disapproval, to Harkavy’s Jewish excitability. Leventhal’s description of his friend’s behavior
implicitly compares their two models of behaving while in a non-Jew’s cross-hairs:
[Harkavy] liked to talk and at these parties he was easily kindled, for some reason. Any
trifle made him enthusiastic, and when he spoke his hands flew and his brows slanted up,
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sharpening the line of his nose. His eyes were light, round, and depthless, his fair hair
was fading back, the curls thinning. Albee studied him, grinning and curious; Harkavy
appeared to delight him...Harkavy may have noticed this. Leventhal had never asked him
about it, but perhaps it did light on his consciousness, for all his traits, Jewish and
otherwise, became accentuated. He carried on, giving imitations of auctioneers, in reality
burlesquing his father. Leventhal watched, unsmiling and even forbidding. The laughter
and the somewhat ambiguous applause, sometimes led by Albee, seemed to excite
Harkavy, and he would start again, working up the bid. (173-4, my emphasis)
Eccentricities of speech including accents, lisps, gesticulations, and excesses in volume or
emotion are signifiers of what Gilman calls “the hidden language of the Jews,” evidence of the
Jew’s physical and linguistic difference (Jew’s Body 20). Albee, a self-described expert in
recognizing Jewishness, knows how to decode this language. He knows, for example, that the
Jew “raises his voice beyond the fashionable key, in a language execrable to the ears of Englishspeaking people,” as suffragist Nina Morais, a Sephardic Jew from Philadelphia, summarizes the
stereotype of the Jew in the turn-of-the-century imagination (qtd. in Dinnerstein 41). On the
stigma of gesticulation, Gilman writes that fin-de-siècle anthropologists understood “gestural
language” as a “sign of the primitive state of a culture” (Jew’s Body 14). That Albee believes the
Jewish child of Caliban to be primitive is self-evident. Caliban also spoke a hidden language, his
own mauscheln: he could merely “gabble like / A thing most brutish” until Prospero “endowed
[his] purposes / With words that made them known” (1.2.359-361).
To Leventhal’s chagrin, Harkavy appears to accept, even embrace Albee’s scrutiny, as
the emphasized phrase suggests. Oddly enough, Harkavy’s physiognomy (“the line of his nose”)
grows more Jewish as his excitement mounts. Rather than shy away from the scrutiny of the
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racial gaze, he performs, parodying his immigrant father, a rare book dealer and the source of his
Jewish patrimony. Adopting the persona of the auctioneer is particularly bold, for Harkavy
thereby tempts the partygoers to entertain their worst suspicions about Jews, trade, and money.
(Albee, for one, assumes that Leventhal has tribal connections to banking.) What could be more
defiant than a Jew performing, for a gentile audience, the role of a Jewish trader, his excitement
hysterically blossoming at the thought of an increasingly hefty payday? Non-Jews already
assume, Morais writes, that the Jew’s “conversation rings upon the dollar” (qtd. in Dinnerstein
41); Harkavy’s auctioneer act bursts forth from his audience’s disapproving imagination. His
self-parody obliquely satirizes men like Albee, who fall for antisemitic myths.48
If Albee greedily searches for evidence of visible Jewishness, and Harkavy playfully
avoids its confines through performance, then Leventhal shies away from it. His description of
the Harkavy-Albee dynamic reveals a broad discomfort. He “resent[s]” the way Albee stares at
Harkavy, but questions why his friend grows so animated in front of an audience (“he was easily
kindled, for some reason,” “Any trifle made him enthusiastic”). When Harkavy breaks out his
auctioneer routine, Leventhal becomes “unsmiling and even forbidding” and identifies the other
guests’ applause as “ambiguous” (173). In the face of laughter and applause, Leventhal grows
“annoyed” (174)—but at what? Albee’s egging on of Harkavy, or Harkavy’s excited response?
Elsewhere in the novel, Leventhal tries to remain racially invisible, dodging antisemitic taunts
from Albee and his boss. When the latter remarks on Leventhal’s brother’s “mixed marriage,”
Bellow’s hero fumes internally (“Mixed marriage! It had come out instantaneously”), but says
nothing (181). He rarely meets Albee’s taunts with anything more than bland disapproval.

48

Defiant, ethnically specific self-parody is the literary mode Roth employs in Goodbye, Columbus and, to greater
effect, in Portnoy’s Complaint.
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While kibitzing with a group of Jewish friends and acquaintances, including Harkavy,
Leventhal suggests that engaging with antisemitism is a zero-sum game. The conversation turns
to world history, and when Harkavy asserts that English Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, born
a Jew, was “a credit to them and us”—the English and the Jews, respectively—Leventhal
disagrees on both counts. “He wasn’t an Englishman to the English,” says Leventhal, alluding to
Thomas Carlyle as evidence: “[W]ho said [Disraeli] was the monkey on John Bull’s chest?”
Leventhal also characterizes Disraeli’s political ambitions as an act of “spite” against his Jewish
visibility in England:
People laughed at his nose, so he took up boxing; they laughed at his poetic silk clothes,
so he put on black; and they laughed at his books, so he showed them. He got into politics
and became the prime minister. He did it all on nerve. (247)
Harkavy, the novel’s model for Jewish defiance, admires Disraeli, whose “nerve” recalls his
own. He scornfully dismisses Leventhal’s views as trying to “teach the world a lesson with
empty hands” (247). In fact, it’s unclear what Leventhal thinks is the appropriate response to
antisemitic scrutiny.
But in the matter of Harkavy’s party behavior, Leventhal gets worked up over the wrong
performance. What raises Albee’s ire enough to make an antisemitic remark—the comment
which makes Leventhal “sore”—is not Harkavy’s auctioneer routine, but his decision to sing
“spirituals and old ballads” (170, 174). “It isn’t right for you to sing [such songs],” Albee
explains, because Harkavy wasn’t “born to them.” A drunken guardian of tradition, Albee
objects to hearing a Jew’s rendition of American Christian standards. The display of Jewish
visibility only offends Albee when it encroaches upon his own birthright—thus, his “delight” in
Harkavy’s impression of the auction crier, a role he was “bred to” play. Following this same
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logic, Albee hectors Harkavy to sing a psalm, or “any Jewish song” (“Sing us the one about the
mother”), that being his métier—the music which, as a Jew, he has “feeling for” (174). Later in
the novel, Albee presents a literary iteration of this argument when he objects to seeing a study
of Thoreau and Emerson by “a man named Lipschitz”; “people of that background,” he insists,
“simply couldn’t understand” the American literary tradition (259). He would as soon take an
American history course with Professor Caliban.
“You weren’t born to it”: the barb carries deep, biographical significance for Bellow. He
first encountered this prejudice—the “view that because I was not born to an English-speaking
family I had no business in this line of work”—during his college days, when he approached the
head of the Northwestern English Department, William Frank Bryan, about doing graduate work.
“I wouldn’t recommend that you study English,” the chair demurred, anticipating Albee: “You
weren’t born to it” (qtd. in To Fame and Fortune 196). Instead, Bryan recommended that Bellow
pursue anthropology, a field rife with Jewish names. (“Exotics going out to do science upon
exotics” is Bellow’s impish characterization of that discipline in his 1975 story, “Cousins”
[Collected Stories 212]). Late in life, Bellow told Roth that the “Harvard-trained professors”
who held this view “infuriated more than they intimidated” him. Nonetheless, the besmirching of
Bellow’s literary “credentials” stunted his first two novels. As Bellow admits: “Somewhere in
my Jewish and immigrant blood there were conspicuous traces of doubt as to whether I had the
right to practice the writer’s trade” (There’s Simply Too Much 469). Dangling Man and The
Victim came out “very correct” (459), but their painstaking observance of a “Flaubertian
standard,” of “letter-perfect” prose, proved stultifying (qtd. in To Fame and Fortune 243).
Bellow’s career can be organized according to the methods he uses to address Bryan’s
doubts about his “fitness to write books in English” (There’s Simply Too Much 469). Each
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method has an analogue in The Victim. Beginning with Augie March, Bellow responds by
drawing on his Jewish memories, Harkavy-style; as we will see, this is a breakthrough not only
in language, as critics have long argued, but also representation. By contrast, The Victim remains
a blocked book: rigid, humorless, verbally constipated, it responds to antisemitism with a
Leventhalian self-effacement.
Despite Leventhal’s and Bellow’s efforts to stifle or discourage racial visibility,
physiognomic surveillance pervades The Victim. The bitter stakes of racial difference are
apparent from the first paragraph, in which an exotic heat transforms New York into a foreign
city:
On some nights New York is as hot as Bangkok. The whole continent seems to have
moved from its place and slid nearer the equator, the bitter gray Atlantic to have become
green and tropical, and the people, thronging the streets, barbaric fellahin among the
stupendous monuments of their mystery, the lights of which, a dazing profusion, climb
upward endlessly into the heat of the sky. (145)
The summer heat produces, mirage-like, a racial gaze; but then all racial visibility is a form of
mirage, a trick whereby learned perceptions “successfully masquerade as nature” (Jacobson 10).
(The lisp that signals Jewishness to the Victorian theater-goer has no racial connotation to
today’s American.) In a Bangkokian New York, American city-dwellers devolve into barbarian
hordes. Skyscrapers, former symbols of modern urban life, transform into totemic “monuments.”
The paragraph’s geographical incongruities anticipate Albee’s sweeping racial generalizations
(Jew as “Asiatic”). The equatorial heat performs the work of racial “likening” (Jacobson 173),
unites Bangkok (capital of Thailand) and “fellahin” (Arab peasants) into one image of the
uncivilized East. The paragraph reads as though it were written by Albee, when in fact it
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introduces Leventhal’s story: “On such a night,” the following sentence runs, “Asa Leventhal
alighted hurriedly from a Third Avenue train” (145).
Turn back a page, and the novel’s two epigraphs foreshadow this eastward mindmovement. The first, a fragment of “The Tale of the Trader and the Jinni” from One Thousand
and One Nights, introduces The Victim’s action, Orientalized. Both Bellow’s novel and
Scheherazade’s tale concern a seemingly innocent man who finds himself accused of a grave
misdeed while seeking succor from oppressive heat. In the folktale, the man is a wealthy trader
who snacks on dates beneath a shady tree—picture Leventhal at the water fountain—and hurls
their pits into the distance. A malevolent, sword-wielding spirit appears—foreshadowing Albee’s
unnerving knack for surprising Leventhal in his solitude—and threatens to slay the man for
killing his son. The merchant expresses dumbfounded innocence before learning that one of his
date pits had struck the spirit’s child in the chest—an act no less deadly for being unintentional.
The second, shorter epigraph reproduces a nightmare from Thomas De Quincey’s
Confessions of an English Opium-Eater. Anticipating the threat of racial difference in The
Victim, De Quincey describes a “sea” of “innumerable faces...imploring, wrathful, despairing;
faces that surged upward by thousands, by myriads, by generations” (qtd. in 143). Bellow
transforms these tortured sea-faces into the “thronging,” barbarian masses of the novel’s opening
paragraph. Later in Confessions, De Quincey describes terrifying dream-visions dominated by a
frightening “Malay.” These “Asiatic scenes” offer insights into Albee’s fear of the Asiatic Jew
(De Quincey 80). De Quincey’s nightmares express his essential horror at Asian culture. He fears
its uncivilized “modes of life” and “manners” and would “sooner live with lunatics, or brute
animals” (80, 81). The source of this sublime terror is the “mere antiquity of Asiatic things.” A
“young Chinese” is an “antediluvian man renewed,” writes De Quincey, anticipating Grant’s
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theory that Jewish, Asian, and Black races are the remnants of a bygone era of chaotic precivilization. De Quincey fearfully identifies Asia as the “part of the earth most swarming with
human life”: “Man is a weed in those regions” (81). Albee also dreads living in a New York
overrun by hordes of ancient strangers; as we will see, nativist arguments frequently present
immigrants as “swarms,” or “teeming” populations. Finally, De Quincey’s nightmares, like
Albee’s vision of an Egyptian darkness, elide the distinctions between Chinese, Egyptian, and
South Asian culture and mythology.
If Bellow seeks to downplay Jewish visibility in The Victim, these examples of
Orientalism constitute a return of the repressed. The most poignant examples of this return are
associated with Leventhal himself. Elsewhere a victim of Albee’s leering scrutiny, Leventhal is
also tempted by physiognomic interpretation. In the novel’s first pages, Leventhal’s sister-in-law,
Elena, beckons him to visit his sick nephew, his brother’s son. Leventhal attributes Elena’s
heightened emotionality and “superstition[s]” to her Italian background (149). His first glance at
his brother’s wife is a physiognomic rundown:
Her black hair was in disorder, she was wearing a nightgown under her cotton dress, her
feet were bare. She smiled mournfully. Leventhal, impassive as usual, merely nodded. He
observed that her eyes were anxious, altogether too bright and too liquid; there was a
superfluous energy in her movements, a suggestion of distraction or even of madness not
very securely held in check. But he was too susceptible to such suggestions. He was
aware of that, and he warned himself not to be hasty. (148-9)
This passage exposes Leventhal as a reluctant physiognomist. He objects to his own impulse to
draw conclusions about the mind by observing the body. But the physiognomic gaze is
contagious, its symptom a heightened awareness of racial difference. When Elena explains that
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her sickly, feverish son, Mickey, has momentarily stopped breathing, Leventhal dismisses this as
“old country” bunk; later, having seen for himself the severity of the boy’s illness, Leventhal
berates Elena for refusing to take him to a hospital: “Don’t be such a peasant!” (151). In each
case, Leventhal blames Elena’s Italian origins for her mishandling of her son’s illness.
Yet Elena is an American like himself. The source of her old-world superstitions is her
mother, a taciturn Italian immigrant of few words whom Leventhal resents for her Old-World
antisemitism. Elena’s mother is, her daughter says, “an awfully strict Catholic,” superstitious,
clinging to “all the old-country ways.” This includes a fierce objection to Elena’s marriage to
Leventhal’s brother Max. “If Max is home,” Elena explains, “she won’t even come in” (190).
Armed with this knowledge—and the observation that the old woman speaks with a
“characteristic Italian hoarseness”—Leventhal concludes that the “ugly old witch” blames his
brother’s Jewish origins for Mickey’s illness (190-1):
The marriage was impure to her...A Jew, a man of wrong blood, of bad blood, had given
her daughter two children, and that was why this was happening…[Leventhal]
contemplated her grimly, her grizzled temples, the thin straight line of her nose, the
severity of her head pressed back on her shoulders, the baring of her teeth as she opened
her lips to make a remark to her daughter. No, he was not wrong. From her standpoint it
was inevitable punishment. (192)
For Leventhal, the old woman’s wizened physiognomy confirms her intractable, superstitious
antisemitism. Yet Leventhal reaches this conclusion through a comparable superstition. If
Mickey’s grandmother believes the boy has been tainted by bad, Jewish blood, his uncle unearths
her antisemitism by scrutinizing her own racialized body.
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Leventhal also demonstrates an ongoing concern with the physiognomy of his two
nephews. What clues do their faces offer about their dual inheritance? Having scrutinized
Elena’s Italian listlessness, Leventhal turns his attention to her older son, Philip: “He resembled
her strongly. Only his slightly outcurving nose belonged to the Leventhals” (149). The nose, that
tell-tale sign of Jewish racial difference, is Philip’s only patrimony, an attenuated link to the
Leventhals. Philip’s father works out of town, and the boy wears paternal neglect on his face.
There are also telling gaps in the boy’s vocabulary. When Leventhal and his nephew, out for a
day in Manhattan, encounter a Jewish street peddler (“Don’t pester, don’t shtup. Buy or beat it”),
Philip asks his uncle to translate the man’s Yiddish (225). In his brother’s absence, Leventhal
must foster Philip’s connection to his Jewish paternal legacy.
The stakes of Leventhal’s genealogical concern become apparent when Philip’s sickly
brother dies. Mickey’s funeral is in a Catholic church, and to Leventhal’s surprise the boy lies in
an open coffin according to Catholic tradition. The opportunity to scrutinize his nephew’s
physiognomy for the last time is evidence enough of the boy’s extinguished Jewishness. Despite
this, Leventhal “note[s] the curve of [Mickey’s] nose, the texture of his brushed-up hair...the
poise of his small chin over his breast,” and concludes, “He was going to turn out like Max and
me. A Leventhal” (287). All this from the shape of a nose, the coarseness of hair? The
physiognomic interpretation of Mickey’s features stokes Leventhal’s Jewish fellow-feeling.
Suddenly “displeased,” Asa laments that “from the Leventhals’ side...it was peculiar, after so
many generations, to have this,” a Catholic funeral; after all, “the boy was one of them, too” —a
Leventhal, a Jew. (288). Ironically, Leventhal defiantly affirms his nephew’s physiognomic
Jewishness as a result of the visibility built into Catholic funeral practices, part of the old-country
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superstition Leventhal resents.49 The funeral goads Leventhal to consider how his father would
have found the day’s events “incomprehensible”—a baptized grandson, buried in a Catholic
cemetery, like the child of Irish or Italian immigrants (290).50 The childless Leventhal also
experiences a stir of fatherly emotion. Wondering how his defeated, blue-collar brother will
manage from long-distance a distraught wife and son, he reflects: “I’d take [Philip] in a minute”
(290).
The funeral points to the novel’s ambivalence towards Jewish visibility and racial
visibility in general. Leventhal’s identifiable Jewishness makes him a target of Albee’s
scheming, but Jewish visibility does not only create victims. If the “outcurved” noses of Philip
and Mickey Leventhal signal to the gentile their “essential unassimilability” within American life
(Jacobson 178),51 their faces also remind Leventhal that the boys are his kin. The physical
continuity that persists in his half-Jewish nephews obliges Leventhal to reconsider the value of
his Jewish patrimony.
Later Bellow works—Herzog, “The Old System,” “A Silver Dish,” and, most poignantly,
The Bellarosa Connection—revisit in greater detail and with a more sustained optimism the
continuity a Jewish physiognomy preserves. But before embracing the Harkavy model of Jewish
visibility, Bellow needed to cast off the Leventhalian discomfort with racial visibility that
remains even in The Victim’s final scene. Set three years after the novel’s events, the final
chapter records a chance encounter between Leventhal and Albee in a theater. Leventhal is
surprised to see his former nemesis reasonably successful, working in radio, dating a once49

“I am never more of a Jew than I am in a church when the organ begins,” remarks Zuckerman in Roth’s The
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chapel.
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(290).
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popular but still attractive actress. His scheme to clean himself up on Leventhal’s dime has
worked. Albee’s vision of America has also changed a bit. He concedes that he isn’t “the type
who runs things,” but rather “the type that comes to term with whoever runs things.” His
admission that the “world wasn’t made exactly for me” rejects earlier Grantian claims that he
had been bred from the “lords of the earth.” But Leventhal remains skeptical. As Albee slips off
(“Anyway, I’m enjoying life”), Leventhal calls after him: “Wait a minute, what’s your idea of
who runs things?”—as if he doesn’t already know (379). Leventhal’s desire for satisfaction, his
wish that Albee make penance for his twisted ideas about Jewishness, reaches a dead-end. In the
intervening years, Albee has figured out how to live comfortably, still smelling of liquor and
nurturing his old prejudices, among the children of Caliban. He is a testament to the postwar shift
in American culture that saw antisemitism become a “less socially acceptable aspect of
American life”—not something eradicated, but reduced to a whisper (Dinnerstein 150).
The Victim was also a dead-end for Bellow. “I could not, with such an instrument as I
developed in my first two books,” Bellow admits, “express a variety of things I knew intimately”
(qtd. in To Fame and Fortune 243). WASP-approved prose proved too “restrictive” a vehicle; he
required a more “expansive” language (There’s Simply Too Much 475). The instrument Bellow
lighted upon in his next novel was, Leader writes, “an American speech largely absent from high
culture” (To Fame and Fortune 444). Propulsive, comic, and daring, The Adventures of Augie
March is a shaggy picaresque narrated by a talky Jew whose allusions to Heraclitus and
Napoleon nestle comfortably between pool hall dramas and histories of Chicago gang wars.
Many critics have commented on the achievement of Augie’s Yiddish-streaked, serpentine
sentences.52 Fewer emphasize how Augie signals an analogous shift in Bellow’s construction of
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character. Augie’s adventures are crammed with Brobdingnagian eccentrics whose bodies are as
idiosyncratic as their names. Many are incessant talkers, and Augie inhales their breathless,
manic lectures on the ways of the world while observing their physical forms. Augie’s eye is
omnivorous, his tongue unrepentant. No longer would Bellow or his heroes shy away, like
Leventhal, from physiognomic suggestion. Intoxicated with his newfound “polyglot versatility,”
Bellow set about “get[ting] into words the appearance of a gallery of personalities—characters
like Grandma Lausch or Einhorn the fertile cripple” (There’s Simply Too Much 475).
No figure in Augie March demonstrates Bellow’s new attitude to the linked concepts of
character, the body (especially the ill or disabled body), and Jewishness better than William
Einhorn, the “first superior man” of Augie’s adventures. An important real-estate broker who
rules his Chicago neighborhood like a fiefdom, the disabled Einhorn employs a teenage Augie as
“not just metaphorical right hand but virtually arms and legs” (449). Before launching into a
twenty-five page excursus on Einhorn’s grandeur, Augie presents a preamble that provocatively
clears space for his subject—for all of Bellow’s subjects—within the annals of history. Augie
writes:
William Einhorn was the first superior man I knew. He had a brain and many enterprises,
real directing power, philosophical capacity, and if I were methodical enough to take
thought before an important and practical decision and also (N.B.) if I were really his
disciple and not what I am, I’d ask myself, “What would Caesar suffer in this case? What
would Machiavelli advise or Ulysses do? What would Einhorn think?”
By placing Einhorn among this “eminent list” of kings and counselors, Augie contests a theory
of history that assumes “we’re at the dwarf end of all times” (449). Augie’s defense of Einhorn’s
superiority—the word evokes a vigorous, industrious character—builds on this metaphor of size.
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The individual who necessarily privileges Caesar and “other old-time men” over his
contemporaries transforms himself and his age into “mere children whose only share in grandeur
is like a boy’s share in fairy-tale kings.” This is “the opinion of students who, at all ages, feel
their boyishness when they confront the past” (449).53 Why shouldn’t a property-owning macher
and local chieftain be considered with the same seriousness as Caesar? What makes ancient
Rome a more worthy narrative subject than Depression-era Chicago?
Bellow uses Augie as the mouthpiece for his gripes against the literary-historical
stewardship that dismissed his early ambitions. Before attending Northwestern, Bellow took
classes at the University of Chicago, where he resented the attitude of some English professors
who “had only eyes for the glorious classical past, dismissing the contemporary”:
Only greatness need apply. Local boys and girls, swarming in the foreground, were
ephemerists; high-and-mighty professors admitted no connection between James T.
Farrell and Sophocles. (qtd. in To Fame and Fortune 180).
A compositional metaphor organizes this idea: student hordes and their trifling, provincial
concerns threaten to block the professor’s view of a distant and lofty literary past. Bellow
imagines himself and fellow Chicagoan James T. Farrell—author of the Studs Lonigan trilogy,
published during Bellow’s high school years—as part of this local throng. Far-sighted
practitioners of chronological prejudice, Bellow suggests, are incapable of distinguishing either
writer from the undulating mass or spotting their ties to literary tradition (“You weren’t born to
it”).
Augie berates this view as childish, cowardly, and self-defeating. Beating back the
ephemerist swarm, the hoary custodian of tradition regresses to boyhood; he makes himself the
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ward of “beings of a different kind from times better and stronger than ours” (449). Leader
quotes Bellow expressing a similar view in a 1957 letter to critic Lionel Trilling: “We may not
be strong enough to live in the present. But to be disappointed in it! To identify oneself with a
better past! No, no!” (qtd. in To Fame and Fortune 533). For Augie, there’s a political danger in
viewing the present as inherently fallen, for it expresses a “wish to abdicate into some different,
lower form of existence.” Slavish past-worship, Augie warns, is anti-democratic. Being accepted
as a “demigod” is “just what would please Caesar among us teeming democrats” (449). Why
“teeming”? Because Caesar sees “us...democrats,” like the “high-and-mighty” professor’s
ephemerist students, as another swarm—indeterminate, pest-like, and overflowing. Modernity is
the age of the rabble, and a strongman is required to control the chaos.
Augie’s argument—that lapsarian theories of history can lead to authoritarian politics—
was likely informed by Bellow’s experience seeing America’s most prominent architects of
literary modernism (T.S. Eliot, Ezra Pound) express sympathy, and in Pound’s case,
propagandistic support, for fascist governments.54 The equivalence of the “modern condition”
with “shrinkage, decay, estrangement, disappointment, decline” is, Bellow writes in 1989,
“civilization seen from the vantage point of classicism and aristocracy” (There’s Simply Too
Much 364). The belief in modernity’s fallenness, the consequent urge to recreate a mythical past
of great men as a means to overpower the “teeming democrats”—these ideas connect the
modernism of Eliot and Pound to Nazism, Italian Fascism, and Grant’s Nordicism. What’s more,
each branch of this ideological cohort associates modernity’s ignorant swarm with mass
migration and racial diversity. Ross, an outspoken advocate of eugenics and immigration
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restriction, bemoans that technology has ushered in an “era of facile migration” and warns that
the “muddled mixing” of races “begets absolutist government” (“Menace of Migrating Peoples”
131, 132). Grant takes this argument a step further. He opens his Passing of the Great Race by
suggesting that universal suffrage (“the rule of the average”) is inimical to “progress” when a
nation includes a preponderance of “lower classes” (7). For Grant, the “abdicat[ion]” that Augie
criticizes is a necessity; the “different, lower form of existence” has already befouled American
shores. Anticipating the rise of dictatorial politics, Grant defends the “benevolent or even
intelligent” despot on the grounds that he may, through his “enormous power,” mobilize the
“brute strength of the unthinking herd” for the “general uplift of the race” (7). There’s no need to
speculate with Augie about whether Grant’s ideas would “please Caesar.” History has shown
how well this argument suited Hitler, whose SS underlings cited The Passing of the Great Race
in their defense during the Nuremberg Trials (Spiro xi-xii).55
If mass migration and racial diversity became representative symptoms of modernity’s
essential sickness, the most paranoid iterations of this argument identify the Jew as the source of
these maladies. The Nazis famously compared Jews to a bacillus; no less venomously, T.S. Eliot
writes in “Gerontion” that “My house is a decayed house / the jew squats on the windowsill, the
owner” (ll. 7-8).56 But crackpots, poets, and Nazi sympathizers were not the only Americans who
found in the Jew a “convenient scapegoat” for the “ills of modern life,” writes historian Eric L.
Goldstein (36). In a tumultuous era of urbanization and increased Jewish visibility, the Jew’s
imagined physical and mental attributes, including “nervousness, intellectuality...lack of physical
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development,” and ruthless self-interest, were increasingly identified as the deleterious “marks of
urban living” (Goldstein 37). The sheer numbers of new arrivals from eastern Europe in the first
decades of the twentieth century inspired written and visual representations of Jewish “swarms”
or “throngs” of Jews overtaking American cities.
A noteworthy description of this Jewish swarm comes from Henry James’s domestic
travelogue, The American Scene (1907), which impressed Bellow enough to mention in his
nonfiction.57 A visit to Manhattan’s Lower East Side produces a mixture of wonder and
repulsion in James, who marvels at the “extent of the Hebrew conquest of New York” (James
132). The overflowing population of the Jewish ghetto exceeds even the “pressure of the present
and the immediate” which James associates with the city’s other neighborhoods. James’s
claustrophobic prose style, its sentences stuffed to the point of bursting with observations,
impressions, and qualifications, becomes an ironically apt vehicle for describing the “intensity of
the material picture in the dense Yiddish quarter.” In language reminiscent of Grant and Ross on
the perils of immigration, James describes the “sense...of a great swarming” as he approaches the
Lower East Side:
There is no swarming like that of Israel when once Israel has got a start, and the scene
here bristled, at every step, with the sights and sounds, immitigable, unmistakable, of a
Jewry that had burst all bounds...It was as if we had been thus, in the crowded, hustled
roadway, where multiplication, multiplication of everything was the dominant note, at the
bottom of some vast sallow aquarium in which innumerable fish, of over-developed
proboscis, were to bump together, for ever, amid heaped spoils of the sea. (131)
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My knowledge of James’s account and Bellow’s responses to it in “My Paris” (1983) and “A Jewish Writer in
America: A Lecture” (1988) come from Leader’s To Fame and Fortune (756, n54)
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Though James first attributes the neighborhood’s swarming to a “quality of appealing,
surrounding life,” suspicions of the Jewish masses and their foreign physiognomy seep into his
prose. His Jew-crowded city blocks recall Ross’s fears of “congested and free-multiplying
Asiatics,” who present the “truly appalling prospect of a human deluge” (“Menace of Migrating
Peoples” 133). Indeed, James remarks that “no district in the world known to the statistician has
so many inhabitants to the yard,” except “some shy corner of Asia” (James 131). Both the Jew
and the “Asiatic” reproduce at an animalistic rate, an idea implicit within the word “swarm.”
Thus, James compares the Lower East Side’s denizens to “innumerable fish”; later, he compares
the preponderance of fire-escapes to “a little world of bars and perches and swings for human
animals and monkeys” (134). Contemporary caricatures offer similar pictures of the Jewish
swarm. “The Noon Hour on Fifth Avenue,” from a July 1914 edition of Life magazine, shows
streets thronged with portly men, their faces little more than hats, curved noses, and dark
moustaches. Some read Yiddish newspapers, others extend their hands as if demanding payment.
In the foreground, a child tries to tear away her flabbergasted mother from the foreign mob
(presumably they are the image’s only non-Jews). In the distance, storefront banners, advertising
Jewish businesses, clog building facades (Baigell 55, fig. 28).58
The caricaturist might have turned to James for a caption: “multiplication, multiplication
of everything was the dominant note”—of people, of profits. An anxiety about Jewish
industriousness and financial self-interest explains James’s wary tone. “Who can tell,” James
asks, “what the genius of Israel may, or may not, really be ‘up to’?” (135). For James, Israel is
unruly, uncontainable. Having allowed the Jews to “[get] a start,” Americans can only gasp at
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“Broadway on a Jewish Holiday” (Puck magazine, August 3, 1906) showcases the opposite fantasy. On a Jewish
holiday, Broadway is barren except for a yawning policeman (likely Irish), and a matted mass of business signs
bearing faux-Jewish names (Baigell 54, fig. 27).
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their ability to accumulate “spoils.” Another caricature, titled “The Jewfish and Octopus Start a
Pawn Shop,” anticipates James’s description of a booty-laden Jewish aquarium. Published in a
1902 issue of Life, this cartoon finds its titular characters advertising “Second-hand Oysters” and
promising “Highest Prices Paid for Cast Off Shells” (Baigell 49, fig. 49). The octopus, Baigell
notes, is a common visual symbol for the Jew’s greed and “many-tentacled” influence over
world finance and trade (46); he is an aquatic puppet-master. A lobster, seahorse, and blowfish—
potential rubes—stare vacantly at the octopus and the anthropomorphic Jewfish, who wears a
pince-nez perched upon his “overdeveloped proboscis.”
James’s reference to the Jew’s nose is significant because he so strongly associates the
Jewish “swarm” with its distinct and alien appearance. The Jew’s racial visibility in New York is
partly explained by his numbers. The other operative factor is what James calls “the intensity of
the Jewish aspect,” or appearance. This ubiquitous intensity of the Jewish face startles James.
With so many Jews in New York, he seems to ask, shouldn’t some look less Jewish? Alas, James
writes:
the denizens of the New York Ghetto, heaped as thick as the splinters on the table of a
glass-blower, ha[ve] each, like the fine glass particle, his or her individual share of the
hard glitter of Israel. (132)
In a perniciously eloquent phrase, James affirms the Jew’s inherent, immutable physiognomic
difference; the density of the east side’s Jewish population is matched only by the density of
Jewish “race-quality” (132). Particularly among the elderly, Jewish faces display an “excess of
lurid meaning” which reveals the “gathered past of Israel'' (132). The Jewish visage carries the
history of the Jewish people’s historical traumas. Each face bears the evidence of generations of
persecution and homelessness.
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What degradations follow the introduction of this mass of “concentrated” Jewishness into
American life (132)? While Grant and Ross fear the noxious physical and psychical effects of
racial intermixture, the “man of letters...gasp[s]” at the havoc the Jew’s speech will wreak upon
the English language (James 138). In his “lettered anguish,” the novelist James condemns the
cafes and bars of the Lower East Side—“haunts of comparative civility” where, removed from
the throngs, he may discern the “germ” of a future “public”—as a “torture-room of the living
idiom” (138, 139). The mixture James fears is the one that yields the “Accent of the Future,” a
mongrel tongue which “we shall not know...for English—in any sense for which there is an
existing literary measure” (139).
In his preamble to Einhorn’s story, Augie issues an apologia for modernity that
challenges the lapsarian myths of America’s old breeds. His vehicle for defending the “teeming
democrats” is the Accent of the Future, a linguistic descendant of the “unnatural squawking of
East Side Jews,” as Bellow characterizes James’s description (There is Simply Too Much 341).
Augie’s elevation of Einhorn as a “superior man” displays a similar underhandedness toward
literary-historical tradition. Einhorn is the progeny of those “whose crackling and shrieking set
Henry James’s teeth on edge” (359). He is also, in Augie’s description, “a cripple who didn’t
have the use of either [arms or legs], not even impartial” (Augie March 449). Nevertheless,
Augie insists on Einhorn’s fitness for inclusion in an “eminent list” that includes Caesar,
Machiavelli, and Ulysses.
Grant would deem Einhorn a “worthless type,” suitable for sterilization (50); Hitler
would condemn him as an untermensch, smokestack-fodder. But in Augie March’s Chicago,
Einhorn reigns as local leader and real-estate macher. Far from disabling him, Einhorn’s
paralyzed limbs contribute to his superiority. His dependence on others for each daily task does
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not render Einhorn helpless; on the contrary, “the things that had to be done for him made him
autocratic.” (Einhorn is a predecessor to Cousin Tina of “The Old System,” whose control over
her obese body lends her a “totalitarian air.”) Augie jestlessly compares him to Louis XIV, who
“had one nobleman to hand him his stockings, another his shirt” (454). By this measurement,
Einhorn outshines the Sun King, who was never carried “pick-a-back” to and from the car by
Augie March (453).
Augie March contains a “gargoyle” (Wood) or two, the occasional “Balzacian
monstrosity” (Leader), but Einhorn is not one of them. That Einhorn “boast[s] of [his paralysis]
as a thing he had overcome” is unsurprising given his pride, his industriousness, his “teaching
turn” (461, 457): a man of brains and “philosophical capacity” (449), a shrewd thinker and
ravenous collector of writing on his favorite subjects, Einhorn instructs Augie in “what could be
done with the world, where it gave or rested” (457). Augie rarely ironizes these claims. Instead,
he solemnly describes the grueling routine whereby Einhorn “raise[s] his unusable arms” onto
his desk before making a grand pronouncement:
[It was] a neat trick that went through several stages, [Einhorn] tugging the sleeve of the
right with the fingers of the left, helping on the left with the right. There wasn’t any
appeal to feelings as he accomplished this; it was only an operation. But it had immense
importance. As a robust, full-blooded man might mount up to a pulpit and then confess
his weakness before God, Einhorn, with his feebleness demonstrated for a preliminary,
got himself situated to speak of strength, with strength. (458)
Similarly, Augie’s account of Einhorn’s morning routine recalls a warrior preparing for battle—a
mock-heroic sans mockery. With reverence Augie meticulously preserves the details: Einhorn’s
socks of “grand silk” and “trousers with a banker’s stripe,” his fine shoes “that of course never
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wrinkled below the instep, much less wore out,” his tie knot “inspected many times by his
fingers and warped exactly into place with some nervousness about the top button” (454, 458).
Prone to digression, Augie returns to Einhorn with Homeric transitions (a rhetorical gesture
otherwise absent from the novel): “Let it be hot—for I’m reporting on summers, during
vacations, when I spent full time with him” (459), “But now suppose we’re at lunchtime, in
Einhorn’s specimen day” (465), “But let’s take it back to the toilet, where Einhorn got himself
ready in the morning” (458).
Nor is Augie’s testament a hagiography. Einhorn is not exclusively virtuous: he is a
chronic adulterer and an inveterate schemer. He artificially inflates real-estate costs with false
bids, scams mail-order catalogues by placing bulk orders on credit and foregoing payment, and
uses a screwdriver to jimmy coin-operated telephones, saving a nickel (456). Though insistent
that he is no “different from other men,” he never “overlooks[s] any chance to exploit” his
paralysis (461). He puts out a publication titled The Shut-In, which he mails, “as a service,” to
other people with disabilities; altruism aside, Augie notes, the newsletter attracts “considerable
insurance business” (462). In his more fearful moments, Einhorn turns depressive—“If society
had any sense they’d give me euthanasia,” he whines, in accord with the eugenicists—but these
occur “not oftener than ordinary people get a shove of the demon” (470). Einhorn’s black
moments add to his complexity and stature rather than belie his boastfulness.
The punchline: the evidence Augie enters in his case against the present’s fallenness is a
disabled Jew, a man doubly obsolete in the eugenicist’s eyes. As a real-estate owner, an
insurance broker, a schemer, Einhorn is also Hitler’s archetypical parasite. Behold the superior
man, Augie declares, wheeling forward the image of the conniving untermensch. Who better
than an ambitious, wealthy, crippled Jew to undermine what Albee calls, at the end of The
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Victim, “that stiffness of once upon a time” (379)? Einhorn demonstrates that eminence still
reigns. The knowledge that modern man is no mere insect in a featureless warm pushes Bellow
into a new aesthetic domain. From Augie onward, Bellow displays an “inexhaustible passion for
a teemingness of dazzling specifics,” writes Roth (Why Write? 292). That passion runs wild
when Bellow depicts the human form. The swarm (Roth’s “teemingness”) is no longer a
“pervasive threat,” but sustenance for a literary imagination’s “voracious appetite” (292). The
intense “Jewish aspect” that confounds Henry James and unnerves Asa Leventhal emerges as
Bellow’s subject.59
Einhorn is the prototype for those Bellovian characters who derive an uncanny strength
from their aberrant, disobedient bodies. Bellow’s new style of portraiture—rich with limping,
shuffling arguments against the validity of physiognomy, eugenics, and myths of Olympian
races—has more in common with Harkavy’s acceptance of Jewish visibility than Leventhal’s
anxiety. Bellow thereby inserts himself into a tradition of American Jews who, defying the
antisemite’s scrutiny, freely “describe themselves in racial terms” (Goldstein 166).60 Similarly,
Jacobson emphasizes that the “history of racial Jewishness...encompasses the ways in which both
Jews and non-Jews have constructed Jewishness...and seen it...over time” (175). Beginning with
Augie March, “ambiguity ceases to be a source of consternation” for Bellow, writes Roth (292).
The ethical ambiguity of representing the Jewish body as Jewish is one “contradiction” Bellow
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Roth reaches a broader conclusion when he writes that Augie March’s “intricate landscape of physical
being...make[s] ‘character’...less an aspect of the novel than its preoccupation” (292).
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Goldstein identifies a “growing tendency” for racial self-identification among American Jews during the interwar
years (166). If appealing to a Jewish race risked confirming antisemitic myths of the Jew’s clannishness, essential
difference, and unwillingness to assimilate to American life, it also provided American Jews with a “feeling of
community and connection to other Jews” and a means for responding to “attacks on their group character” (169).
Goldstein also makes clear that positive appeals to Jewish racial distinctiveness were hard to separate from their
more malign forms. At times, American Jews seemed to “accept and internalize the very stereotypes they were
trying to fight,” such as when they displayed anxiety about looking Jewish (177).
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permits—no, lets loose—within his prose (292). The writer who had once identified with
Leventhal begins to see and celebrate Jewishness everywhere, in everything.
In many cases, Bellow’s references to the Jew’s body continue to draw on late nineteenth
and early twentieth century racial discourses. But mediated through Bellow’s heroes, these ideas
cease to sting. Dr. Samuel Braun, narrator of “The Old System” (1968), describes his Orthodox
cousin Isaac as “[r]acially distinct,” a member of a “blood group characteristically eastern
Mediterranean. The very fingertips belonging to a distinctive family of patterns. The nose, the
eyes long and full, the skin dark” (Collected Stories 110). Isaac, for his part, identifies the Braun
family as descendants of the lost Naphtali tribe of Israel (94). In the story “Cousins” (1975),
Bellow pokes fun at the racial assumptions of pre-Boasian anthropology and the influence of
Jews on modern anthropology when he describes Boas, Herskovitz, etc. as “[e]xotics going out
to do science upon exotics” (212). In “A Silver Dish” (1976), Bellow plays with the Jew’s racial
connection to the exotic-indigenous while describing his protagonist, Woody Selbst: “Born a
Jew, he was a Jew facially, with a hint of Iroquois or Cherokee” (15). Similarly, Ijah Brodsky
(“Cousins”) describes his Cousin Motty in the Russian baths, thus: “Naked, he resembled an
Indian brave” (218). In The Bellarosa Connection, Harry Fonstein’s Galician Yiddish has a
“Chinese sing-song” quality (43); Billy Rose has a “pink, histrionic, Oriental little face” (57).
Elsewhere, Bellow attributes Jewishness, willy-nilly, to physical features, gestures, and
emotions. Fonstein gives Bellow’s narrator a “hard-edged Jewish look” (45). A Fonstein relative
possesses “an ancient Jewish face...dark and craggy” (78). A rabbi whom Isaac Braun visits in
“The Old System” possesses a “Jewish moral genius” (113). Another rabbi has a “play of Jewish
cleverness in his face” (101). Selbst, raised Christian, utters the occasional “Jewish observation”
in the presence of his Jewish father (25). A cousin in “Cousins” has a “Hasidic pallor” (213).
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Von Humboldt Fleisher, titular subject of Humboldt’s Gift (1975), buys a dilapidated house in
the New Jersey sticks, where he “suffer[s] keen Jewish terrors”: he is, after all, “an Oriental”
living with a “Christian maiden” (269, 270). In Herzog (1964), a zoologist’s macaque monkey is
“obstinate and cranky, with a poor color, like a glum old Jewish uncle” (458). The monkey’s
“poor color,” like Brodsky’s cousin’s “Hasidic pallor,” evokes stereotypes of the Jewish body’s
susceptibility to illness, especially tuberculosis—the disease that ultimately kills the ailing
macaque.
The comic specificity of Bellow’s monkey analogy ironizes the allusion to the Jewish
body’s weakness and dulls the barbs inherent to James’s comparable description of “human
squirrels and monkeys” who “perch” and “swing” on Lower East Side fire-escapes (James 134).
If this description of Rocco the consumptive simian adjusts James’s “irresistible” analogy (134),
Bellow’s mature work constitutes a broader revision of the Jewish swarm in The American
Scene. The “insistent, defiant, unhumorous, exotic face” multiplied throughout the Jewish ghetto
“could only be,” James insists, “the gathered past of Israel mechanically pushing through” (135,
132). Bellow arrives at a similar conclusion: the Jewish body can be a storehouse of memory and
a sign of historical continuity. What distinguishes Bellow’s conjecture from James’s? It’s a
matter of specificity. James gazes at a swarm and sees each face as a “splinter” reproducing the
“hard glitter of Israel.” By contrast, Bellow creates figures whose somatic characteristics—
alternately legs, veins, fat, faces—reinforce their connection to Jewish familial memory.
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Herzog to The Bellarosa Connection: Or, How Bellow Learned to Stop Worrying and Love
Jewish Physiognomy
In a July 1987 letter to the novelist Cynthia Ozick, Bellow remorsefully confesses that he
had been “too busy becoming a novelist to take note of what was happening in the Forties”
(Letters 439). His careerist “preoccupation” with art had occluded his reckoning with the “central
event of [his] time, the destruction of European Jewry” (439, 438).61 Janis Freedman Bellow,
Saul’s fifth and final wife, describes her husband’s protracted preoccupation with the Shoah
during the last decades of his life:
[I]n the twenty years I lived with him, only once did the books on the Holocaust
disappear from the bedside. I remember this time because I enforced the ban. I told him
that we would not have Hitler in bed with us while I was pregnant. That did not stop us
from talking in the middle of the night, or over breakfast, or after a morning’s work. That
ban would have been too large to enforce. (qtd. in Love and Strife 590)
Too large, indeed—for Bellow had been “brooding about” his “unspeakable evasion” of the
catastrophe since before Janis was born (Letters 439).62 The stack of ever-present death-books
was Bellow’s latter-day corrective, an attempt to fuse his role as “participant-observer in the life
of his country” with that of witness to “the history of the Jews in our time” (qtd. in Love and
Strike 458).
This description of the writer’s task comes from “A Jewish Writer in America,” a lecture
Bellow delivered to the Jewish Publication Society in Philadelphia in May of 1988.63 Presented a
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Aarons begins her “Bellow and the Holocaust” essay with excerpts from the same letter, though she emphasizes
Bellow’s conviction that his oversight was symptomatic of his cultural milieu and American intellectuals as a whole
(55).
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In his letter to Ozick, Bellow writes that his “brooding” began in “late Forties” (Letters 439). Janis Freedman,
born on September 3, 1958, was forty-three years his junior (Love and Strife 356).
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The version of this lecture reprinted in There’s Simply Too Much to Think About (as “A Jewish Writer in America:
a Lecture”) leaves out this sentence, but retains its sentiment. Leader quotes from a typescript, presumably the one
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year or so after his letter to Ozick, Bellow’s lecture provides autobiographical and literaryhistorical context for his ruminations on the Jewish-American writer’s web of responsibilities.
Bellow describes viewing “newsreels of the camps” in the late forties, an experience that
triggered his “brooding” and illuminates the aesthetics and ethics of his representation of the
Jewish body (There is Simply Too Much 366). Bellow writes:
In one of [the newsreels], American bulldozers pushed naked corpses toward a mass
grave ditch. Limbs fell away and heads dropped from disintegrating bodies. My reaction
to this was...a deeply troubling sense of disgrace or human demotion, as if by such
afflictions the Jews had lost the respect of the rest of humankind, as if they might now be
regarded as hopeless victims, incapable of honorable self-defense, and arising from this,
probably the common instinctive revulsion or loathing of the extremities of suffering—a
sense of personal contamination and aversion. The world would see these dead with a
pity that placed them at the margin of humanity. (366)
The sight of industrialized mass burial tortured Bellow. The bulldozer, that indelicate instrument
of his father’s coal yard and his brother’s construction sites, was built to haul stone and metal
and earth, not the Jewish dead. The lives of Europe’s Jews had already been mechanistically
expunged; must their bodies also be reduced to demolition waste? The “disgrace” of the
newsreels, Bellow warns, is in the “human demotion” of Jewish bodies to a form of debris
(“limbs fell away,” “heads dropped from disintegrating bodies”). (These images are then
captured and broadcast through a system no less mechanized.) “The corpse,” writes French
philosopher Julia Kristeva, “is the utmost of abjection,” because it flouts “identity, system,

Bellow read from in Philadelphia. A decade later, Bellow presents a similar conclusion via Abe Ravelstein, who
insists that “a Jew should take a deep interest in the history of the Jews—in their principles of justice, for instance”
(Ravelstein 771).
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order,” reminds the living of life’s precariousness (4). The newsreels transform the Jewish
victims into a ghastly memento mori. Surely, the SS officers working in the camps resented their
prisoners for the fathomlessness of their abjection, their skeletal proximity to death. Bellow fears
that the newsreel viewer may also experience a similar resentment, the “revulsion” with which
the unvanquished faces “extremities of suffering.” In his story “The Old System,” Bellow writes
that Hitler “made sure that certain modern race notions”—that of the Jew’s inherent inferiority
and noxious influence on the body politic—“became social realities” (Collected Stories 104).
The bulldozer burial and its visual proliferation as newsreel footage confirm that Hitler’s
dehumanizing work had been realized.64
Earlier in “A Jewish Writer in America,” Bellow explains that his encounters with
literary proponents of these “modern race notions” shaped his development as a writer. One such
notion dismisses Jews as an antiquated and obsolete race, alien to the modern world. As a
precocious high schooler, Bellow is “deeply wounded” to discover that Oswald Spengler’s The
Decline of the West labels Jews as “Magians,” anachronistic hangers-on to the West’s “Faustian”
civilization:
I envied the Faustians and cursed my luck. I had prepared myself to be part of
civilization, one of whose prominent interpreters (Spengler was an international best
seller) told me that I was by heredity disqualified. He did not say that I must be put to
death and one might be grateful for that. Yet he did pronounce Jews to be fossils,
spiritually archaic, and that was in itself a kind of death. (There Is Simply Too Much 358)
Though the ambitious would-be writer’s confidence in his American upbringing (“a new venture
in civilization”) allows him to “[hold] Spengler at bay,” he also finds American iterations of
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One could compare Bellow’s encounter with the newsreels to Susan Sontag’s description, in On Photography, of
discovering a book of Holocaust photographs during her teen years.
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Spengler’s argument (358). To T.S. Eliot, whose “distinguished historical consciousness” had set
the parameters of modernist aesthetics, Bellow’s Jewish art “would have been part of the decay
[of civilization] and part of the reason for his disappointment” (364-5).65 Truman Capote
provides Bellow with a more contemporary example. In addition to lamenting that a “Jewish
mafia” dominates the American literary ecosystem (qtd. in 363), Capote writes, a la Spengler,
that “all [Jews] ought to be in the Museum of Natural History” (158). Crammed with sawdust
and placed behind glass, Capote’s Jew is a remnant of a bygone, lower age of man. He evokes
the same curiosity as a trilobite or a Cro-Magnon skull—to think these creatures once roamed the
Earth! Capote’s image of the Jew-as-museum-piece is terrifyingly uncanny, even abject; like the
newsreels, it transforms formerly breathing subjects into lifeless objects. Similarly, Kristeva
finds abjection not only within “Nazi crime” but also the “dark halls of the museum that is now
what remains of Auschwitz” (4).
Fin-de-siècle myths of Jewish physical inferiority are the precursors to these theories of
Jewish obsolescence. According to Gilman, nineteenth-century European stereotypes about the
Jew’s flat-footedness and susceptibility to consumption were inseparable from attempts to bar
newly emancipated Jews from civic participation. The flat foot and its network of related lower
body ailments, writes Gilman, were physical signs that the Jew was “congenitally unable and,
therefore, unworthy of being completely integrated into the social fabric of the modern state”
(The Jew’s Body 40). Gilman places this foot-myth within the medieval and early modern
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In “Distractions of a Fiction Writer” (1957), an essay written thirty years earlier, Bellow similarly evokes both
Spengler and Eliot to express the absurdity and danger of declaring the novel dead: “I merely wish to show that the
term obsolete, derived from evolutionary thought, has a place of importance in the history of persecution” (There Is
Simply Too Much 90-1). In the process, Bellow defends the vitality of the Jewish people and the American novel.
His original pitch for the piece, taken from a 1956 letter, argues more tendentiously for this connection: “The
modern world is full of people who declare that other people are obsolete. Stalin and the Kulaks, Hitler and the Jews
and Slavs and gypsies, and Trilling and T.S. Eliot and several others have decided the novel is done for historically”
(qtd. in To Fame and Fortune 531).

71
tradition of representing the heretical, deicidal Jew as a living devil who walked on cloven
hooves; though able to assume the shape of man, the devil-Jew’s hooves remained hidden in his
shoes, a buried “sign of difference” testifying to his true, inhuman nature (The Jew’s Body 39).66
These demonological explanations of the Jew’s constitutional difference were revised according
to the secular “rhetoric of pseudoscience” in the era of the modern nation-state, which saw
citizenship rights (including the right to serve in national armies) extended “piecemeal” to
Europe’s Jews (38, 40). The “foot-soldier,” Gilman writes, became the “hallmark” of midnineteenth-century “liberal movements,” and Jews were increasingly maligned as physically
defective malingerers. A “worthless soldier” on account of his weak feet and lungs, the Jew
became a worthless citizen (40).67
Bellow demonstrates his investment in the political stakes of Jewish visibility in an early
scene from Ravelstein (2000), his final novel. Chick, Bellow’s narrator, describes a confrontation
John Maynard Keynes recorded while acting as a British representative at the Paris Peace
Conference, where the Allied powers debated the terms of German reparations after World War
I. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, fearful that Germany’s “blockaded, starved cities”
might breed Bolshevism, recommended that Germany use the Kaiser’s gold reserves to purchase
food rations from the Allies; French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau insisted the German
gold rightfully belonged to France (692). Seething with frustration, Lloyd George singled out for
ridicule Clemenceau’s Minister of Finance, a Jew named Louis-Lucien Klotz. Lloyd George “did
an astonishing kike number on him, crouching, hunching, limping, spitting, zizzing his esses,
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In The Devil and the Jews (1943), Joshua Trachtenberg identifies other demonic features that the medieval Jew
was said to hide beneath his clothes: horns, a tail, a goat’s beard, and an unholy animal stench (the foetor judaicus)
(46-8).
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Following Gilman, Jacobson writes that Jewish emancipation, the emergence of nationalism, and debates over
citizenship “formed the context within which science comprehended ‘the Jewish race’” (179).
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sticking out his backside, doing a splayfoot parody of a Jew-walk” (636).68 The modern reader
who has learned to associate Jewish physical difference with the nose may be surprised to learn
that Lloyd George’s routine is a pitch-perfect account of fin-de-siècle stereotypes of the Jewish
body, which represent the Jew’s speech as accented and faulty, his legs weak and malformed, his
gait hampered and peculiar (The Jew’s Body 10, 39).
Chick revisits this scene later in the novel, admitting that he “can’t explain why [he is] so
affected by it” (693). Yet it is easy enough to speculate: in this prelude to World War II, Keynes
records an Allied leader displaying the rampant, body-based Jew-hatred characteristic of Nazism.
In this second version, Chick quotes directly and at length from Keynes’s memoir, Dr Melchior:
a Defeated Enemy:
Do you know Klotz by sight?—a short, plump, heavy mustached Jew, but with an
unsteady, roving eye and his shoulders a little bent in an instinctive deprecation. Lloyd
George had always hated and despised him. And now saw in a twinkling that he could
kill him. Women and children were starving, he cried, and here was M. Klotz prating and
prating of his “gooold.” He leant forward and with a gesture of his hands indicated to
everyone the image of a hideous Jew clutching a money bag. His eyes flashed and the
words came out with contempt so violent that he seemed almost to be spitting at him. The
anti-Semitism, not far below the surface in such an assemblage as this one, was up in the
heart of everyone. Everyone looked at Klotz with a momentary contempt and hatred; the
poor man was bent over his seat, visibly cowering...Then, turning, [Lloyd George] called
on Clemenceau to put a stop to these obstructive tactics; otherwise, he cried, M. Klotz

68

The Library of America edition of Ravelstein notes that Bellow’s first mention of this scene erroneously presents
the subject of Lloyd George’s parody as German (860). A later description in the novel, which quotes in detail from
Keynes’s memoirs, correctly identifies Klotz as French.

73
would rank with Lenin and Trotsky among those who had spread Bolshevism in Europe.
The Prime Minister ceased. All around the room you could see each one grinning and
whispering to his neighbor, “Klotsky.” (Keynes 422-3; qtd. in Ravelstein 693, my
emphasis)
According to Keynes, Lloyd George’s “nasty youpin parody” awakens the slumbering
antisemitism of his fellow statesmen (Ravelstein 637). Lloyd George’s hatred becomes
infectious, transmissible; his routine makes visible Klotz’s Jewishness and Eastern foreignness
(“Klotsky”). The hallmark of Klotz’s Jewishness is, for Keynes’s Lloyd George, the finance
minister’s rapacious appetite for gold. Klotz becomes a malevolent, purse-guarding Shylock,
content to let Bolshevism overrun Europe so long as he can protect his precious coins.69 By
linking myths of Jewish greed and money-lust to fears of political upheaval, Lloyd George
anticipates the myth of the “International Jew”—a stateless war-monger and manipulator of
financial markets who ruthlessly profits from global misery—that becomes a staple of Henry
Ford’s Dearborn Independent and Julius Streicher’s Der Stürmer.
This is a very different routine from the “astonishing kike number” Chick describes.
Though Keynes offers a brief description of Klotz’s appearance, Lloyd George’s “hideous”
parody treats the Jewish physiognomy peripherally. Keynes describes Lloyd George as he
“lean[s] forward,” perhaps in imitation of Klotz’s curved posture—or else to pantomime a miser
guarding his treasure. In Chick’s revision, however, Lloyd George taunts Klotz for his
physiognomic differences: his limping, splay-footed walk, his sloping posture, his lisping,
corrupted speech. Only Klotz’s posture comes from Keynes; there, even Lloyd George’s
“spitting” seems a function of his hatred rather than a mockery of Jewish accents. Bellow’s
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portrait of Lloyd George is not only more vivid, rich in startling particulars. It also emphasizes
the continuity between Lloyd George’s antisemitism and the Holocaust, that lunatic solution to
the problem of the aberrantly Jewish body. Bellow transforms Lloyd George’s posture of the
hunching, miserly Jew—an image at least as old as The Merchant of Venice70—into a furtherreaching condemnation of Klotz’s unsightly, sickly body. Klotz’s Jewish physiognomy, not his
Jewish greed, disqualifies him from participation in this meeting of statesmen.
Bellow, like his narrator Chick, believes that “in the surface of things you saw the heart
of things” (753). This dictum explains both Bellow’s repulsion at the Buchenwald newsreels and
his efforts in fiction to rescue the Jewish body from abjection. Though Bellow’s novels become
increasingly concerned with the philosophical implications of twentieth-century pogroms, he
stages his reckoning upon the Jewish body’s heart-permeable surface. This is not to say that
Bellow performed as propagandist. On the contrary, he bristled at the notion that the “Jewish
writer in America,” or any writer, should produce “public relations releases” (There Is Simply
Too Much 72). Bellow’s novels do not feature the schlocky, middlebrow portraits of Jewish
heroism or ghetto nostalgia that Roth associates with Leon Uris and Harry Golden (Reading
Myself 186-7). These once-popular writers set out “to make the Jew and Jewishness acceptable,
appealing, and attractive” (186), whereas Bellow’s representation of the Jewish body grows
naturally from his aesthetic emphasis on the specificity and diversity of the physical world.
Describing his idol’s achievement in Augie March, Roth writes that the “richly rendered surface”
of Bellow’s fiction becomes “manifold with contradiction and ambiguity,” yet that ambiguity
“ceases to be a source of consternation.” Bellow’s embrace of what Roth calls “[m]anifoldness”
explains his proclivity for creating Jewish characters who limp and shuffle and drag defiant legs
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(Why Write? 293). Bellow is not Max Nordau, the Hungarian-Jewish physician and Zionist who,
accepting myths of Jewish debility, encourages his co-religionists to join gyms, bulk up, and
reinvent themselves as Muskeljuden (“muscle-Jews”) (The Jew’s Body 53).71 Instead, Bellow
embraces the ambiguity of the Jewish body’s purported infirmity and rehabilitates that body
through irony and subversion. Physical ailments evoke authority. What Bellow writes of Victor
Wulpy applies to his other misshapen heroes: “even his oddities (naturally) had power”
(Collected Stories 306).
Thus Bellow’s cripples become “fertile,” his limpers “virile.” The way Wulpy “gimp[s]”
is “formidable, not as if he was dragging his leg but as if he were kicking things out of the way”
(Collected Stories 306). In “By the St. Lawrence,” Rob Rexler, eminent Bertolt Brecht scholar, is
a “crustacean,” a “human bivalve,” deformed by polio in childhood (3, 11). Though Bellow
makes repeated, unsparing reference to Rexler’s disability (“deformed man,” “bitter aging
hunchback”), he also emphasizes Rexler’s means for casting off the “outlook and habits of a
cripple” (9, 3). These include his prose’s “swift sentences,” his gait’s “virile descending limp”
(1, 3). In what sense can a limp be virile? The association ceases to be peculiar once one
considers the strength required to haul a defiant limb from place to place. Indeed, Rexler’s
deformity transforms him into a “cripple gymnast whose skeleton was the apparatus he worked
out on like an acrobat in training” (3). As an elderly man Rexler visits his childhood home of
Lachine, Canada, where he remembers seeing a man killed by a speeding train, the man’s lungs
lying “in the roadbed as pink as a rubber eraser” (11). Approaching death himself, Rexler
dismisses his life’s work as the “[e]vidence of wasted years,” and his memory of those splattered
organs—“the foolish oddity of the shapes” —comes to symbolize a “refutation of the high-
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ranking desires and subtleties” (11). Dejected, Rexler reflects that “everything depends on these
random-looking parts,” those delicate organs strewn across the train tracks. Rexler’s
“everything” is not only individual life, but the scope of human achievement. The fragility of the
body renders man’s so-called higher impulses “finite” (11). Sure, vita brevis, Rexler suggests—
but ars longa? Hardly.
The assailability of the body deflates the ambitions of the spirit—this is the eraser-pink
lesson of the dead man’s organs. Elsewhere, Bellow worries over this unavoidable frailty which
Roth calls the “radical vincibility of one’s physical being” (Why Write? 303). Fittingly, Mr.
Sammler’s Planet (1970), the “first Bellow novel to confront the Holocaust directly” (Love and
Strife 69), marks its author’s “preoccupation” with this theme (Why Write? 303). (What do the
Buchenwald newsreels show if not the “vincibility,” the expungibility, of the Jewish body?) Yet
Bellow’s oeuvre also presents the body, especially the Jewish body, as the site of historical
continuity. Bellow creates a counter-image to the helpless, “finite” organs by revising and
rehabilitating for his own needs the racialist’s pejorative belief in the Jewish body’s
immutability. Does each Jewish face contain James’s “hard glitter of Israel”? Does Bellow
believe with Grant that “the mixture of a European and a Jew is a Jew”? No. Nevertheless,
Bellow finds in the Jewish body a link to what Rexler calls “that old-time feeling” (11)—to
familial memory and an unextinguished Jewish past.
Let’s return to Moses Herzog, whom I left gazing woefully at his mirror. There Herzog
subjects himself to ruthless “self-examination[s]” after a withering divorce (420). Finding
himself “caught in the part of the aging, conceited handsome man,” Herzog performs a rigorous
physical, intellectual, and moral audit (428). (Conclusion: he is a balding scholar manqué, a
subpar husband and father.) But the mirror, tally keeper of its master’s sorrows, also reminds
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Herzog of his physical connection to family memory. This is an embryonic, somewhat gloomy,
and ultimately fleeting sketch of the Jewish body’s immutability, but one upon which Bellow
builds in later fictions.
Moses lights on this point of familial continuity when he purchases a new wardrobe after
his doctor advises him to ease his mind with a vacation. The ordeal is demoralizing. Eyeing the
“reckless and gaudy styles” of a Fifth Avenue shop window—“madras coasts, shorts with
melting bursts of Kandinsky colors”—reminds Herzog of his age, his “pitiful puckered knees and
varicose veins” (435). (Herzog’s literary antecedent is Gustav von Aschenbach, pathetically
dolled up in infectious Venice.) Then, as he considers a crimson and white striped coat—the
salesman’s recommendation—Herzog recalls his ancestors, who in the Old Country had “worn
black gabardines down to the ground” (436). The story of the Herzog family’s American
assimilation bumps up against his wounded self-regard when he returns home. Seeing his mirrorimage in the ridiculous blazer plus swimming trunks and a straw hat, Herzog laments that he
looks “gruesomely unlike” the rabbis who were his forefathers—Jews with beards “thick and
rich, full of religion.” Herzog’s mother had hoped he would emulate those rabbinical ancestors.
Instead Herzog is a secular scholar, clean-shaven, his “face charged with heavy sadness, foolish
utter longing of which a religious life might have purged him” (438).
Some critics interpret Herzog’s sadness as a facial manifestation of his distance from his
observant ancestors.72 Thus, Paule Lévy concludes that Bellow’s hero wrestles with a “guilt
engendered by his own cultural denial.” Turning his back on his Jewishness, Lévy argues,
Herzog “disguise[s] himself as a dandy” in his efforts to “emulate the WASPS” (113). But Levy
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fails to notice that Herzog’s disguise fails from the start. The new swimwear exaggerates his
estrangement from both his Jewish past and a gentile present: “[b]are-legged,” Herzog reflects,
“he looked like a Hindu” (438). Why a Hindu? Bellow’s gag plays on the inappropriateness of an
aging American Jew’s accidental resemblance to, say, Gandhi in his loincloth; the comparison
also revisits The Victim’s racial likening of the Jew with the Eastern other. In this case Herzog—
author of a scholarly book, Romanticism and Christianity, which demonstrates his acquaintance
with a Western, Christian gaze—recognizes that his efforts to bedeck himself as a dude evoke
both his ancestors’ Judaic gabardines and, in an imaginative movement further east, a barelegged Hindu.
Yet there is a negative capability to Herzog’s self-deprecating scrutiny which Bellow
later explores. Beneath the stranger’s garments, Moses identifies a point of physical continuity
between himself and those bygone, bearded Herzogs. His family’s history lies below the
epidermis, in those “long veins winding in the arms and filling in the hanging hands, an ancient
system, of greater antiquity than the Jews themselves” (438). What theory of the body does
Moses’s doleful vanity disclose as he reflects on his veins? The circulatory system’s antiquity is
self-evident: man’s veins perfected their circuit-like organization long before he named them or
identified their structure. By comparing the Jews to this bodily system, Bellow endows their
history with a comparable permanence; Jewish continuity becomes an object of scientific
scrutiny, as immutable as gravity. The Jewish body—that maligned and besmirched form—
becomes the seat of Jewish historical endurance, and Bellow makes a claim for Jewish antiquity
that flouts racialized, Spenglerian claims of obsolescence.
This is a powerful image with deep connections to Bellow’s Jewish concerns, but Herzog
is the wrong vehicle for exploring the body’s relationship to “old-time feeling.” Herzog’s
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heartfelt recollections of his ancestors and his childhood usually end in cynicism. In a
particularly poignant memory, Herzog’s mother “moisten[s] her handkerchief at her mouth and
rub[s] his face clean.” Herzog can still recall the saliva’s odor, but what does that prove? “All
children have cheeks and all mothers spittle to wipe them tenderly. These things either matter or
they do not matter” (449). Moses concludes that his “acute memories are probably symptoms of
disorder” (449). Whether embodied or recollected, a matter of veins or brain, family memories
render Herzog vulnerable to the naive, dangerous nostalgia he calls “potato love” (493). Leader
characterizes potato love as a “degenerate longing for communion with the mass,” a love based
on “falsity” and generality that “breeds further falsity” (To Fame and Fortune 632). A
knowledge based in Jewish memory and the Jewish body need not be identical with potato love,
Leader suggests, but Herzog, on high-alert to feeling since his betrayal by Madeleine and
Gersbach, is too reality-focused to worry about the distinction (631).73
Bellow finds a more fitting vehicle for this theory of the Jewish body in “The Old
System” (1968). Again he begins from a place of skepticism: the story’s narrator, Dr. Samuel
Braun, is a scientist, and his expertise in the “chemistry of heredity” complicates his speculations
on the inheritance of familial characteristics (98). Recalling his beloved dead on a “thoughtful
day,” Dr. Braun ultimately questions the limitations of scientific knowledge in matters of family
feeling (90). The heart of Dr. Braun’s reminiscences is a squabble between his older cousins,
Isaac and Tina. Resentful that her brother, a wealthy real estate developer, refuses to include his
siblings in his investment opportunities—in fact, Isaac avoids fundraising with family money
because Tina and his brothers have proven unreliable, withdrawing from a previous deal at the
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last minute—Tina habitually spurns Isaac’s gestures of reconciliation and fraternal decency. The
internecine drama reaches its bitter denouement when Tina insists that Isaac, repentant despite
his innocence, pay a $20,000 fee to visit her on her deathbed. How is it possible, Dr. Braun
wonders, that a mere “protein molecule originating in an invisible ferment” can produce “such
propensities of ingenuity, and creative malice and negative power” (98)? What is the relationship
between genetics and “these particular forms—these Isaacs and these Tinas” (116)? Is genetics
in fact the source of this familial continuity? As the story progresses, Dr. Braun identifies a more
traditional force at work, which he calls “the old system”—Bellow’s phrase, according to
Leader, for “the Jewish way of intense and voluble family feeling, of the open expression of
anger and love” (To Fame and Fortune 129).
Dr. Braun’s questions are a molecular variation of the physiognomist’s impulse to
explain character through the interpretation of physical form. For this reason, the scientist’s
sketches of his cousins allude to both Jewish history and phylogeny, the study of a species’
evolutionary history. Recalling a boyhood memory of sitting with his older cousin beneath a
sycamore tree, Dr. Braun presents Isaac’s inchoate sense of Jewish familial responsibility as
instinctual, an evolutionary adaptation: “[Dr. Braun’s] senior by fifteen years, Isaac had a mature
business face. Born to be a man, in the direct Old Testament sense, as that bird on the sycamore
was born to fish in water” (92). For the budding scientist, his cousin’s connection to Jewish
mensch-hood is predetermined, in-born, visible on a face prone to “archaic looks” (94). Isaac
makes good on his face’s promise in adulthood. He becomes an “old-fashioned Jewish
paterfamilias,” wealthy and Orthodox (97). He lives in and embodies the “old system,” a fact Dr.
Braun interprets as an act of historical defiance. Through his “ample old-fashioned respectable
domestic life,” Cousin Isaac revives in miniature “an Eastern European model” of Jewish

81
existence that had been “completely destroyed in 1939 by Hitler and Stalin” (104). In this way,
Dr. Braun revises Grant and Spengler. The scientist presents his cousin’s connection to Jewish
antiquity as a sign of virtue, strength, and endurance. Isaac’s “archaic” appearance and behavior
restores the “old conditions” obliterated by the twentieth-century’s “modern race notions” (104).
Isaac’s primordial Jewishness even stands out in comparison to more frum, or pious,
Jews. Perplexed by Tina’s deathbed proposition, Isaac seeks the spiritual counsel of the
Williamsburg-based leader of a Chabad-like ultra-Orthodox congregation.74 In his business
clothes, Braun “seem[s] no less archaic” than the rabbi himself or his “bearded followers” in
long coats (111). The rabbi “has the old tones, the manner, the burly poise, the universal calm
judgment of the Jewish moral genius”; nevertheless, Dr. Braun speculates that his cousin might
balk at “something foreign” or “contemporary” about him (113). Samuel’s justification builds on
the image of the sycamore-dwelling fish hawk. The rabbi and his followers are “recent birds,
finches, thrushes,” while Isaac is a “more antique type” with “more scale than feather in his
wings” (113). The rabbi’s centuries-old trappings of Jewish Orthodoxy (“hat and beard and
gabardine”) do not do not predate Isaac’s “ruddy brown eye” or the “tough muscles of [his] jaw
working under the skin” (113). The rabbi remains contemporary despite his traditional plumage.
Isaac Braun, Jurassic Jew, represents an earlier stage of evolution—a point of pride for his
science-minded nephew, Dr. Braun.
But fathers alone do not preserve a Jewish family line. Dr. Braun also locates an ancient,
embodied Jewishness in Aunt Rose, mother of Isaac and Tina. Stout and wide-hipped, as
indefatigable as she is immovable, Aunt Rose is “the original dura mater—the primal hard
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mother” (93). Dr. Braun repeats himself since Rose is doubly a dura mater. Hard mother, a
translation from the Latin, accurately captures Aunt Rose’s ruthlessness, a fact written on her
“flaming face” and “sharp straight nose,” which promises to “cut through mercy like a thread”
(104, 93).75 Dura mater’s anatomical meaning effectively evokes Rose’s physicality: she is the
tough membrane that envelops the brain and spinal cord, the tissue that protects the nerves and
brain activity of the Braun family. Between Herzog and this story, the “old system” of Jewish
continuity moves from the circulatory to the nervous system. In Aunt Rose, Bellow creates an
archetypical first-generation Jewish matriarch (thus primal), a newly-minted American intent on
“building a kingdom with the labor of [her husband] and her obedient sons” (93). American
ambition meets Old Testament structures within Aunt Rose’s fleshy form: with her “large bust”
and “wide hips,” she is a maternal Jacob, her descendants the tribal leaders of a new land (93).
Though not a “big woman,” Aunt Rose is monumental, her form befitting a matriarch. If
her bust and hips are sculpted for the benefit of future generations, her antique shape, like her
son’s, evokes a Jewish past. Dr. Braun notes that Rose has “old-fashioned thighs of those
corrupted shapes that now belong to history,” an odd, suggestive phrase that obliquely evokes the
“vast and trunkless legs of stone” of Shelley’s “Ozymandias” (93). But in what sense can a
particular thigh-shape be lost to time? The qualifier “old-fashioned” links Rose’s forlorn thighs
to the Ashkenazi Jewish life that Hitler destroyed and which Isaac works to recreate.76 Rose’s
legs are a physical analogue to the old system, “the old conditions” (104). Being a testament to
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times past comes with locomotive consequences. Aunt Rose’s corrupted thighs “hamper her
walk,” and the “excessive female weight she carrie[s]” damages her feet (93). Yet this painful
description remains ambivalent, for the emphasis on Aunt Rose’s gendered burden suggests a
perpetual, symbolic pregnancy: she bears the weight of all future Brauns. A symbol of Jewish
life past and present, Aunt Rose moves with an appropriately pained dignity. As we will see in
The Bellarosa Connection, Bellow associates hampered walks with fecundity in women and
virility in men—an inversion of fin-de-siècle stereotypes of the Jew’s malformed and unathletic
body.
Following Aunt Rose’s death, Tina anoints herself the Brauns’ new hard mother. A
“gloomy, obese woman, sternly combed,” she is a fitting successor because her body prepared
her for authority. With her massive size and hair pulled back tight (“the hairline was a fighting
barrier”), Tina assumes a “totalitarian air” and manages the “dictatorship” of her family and “her
huge person” (103). Like her mother, Tina elicits obedience through her stubbornly oversized
body—a “primordial idea, hugely blown up,” an assertion of her “personality” converted into a
“tremendous female form.” (103).77 Tina’s uncontainable flesh grants her “majesty,” her regal
largeness reminiscent of Elizabethan portraiture, in which the globe-sized Virgin Queen holds a
tiny hand over the map of her vast dominion. But despite Tina’s apparent loathing for Isaac’s
Orthodoxy—she finds an irony in Isaac reading the psalms in his Cadillac, suggesting her
brother would “pick God’s pocket” (98)—her reign ultimately preserves the old system it would
eradicate. When Isaac arrives at her deathbed with money in tow she reneges, refusing the fee
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and granting her brother the “Jewish deathbed scene” he wants. The “old rules” of Jewish
family-feeling remain in place (107).
In narrating the story of Isaac and Tina’s feud and reconciliation, Dr. Braun reveals his
own unscientific nostalgia for the old system. Trained to observe data with a “cold eye,” Braun
nonetheless becomes “bitterly moved” by his recollections and the thought of Tina’s and Isaac’s
deaths: “Oh, these Jews—these Jews! Their feelings, their hearts! Dr. Braun often wanted
nothing more than to stop all this. For what came of it?” (116). Despite himself, Dr. Braun finds
his scientific understanding eclipsed by an intense emotional response that he explicitly identifies
as Jewish. The drama of Dr. Braun’s relationship to the old system is related to his ongoing
questions about the mysteries of heredity, which produce such distinct figures as religious,
penitent Isaac and stubborn, dictatorial Tina. How can a protein molecule, Dr. Braun asks at the
story’s outset, “be capable of printing a talent or a vice upon a billion hearts”? How does a
family acquire such “fertility of metaphor” (98)? How can “these Isaacs and these Tinas” be both
individuals and, in a larger sense, merely forms (116)? The answer resides in the “old system” of
the Jewish body, the mysteries of which outrun the confines of Dr. Braun’s scientific
methodology.
Yet Bellow’s efforts to restore dignity to the Jewish body do not ignore the brutal
realities of twentieth-century European history and the destruction wrought by its “modern race
notions.” Both “The Old System” and his subsequent novel, Mr. Sammler’s Planet (1970),
include unflinching portraits of antisemitism’s physical collateral.78 In the earlier story, Dr.
Braun’s uncle (Isaac’s father) suffers physically and emotionally as a conscript in the Russo-
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Japanese war. A victim of Czar Nicholas II’s “irrational decree,” Uncle Braun is embroiled in
gentile mishigas (“How those old-time Jews despised the goy wars”), forced to subsist on
“maggoty pork” in Sakhalin, a distant island off Russia’s eastern coast. Doubly unclean, maggotridden pork is a special indignity for the displaced Jew.79 As a soldier, Uncle Braun marches on
“short humiliated legs” until, the war over, he “escape[s] through Manchuria” and hops on a
Swedish ship to Canada. But the damage has been done. Dr. Braun recalls that his uncle, though
formerly a railroad worker, “did not look so strong…[h]is chest was deep and his arms long, but
the legs like felt, too yielding, as if the escape from Sakhalin and trudging in Manchuria had
been too much” (92). Uncle Braun’s disproportionate physique belongs to antisemitic caricature;
in American and German newspapers and humor magazines, weak Jewish legs bend under the
weight of overfed bellies.80 Nevertheless, Bellow challenges the fin-de-siècle image of the
bandy-legged Jew as unfit soldier by switching that stereotype’s cause and effect; in “The Old
System,” it is the humiliation of being conscripted into loathed “goy wars” that deforms Uncle
Braun’s legs, making them “yield” like “felt.”
Similarly, Artur Sammler of Mr. Sammler’s Planet admits he has been “deformed” by his
encounters with Nazi violence (178). The poise and sophisticated bearing of Sammler, an
Oxford-educated intellectual historian, belies the unbearable indignities he suffered as a
concentration camp prisoner. He recalls in a bruised staccato his wife’s execution by firing squad
and his own unlikely survival:
[H]e himself underwent murder beside her. When he and sixty or seventy others, all
stripped naked and having dug their own grave, were fired upon and fell in. Bodies upon
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his own body. Crushing. His dead wife nearby somewhere. Struggling out much later
from the weight of corpses, crawling out of the loose soil. Scraping on his belly. Hiding
in a shed. Finding a rag to wear. Lying in the woods many days. (71)
Hiding in the Zamosht forest, Sammler is “not entirely human.” His mind lacks the capacity for
moral judgment, his body the chemical compounds associated with human life: “fat, nicotine,
alcohol, sexual excretions…[n]one of these in Sammler’s blood” (108). Frozen, delirious,
starving, he kills a wandering German soldier for clothes and food. To explain this act of
violence, Sammler evokes the mass grave: “humankind marks certain people for death...and I
have been in this written-off category” (178). Surviving in spite of this marking “leaves you with
idiosyncrasies” (178). The physical manifestation of Sammler’s deformity is his “opaque guppy
eye,” damaged by a camp guard’s rifle butt. The cloudy eye is also the vehicle of Sammler’s
obsession (197). Half-blind, viewing the world askance, Sammler sees the hedonistic, sex-addled
New York of the late sixties as an American parallel to Nazi nihilism. Bellow needs Sammler’s
injury, his physical and psychical scars, to employ the elderly refugee as a mouthpiece for his
own cultural gripes, but Sammler receives no consolation for his trauma. His quasi-Tiresian
sagacity doesn’t lessen his deformity.81
One of the American types Sammler’s skewed vision identifies is the so-called “physical
culturist,” the physique-obsessed antithesis of Bellow’s limping heroes (53). Wood notes that
Bellow is “rarely found describing young people,” that “even his middle-aged characters seem
old” (xv). More accurately, Bellow lampoons the fit and youthful as superficial, body-conscious
sculptors of the self. Sammler introduces the “physical culturist” as a means of describing

81

By characterizing Sammler as quasi-Tiresian, I follow Leader, who writes that Bellow’s hero is “only half
prophet, unlike blind Tiresias or the Oedipus of Oedipus at Colonus” (Love and Strife 77).

87
Wharton Horricker, the athletic beau to Sammler’s niece. Horricker materializes through
Sammler’s shorthand:
A physical culturist (tennis, weightlifting). Tall, from California, marvelous teeth. There
was gymnastic apparatus in his house. Angela [Sammler’s niece] described the slanted
board with footstraps for sit-ups, the steel bar in the doorway for chinning...and the
prevalence of mirrors. Horricker was handsome. Sammler agreed. Cheerful, somewhat
unformed as yet, Horricker was perhaps intended by nature to be rascally (what was all
that muscle for? Health? Not banditry?)...With long California legs, small hips, crisp long
hair with a darling curl at the back, he was a mod dandy. (53).
This punctuated account exposes the dashing Horricker as no more than his anatomical parts. He
has the psychology of a ship’s manifest. If Bellow needs a novel to depict Sammler and a story
for Dr. Braun, then Horricker’s suitable form is a list. No need to waste verbs on someone who
can be captured with nouns: tennis, weightlifting—ironically, these nouns denote activity, though
we hardly see Horricker move. As Sammler asks, what was all that muscle for?
Horricker lacks the virility and introspection of Bellow’s limpers and aging scholars. The
details of Sammler’s list invite this comparison. Horricker’s “gym apparatus” recalls Bellow’s
far more sympathetic portrait of the venerable Rob Rexler, whose polio-deformed body acts as
its own gymnastic “apparatus.” Similarly, the “prevalence of mirrors” within Horricker’s house
brings to mind Herzog’s own aborted attempts to participate in what Sammler derides as the
“cult of masculine elegance” (53). Like Herzog, Horricker is obsessed with appearances. He is
“critical of other people’s clothes” and “submit[s]” Angela to a “West Point inspection” when
they meet (53). Yet Horricker’s gaze never wounds him; his mirror is no enemy. Self-critically,
an overdressed Herzog recalls Matthew 6:28, an injunction against indulging in the frivolity of
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fashion: “Consider the lilies of the field, he remembered, they toil not, neither do they spin, yet
Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed [like one of these] (Herzog 438). Horricker’s “selfpampering fastidiousness” produces no crisis of conscience. Instead it is Sammler who,
considering Horricker, ponders “Solomon in all his glory versus the lilies of the field” (Mr.
Sammler’s Planet 53-4).82
A later iteration of Horricker appears in Bellow’s following novel, Humboldt’s Gift, as
George Sweibel. An old chum of egg-headed narrator Charlie Citrine, Sweibel is his friend’s
connection to their hometown Chicago’s underworld of enticing criminality and sleaze.
Proximity to this body-master endangers Bellow’s hero. In a reaper-panicked reaction to the
death of his friend and mentor Von Humboldt Fleisher (the novel’s titular gift-giver), Citrine
places himself under Sweibel’s tutelage and develops into an “intense physical culturist”
(Humboldt’s Gift 251). To overcome visions of himself “on the border of senility, his back
hooked, and feeble,” Citrine does head-stands and brags to his girlfriend about his low
cholesterol, his “amazingly youthful prostate,” his “supernormal EKG” (252). Vanity threatens
the soul, but Sweibel places his friend in the more immediately precarious position of owing
money to Rinaldo Cantabile, a small-time gangster with much to prove. Citrine amasses his debt
at a card game which Sweibel arranges as an antidote to his friend’s stuffy intellectual life.
Without some “low company,” Sweibel fears, Citrine will “dry out” (303, 302)—a phrase that
connects Sweibel to a baser figure in Bellow’s oeuvre, the lecture-hall heckler of Mr. Sammler’s
Planet who rallies against the historian’s erudition by insisting that the old man’s “balls are dry”
(Mr. Sammler’s Planet 33). Citrine soon learns how revitalizing it is to receive threatening phone
calls at two in the morning, to arrive home to find his brand-new Mercedes—another symptom
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of his death-denial—decimated by blows from a baseball bat, its body pocked and dented like a
golf ball.
Sweibel’s absurd prescriptions follow Citrine through the novel. Cantabile, ridiculous in
his own right, notes that Citrine’s “health fiend” friend, “with all that color in his face,” remains
a coward (280). This ironic condemnation restates Sammler’s Horricker question: what are this
man’s muscles for? Citrine’s description of Sweibel’s materialist spirituality combines awe and
ridicule, questioning his friend’s authority as a health advisor. Sweibel manufactures wisdom by
embracing a physical occultism:
George feels that he can speak for Nature. Nature, instinct, heart guide him. He is
biocentric. To see him rub his large muscles, his Roman Ben Hur chest and arms with
olive oil is a lesson in piety toward the organism. Concluding, he takes a long swig from
the bottle. Olive oil is the sun and the ancient Mediterranean. Nothing is better for the
bowels, the hair, the skin. He holds his own body in numinous esteem. He is a priest to
the inside of his nose, his eyeballs, his feet. (285)
Sweibel is preposterously in tune with his body (do eyeballs need a priest?). Yet his muscular
self-knowledge nearly undoes him: “[i]mmediately after his gall-bladder operation,” Citrine
notes, Sweibel, “his own naturopath,” insists on performing push-ups beside his hospital bed
(291). The self-prescribed exercise causes an infection that nearly kills him.
The Sweibels and Horrickers of Bellow’s fictional world search for truth within their
bodies but end up with their heads up their asses. In contrast, Humboldt’s Gift offers a
competing, restorative image of bodily health when Citrine visits a Russian bath on Chicago’s
Division Street. Compared to the posh Downtown Health Club where Citrine exercises, the
Division Street Bath is home to ancient practices and aboriginal bodies. Its members believe that
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it is “healthful, good for the blood to be scrubbed with oak leaves lathered in old pickle barrels”
(319). Bellow describes with a humor-tinged tenderness these bathers who “resist...modernity”:
[T]he patrons of the Russian Bath are cast in an antique form. They have swelling
buttocks and fatty breasts as yellow as buttermilk. They stand on thick pillar legs affected
with a sort of creeping verdigris or blue-cheese mottling of the ankles. After steaming,
these old fellows eat enormous snacks of bread and salt herring or large ovals of salami
and dripping skirt-steak and they drink schnapps. They could knock down walls with
their hard stout old-fashioned bellies. Things are very elementary here. You feel that
these people are almost conscious of obsolescence, of a line of evolution abandoned by
nature and culture. So down in the super-heated subcellars all these Slavonic cavemen
and wood demons with hanging laps of fat and legs of stone and lichen boil themselves
and splash ice water on their heads by the bucket. (319-320)
Though Citrine cracks a joke or two at their expense, he presents the bathers with reverence and
awe. (Bellow doesn’t say so, but these men are probably jokers, as old Jews tend to be.) A
metaphor of statuary (“cast in an antique form”) runs through these descriptions, transforming
unsightly signs of age into memorialized virtues. Aging legs become “pillars,” their multicolored
varicose veins a form of “verdigris.” These men fail to meet the physical culturist’s standard of
beauty, but they don’t have to: their forms are “old-fashioned,” like Aunt Rose’s thighs, symbols
of historical endurance. Thus Bellow endows their swollen guts with a wrecking-ball power that
contrasts with Uncle Braun’s yielding felt-legs or the bald, pink lungs on the train tracks. Though
“elementary,” Bellow’s bathers are ravenous, forceful, even destructive. Who needs muscle
when buttocks, breasts, and bellies command such attention?
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The bodies of Bellow’s steam-bathers also connect them to Jewish traditions. In
Portnoy’s Complaint, Roth presents the shvitz as a “habitat in which [Jewish men] can be
natural,” a place free from “goyim and women” (54). Roth’s description of the steam-bath as a
“prehistoric...sloppy watery time” predates Bellow’s, and his image is coarser; there, Jewish
bathers return as if by “time-machine” to “an age when they existed as some herd of Jewish
animals, whose only utterance is oy, oy” (53, 54). Bellow, the master, elaborates on his
apprentice’s vision, transforming the aging Jewish body into a cultural legacy. On the streets of
Chicago, Bellow’s men may be strangers, but inside the shvitz they are autochthonous, heirs to a
forgotten lineage, a faded old system. The outward sign of their belonging is their statue-like
limbs of “stone and lichen” (presumably, their pale skin and blue-green veins). Each
monumental, antique form is a Jewish Ozymandias imploring, Look on my liverwurst, ye
Mighty, and despair! The Jewish body-monument displays a strength and endurance that belies
its flabby, mottled appearance, much as the virile cripple achieves authority by mastering his
disability.
Bellow perfects each of these archetypes in The Bellarosa Connection (1989), his most
masterful revision of “modern race notions.” Composed nearly two decades after “The Old
System” and Mr. Sammler’s Planet, The Bellarosa Connection borrows thematic and narrative
elements from each, and its hero, Harry Fonstein, is an unyielding, defiant successor to the
wounded European refugees of those earlier fictions. Fonstein is, like Sammler, a Polish
Holocaust survivor living in America; his story’s anonymous narrator is, like Samuel Braun, an
autumnal New World relative contemplating his beloved, European-born dead.83 The narrator
introduces himself at the story’s outset as a retired, widowed millionaire, living alone in a stately
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Philadelphia mansion that obscures his humble origins in New Jersey as the son of Russian
immigrants. Estranged from his family after marrying a non-Jew, he reminisces about his
exchanges with Fonstein and his American wife, Sorella, whom he has not seen in decades. The
Fonstein-focused memory-tour raises questions that Bellow had been brooding over in his fiction
and essays: What is the American Jew’s responsibility to the memory of the Holocaust? What
explains the constitutional differences separating Old and New World Jews? What solace can the
old system provide in an American milieu? What separates memory from understanding?84
Bellow’s concerns with the ambivalent value of memory enter the novella immediately,
for memory is his narrator’s business, “forty years in the trade” (35). The founder of the
Mnemosyne Institute, an organization that coaches statesmen and executives in the art of
retaining information, the narrator has made millions systematizing memory’s mystery. Given
his “innate gift of memory” (35), how does the narrator “[come] to embody,” in Aarons’s phrase,
“the American-born Jew without a sense of history or collective consciousness” (Aarons 64)?
The irony of the memory man’s historical blindness recapitulates the limitations of Dr. Braun’s
research on heredity. The narrator’s professional expertise occludes, rather than elucidates, his
familial interrogations; as he admits at the outset, his “pictures of [Fonstein and Sorella] are
probably too clear and pleasing to be true.” The expert’s Fonstein recollections are matters of
“emotional memory,” therefore “nothing like rocketry or gross national products.” His “technical
considerations” are a paltry vehicle for exploring the significance of his family’s intersection
with the brutality of recent Jewish history (36). Finding his powers inadequate, the narrator must
turn to another, physical model of memory—represented by Sorella—to grasp the meaning of the
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so-called Bellarosa Connection: Fonstein’s unlikely rescue engineered by showbiz impresario
Broadway Billy Rose, and Rose’s subsequent refusal to meet and accept the gratitude of the Jew
he saved from destruction.
The Bellarosa Connection features some of Bellow’s richest, most complex meditations
on the physiognomy of the Jewish body. Sensitive to the “disgrace” that body endured in the
death camps (There Is Simply Too Much 366), Bellow fashions a hero who flamboyantly
undermines Hitler’s “modern race notions.” A Jew with a shortened leg who walks on an
“orthopedic shoe” (Collected Stories 36), Fonstein emerges as an enhanced version of the
Einhornian virile cripple. Despite being doubly damned in fascist Europe, Fonstein proves
himself a “first-class man” (45). In this way, Fonstein “belong[s] to an even more advanced
category” than his antecedent.85 Einhorn’s disability is evidence of his mettle; in his kingdom of
Chicago’s Humboldt Park, he “boast[s]” of his infirmity “as a thing he had overcome” (Augie
March 461). Fonstein’s stakes are higher: according to Nazi race theory he is an untermensch,
his orthopedic boot a death sentence. But Fonstein’s relation to his ailment exists on an astral
plane: the limping Jew “converts weakness...into burnable energy” and “subsists on the matter he
destroys, just as the stars do” (Collected Stories 45). Faced with certain death, Fonstein struts
across the world-historical stage, boot and all. “Hitlerism,” explains the narrator, does not
destroy Fonstein, but “hasten[s] his development” (47).
What Fonstein develops into is a “person schooled in suffering and endurance” (47). His
survival in Europe and transformation into a successful American—married, rich after patenting
a thermostat, wearing an English-made bespoke boot instead of his Polish clunker—mocks the
Nazi ideology that marked him for death. As a “gimpy Galitzianer,” a Jew and a cripple,
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Fonstein threatens the health of Hitler’s restorative Reich (36). The significance of the Jew’s
defective feet had degraded since Lloyd George debuted his splayfoot youpin parody. Fascism’s
“utopian aesthetics,” writes Susan Sontag, demand “physical perfection”; SS uniforms (“tight,
heavy, stiff”) require “the wearer to stand up straight” (92, 99). Similarly, Gilman notes that an
“erect bearing” is a “touchstone for Nazi racial politics” (Stand Up Straight! 293) and quotes
Hans F.K. Günther, the Nazi Party’s pet race scientist: “the virtues of the Nordic race were
expressed in its male body type, with its straight posture, pronounced chest, and small abdomen.
This posture...was alien to the Eastern man” (qtd. in 291). Within this grim utopia of
standardized bodies, Fonstein’s shortened leg and limping walk reinforce his degenerate
Jewishness.
The narrator of Bellarosa makes explicit the connection between Fonstein’s leg and
certain death when he imagines his distant relative in Auschwitz:
[H]e would have been gassed immediately, because of the orthopedic boot. Some Dr.
Mengele would have pointed his swagger stick to the left, and Fonstein’s boot might by
now have been on view in the camp’s exhibition hall—they have a hill of cripple boots
there, and a hill of crutches and of back braces and one of human hair and one of
eyeglasses. Objects that might have been useful in German hospitals or homes. (36)
The passage’s power comes from its contrasts. An insouciant swing of Dr. Mengele’s “swagger
stick” yields mountains of abjection. Objects are kept, Jewish lives discarded. An astounding
transformation: the Aryan nation renders the Jewish parasite “useful” by metonymically reducing
him to his offending part (a crutch, a back brace). There is something especially perverse in this
mugging of medical accoutrements, which reveals a double standard even in matters of illness.
The crutch is no death sentence for the German body. A final irony: Bellow’s Mengele bears a
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walking aid as an emblem of his office. The swagger stick is a kinky testament to Mengele’s
authority, a reminder of his power to discipline. Bellow imagines the Angel of Death selecting
the crematorium-bound Jewish bodies with a symbol of his own body’s Aryan exceptionalism.
Thus, stick-wielding Mengele preserves Germany’s future for the Aryan, he who struts and
swaggers, poised and erect—never mind that Heinrich Himmler, head of the SS’s “race office,”
suffered from “poor posture” (Stand Up Straight 293)—and confines the limping, slouching Jew
to the dustbin of history. Nazi race theory maniacally extends Spengler’s insistence on the
Jewish race’s obsolescence to the Jewish body itself. In a painful twist, Auschwitz’s “exhibition
hall,” though built to instruct and educate, completes the Jew’s transformation into artifact.
Yet the exhibition hall is not Fonstein’s fate, as the natural history museum is not
Bellow’s.86 Instead, Fonstein “[gets] away from the Nazis, dragging one foot” (Collected Stories
37). Fonstein’s ailment is his avenue to a new American life; his American success disrupts what
Bellow dismisses as the “Darwinism” inherent in the Spenglerian view of history (“mankind
advanced by evolutionary stages”) (There Is Simply Too Much 358). In this sense, Fonstein is
made of sterner stuff than his Old World antecedents Sammler and Uncle Braun, whose
encounters with European antisemitism leave them wounded. At the same time, Fonstein
outclasses the New World Jews of The Bellarosa Connection—especially the narrator, who first
meets Fonstein as a concession to his father’s “paternal judgment.” A tough Russian immigrant,
the memory man’s father introduces Fonstein in the hope that it would “straighten [his son] out
to hear what people had suffered in Europe, in the real world.” Fonstein and the narrator are
direct contemporaries, but the latter’s life at thirty-two consists only of Greenwich Village
bohemianism. He is “immature, drifting, a layabout”—in short, a luftmensch, a “fooling

86

“It did no harm to picture myself in a museum,” Bellow explains in “A Jewish Writer in America.” “On the
contrary, I realized that I didn’t belong there” (There Is Simply Too Much 358)

96
intellectual gossip” and model of “American puerility.” A man of intellectual pretensions, he has
founded the as-yet-unsuccessful Mnemosyne Institute—“about as profitable as it [is]
pronounceable,” bemoans his father—yet his talent for memory is good for little more than party
tricks. Despite his ample brain-power, he has “nothing in his head but froth” (37).
The narrator’s empty-headedness corresponds to his own “tame” experience in World
War II as a “company clerk” on the Aleutian Islands of Alaska (38). Fonstein, on the other hand,
had “seen real action,” indeed had “survived the greatest ordeal of Jewish history” (38), a fact he
physiognomically bears upon his face and body. In contrast to the narrator’s froth-filled noggin,
Fonstein’s Yiddisher kopf is “heavy enough to topple a less determined man.” Like his boot and
prodigious skull, Fonstein’s “other peculiarities” testify to his fortitude: “vividly kinky” hair
bursts from his dome in a “strong black growth,” and “hints of wit at the corners of his mouth
and around the eyes” reveal his experience in the face of catastrophe (36). Stern, unflappable,
Fonstein has the look “of a man holding the lead in the hundred-meter breast-stroke race” (41).
Keeping “the furies of Europe at his back” has conditioned his character and body (37).
Yet the most telling physical difference between Fonstein and his American relative is
their height, for the narrator stands “six or eight inches” taller than the tenacious refugee (37).
Traditional physiognomy equates size and moral stature, as when Grant praises the tall warriorrace of Nordics or laments that the “dwarf stature” of Polish Jews (like Fonstein) will pollute the
American bloodstream (Grant 16). Within this framework, the Jew’s diminutive height is a
physical manifestation of his lowliness. Bellow impishly inverts this idea, transforming
Fonstein’s size into a moral ideal. Remarking on the “physical differences” between Old and
New World Jews, the narrator explains:
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My father’s height was five feet six inches, mine was six feet two inches. To my father,
this seemed foolishly wasteful somehow. Perhaps the reason was biblical, for King Saul,
who stood head and shoulders above the others, was verrucht—demented and
doomed...Therefore a Jew should not be unnecessarily large but rather finely made,
strong and compact. The main thing was to be deft and quick-witted. That was how my
father was and how he would have preferred me to be. My length was superfluous, I had
too much chest and shoulders, big hands, a wide mouth, a band of black mustache, too
much voice, excessive hair; the shirts that covered my trunk had too many red and gray
stripes, idiotically flashy. Fools ought to come in smaller sizes. A big son was a threat, a
parricide. Now Fonstein, despite his short leg, was a proper man, well arranged, trim,
sensible, and clever. (46-7)
Here “proper man” is mensch, a figure of virtue and importance, qualities inextricable from
Fonstein’s small packaging. The Jewish moral and intellectual genius resembles watchwork: it is
“finely made, strong and compact.” The phrase recalls Roth’s description of Bellow-surrogate
Felix Abravanel in The Ghost Writer (1979). Abravanel’s staggering gifts of charm, humor,
intelligence, and literary authority are “stored compactly” in “a head that the Japanese
technicians, with their ingenuity for miniaturizing, might have designed,” a “fully Semiticized
little transistor” (Ghost Writer 59). The engineering marvel of Bellow’s head (as Roth imagines
it) sheds light on the association the Mnemosyne founder’s father makes between compactness
and quick-wittedness or deftness. Both the small body and fast mind are characterized by
concision. Excess blunts the bon mot, bogs down decision-making with needless ambiguity. A
bigger body is harder to hide. For a Jewish cripple in fascist Europe, efficiency is key to survival:
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thus, after escaping Poland for Milan, Fonstein wills himself to speak Italian in his dreams “[s]o
as not to waste time” learning the language (38).
Superfluity, not husbandry, governs the narrator’s American body, a fact his father
registers as an Oedipal danger. If Jews should be compact, then the American-born Jews who
expand under “wider liberties” have assumed foreign, New World forms (47). They have
physically assimilated. Eager to dismiss his father’s mournful theory, the narrator insists that his
generation of Americanized Jews is larger as a result of “better nutrition” and “living it up with
no pales to confine us” (47).87 Yet the narrator protests too much, for his “giddy” unboundedness
explains not only his needless size and flashy sartorial taste, but his underdeveloped connection
to Jewish memory (47). The memory man is another version of Moses Herzog, whose own
excursions into striped foolishness remind him that he has strayed from the traditions of his
gabardine-wearing ancestors. Though not quite a physical culturist, the narrator also resembles
the vain, muscular, clothing-obsessed Wharton Horricker. Like these earlier Bellow figures, the
Bellarosa narrator grows up “under a larger range of influences and thoughts” than his European
progenitors. Liberated from the pales of his ancestors by American life, the narrator casts off his
patrimonial pale-thoughts, thereby severing his link to an inherited Jewish past (47).
The oversized son thus remains “a threat, a parricide,” defiant against Ravelstein’s
entreaty that a Jew “take a deep interest in the history of the Jews.” The narrator displays this
prejudice in his first interactions with Harry and Sorella Fonstein. A tremendous, fleshy outlier to
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the novella’s cast of short-sighted New World Jews, Sorella invites the narrator to participate in
theoretical and philosophical discussions about the Holocaust, but he counters with stubborn,
froth-minded resistance. “Forget it. Go American,” is the memory expert’s ironic (but unspoken)
advice to the refugee and his history-steeped wife (49). Meditating on Nazi brutality, the narrator
initially suggests, is a “pointless exercise,” a terrible coda to the trauma: “First those people
murdered you, then they forced you to brood on their crimes” (49). Elsewhere, the narrator
proclaims that “nothing is resolved by...historical meditations. To think doesn’t settle anything”
(47). His cynical declaration of thought’s impotence recalls Sammler’s more rightfully won
skepticism over “explanations”: “the roots of this, the causes of the other, the source of events,
the history, the structure, the reasons why. For the most part, in one ear out the other” (Mr.
Sammler’s Planet 3). Yet if memory “is life itself,” as the narrator claims at the novella’s outset
(Collected Stories 35), then advising Fonstein to forget his European past means sentencing him
to the death he narrowly avoided.
The narrator’s reluctance to discuss Jewish history with the Fonsteins places him in the
American company of Harry’s unlikely benefactor, the pint-sized theater producer Billy Rose,
who “refused to be thanked by the Jews his Broadway underground had rescued” (41). Having
arranged for Fonstein’s safe passage from Italy—Bellarosa is the bowdlerized version of Rose’s
name as spoken by an Italian prison guard—Rose washes his hands of the refugee. He ignores
letters of thanksgiving, returns checks unacknowledged, wordlessly cuts Fonstein when the
booted survivor happens upon him dining at Sardi’s. “One man’s gratitude is poison to his
benefactor,” suggests the narrator. Or would a meeting yield “[t]oo Jewish a moment” for Rose,
who styles himself a “full-fledged American” (43, 46)? Scholar Ruth R. Wisse writes that Rose
and the narrator are “specialists in retrieval—people and memories—who end up discarding
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what they had saved.” Rose rescues a man but leaves him to find his own way in America; the
narrator uses his staggering power of memory to amass “[his] Philadelphia millions” (Collected
Stories 36)—enough dough to marry a blue-blooded “Wasp lady” and buy an eighteenth-century
mansion, alienating himself from his father and his Jewish relatives in New Jersey—but refuses
to ruminate on the Shoah (55). Both men display an ambivalent commitment to European Jewish
life.
By monetizing his feats of memory, the narrator casts a “psychic darkness” over his
origins in New Jersey—an irony that distinguishes him the more typically Bellovian hero who
clings nostalgically to his Jewish past (55).88 This blind spot in his memory explains the
narrator’s sympathy for Billy Rose, who refuses to grant Fonstein an audience. When the
narrator first meets the Fonsteins in Lakewood, New Jersey around 1947, he tells Sorella that he
“break[s] [his] head trying to understand why it’s so important” for the refugee to meet his
begrudging benefactor (46). So what if the “wild pygmy” turned Fonstein down (46)? What
matters is that the booted refugee may thrive in the New World. Why fret over the circumstances
of his salvation or the horrors he escaped? Why not adopt the stance of Augie March and go at
things his own way?
The narrator reinforces his constitutional alignment with Billy Rose during the story’s
second act, set around 1959, when he runs into the Fonsteins at Jerusalem’s King David Hotel.
Newly successful, the memory man accepts an invitation to speak with Israeli powers-that-be
about setting up a new branch of the Mnemosyne Institute. (The project falls through; the
narrator is ill-suited to matters of Jewish memory.) The Fonsteins are on vacation, though the
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narrator soon learns that Sorella, unbeknownst to her husband, has shrewdly arranged their trip to
coincide with Billy Rose’s donation of a sculpture garden to the city of Jerusalem. Rose also
stays at the King David, and Sorella successfully strong-arms him into a meeting. Rose’s
admonishing refusal to meet the refugee recalls the narrator’s advice to “Go American.” “[W]hat
I did for you, take it and welcome,” Rose tells Fonstein’s dutiful, ingenious wife, “but spare me
the relationship and all the rest of it” (64). Unsurprisingly, the narrator professes to “understand”
Rose’s refusal, and dismisses Sorella’s fantasies of “closure” as naive (65). In the following
exchange, Sorella’s obligation to Fonstein and the memory of the Holocaust contrasts with the
narrator’s (and Rose’s) insouciance:
I said, “I’m trying to figure out what you had in mind [by approaching Rose].”
“Concluding a chapter in Harry’s life. It should be concluded,” said Sorella. “It was a part
of the destruction of the Jews. On our side of the Atlantic, where we weren’t threatened,
we have a special duty to come to terms with it…”
“Come to terms? Who, Billy Rose?”
“Well, he involved himself in it actively.”
I recall that I shook my head and said, “You were asking too much. You couldn’t have
gone very far with him.” (66-7)
The narrator who speaks to Sorella in Jerusalem is an American product of a restriction-free life,
the successful author, like Rose himself, of self-made millions. Though less of a showman, the
memory man understands the spectacle artist’s bottom line; he scoffs at the thought of Rose
reckoning with the ironies of his own unthreatened New World life. Neither can the narrator in
that moment make that reckoning himself. He remains too much the “immature unstable Jewish
American” that Sorella met in New Jersey (38).
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Despite these constitutional similarities, Billy Rose is a vastly different physical type than
the narrator. He is small (“about the size of Peter Lorre”), but without the enviable compactness
of Old World Jews like Fonstein or the narrator’s father (47). Though an assimilated American,
Billy Rose breaks from the novella’s theories about the children of Jewish immigrants who grow
needlessly large. What makes Billy “idiotically flashy” is his professional penchant for spectacle,
as seen in Jumbo (1935) and Billy Rose’s Aquacade (1937)—theatrical performances including a
live elephant and a swimming pool, respectively—gaudy analogues to the memory man’s
attention-grabbing striped shirts. Billy’s impulse toward glitz and showmanship—his version of
the narrator’s head-froth—emphasizes his diminutive stature, which the narrator repeatedly
ridicules. In addition to calling him a “wild pygmy” (46) and “little Lower East Side rat” (64),
Bellow’s narrator ascribes to Rose a history of “sexual humiliation” stemming from his
“unheroic privates” (41, 44). Whether Billy Rose truly displayed the “sexual development of a
ten-year-old-boy” is irrelevant (68); in The Bellarosa Connection, Rose’s smallness is complete
and all-encompassing, down to the most embarrassing detail.
Even Billy Rose’s grand gestures dwarf him, his acts of Jewish philanthropy eclipsed by
selfishness (smallness). The donation of the Jerusalem sculpture garden is, the narrator surmises,
an attempt “to put a top dressing of Jewish grandeur on his chicken-scratch career, on this poor
punished N.Y. soil of his” (64-5). Rose’s career, the narrator’s gardening metaphor indicates, is
all barrenness and infertility. (Similarly, he ascribes to Rose a sexual impotence, or at least
uselessness, when he suggests the producer “couldn’t do a thing” with the women he pursued
[64].) The sculpture garden becomes another spectacle of self-promotion. Sorella Fonstein, less
acerbic than Bellow’s narrator, interprets Billy’s Jerusalem visit as a “calculation,” an attempt
“to enter Jewish history, attaining a level far beyond show biz” (66). Similarly, the narrator
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questions the purity of Rose’s motivations in running the operation that saves Fonstein. Though
the publicity-seeking Rose is uncharacteristically secretive about this project, the narrator scoffs
that Rose’s “personal underground” is “inspired by The Scarlet Pimpernel,” the 1934 film in
which Leslie Howard plays an Englishman who saves French aristocrats from the Reign of
Terror (82). Implicit within this comparison is an accusation: the furtive rescue operation is
another oversized Hollywood production, albeit for a limited audience.
Billy Rose complicates, and perhaps undermines, the spirit of his operation by refusing to
meet Fonstein. The job done—the performance over—Rose snubs the refugee, who must make
his own way in America. Rose’s reason for avoiding even a handshake (“I shake hands when I
close a deal. Otherwise, my hands stay in my pockets” [66]) is that he “[doesn’t] need
entanglements,” a comment the narrator connects to George Washington’s Farewell Address
(64). The memory man is right to ascribe a particularly American meaning to Rose’s refusal,
which is also woundingly un-Jewish in the Old World sense. Entanglements are what make up
the old system. By insisting that Sorella and Fonstein “spare [him] the relationship and all the
rest of it,” Billy Rose cuts himself off from the tradition of Jewish fellow-feeling—an ironic
split, given the purpose of his underground. The Rose-Fonstein connection is disrupted, and Rose
remains infertile. The evidence of his American stuntedness is his body itself, cut off from old
system nutrients. Compared to Fonstein, the narrator notes, Billy Rose “couldn’t measure up”
(69).
The cases of Billy Rose and the Mnemosyne founder reveal the novella’s concerns with
how a Jewish life should be lived in the relative safety and comfort of America. The most
poignant articulation of this question comes from Sorella, the refugee’s American wife:
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The Jews could survive everything that Europe threw at them. I mean the lucky remnant.
But now comes the next test—America. Can they hold their ground, or will the U.S.A. be
too much for them? (69)
Neither the narrator (at the time of the Lakewood and Jerusalem episodes) nor Billy Rose
provides an encouraging answer to this question, a fact Bellow represents physically, as is his
wont: Billy is small because he is an island, while the narrator has grown needlessly large on
liberties, amassing money and success at the expense of familial and ancestral connection. Only
within the novella’s melancholic third act, set in present day (the late 1980s), does the narrator
grasp the importance of the Bellarosa (Missed) Connection. Elderly and widowed, the narrator is
stirred to reconnect with the Fonsteins—it is too late, they have died in a car accident—and
confesses the magnitude of his former blindness: “There was no way...in which I could grasp the
real facts in the case of Fonstein” (82). “The case of Fonstein” is a stand-in for the Shoah, for the
knowledge of the Jewish body’s precariousness.
The narrator owes this belated realization to the memory of Sorella’s instructive
conversation. She is The Bellarosa Connection’s beating heart and its model for American
engagement with Jewish history. Obese Sorella, a French teacher from the humble “backstreets
of Newark” (68), possesses one of the most exceptional bodies in Bellow’s oeuvre. She is so
astonishingly large as to “make you look twice at a doorway,” which she “filled...like a freighter
in a canal lock” (60). The analogy’s illuminating specificity eclipses its tinge of cruelty. To the
sailor, the ship is a massive feminine power, like the sea itself.89 Sorella’s staggering size affords
her a comparable esteem. When the narrator meets her in Lakewood, New Jersey, he finds her
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“sitting in state as obese ladies seem to do” (39). Like Aunt Rose and Cousin Tina in “The Old
System,” Sorella is “queenly, imperial,” her authority inseparable from her pronounced
fleshiness (76). If Fonstein is Bellow’s finest virile cripple, then Sorella—the refugee’s “ample
ballast” (50)—is an improved version of the Bellovian hard mother, her flesh a testament to the
endurance of the old system.
Sorella is an improvement not only because her shape is so remarkable, but because she
combines Aunt Rose’s cunning fortitude with intellectualism and imagination. In New Jersey,
the narrator notes that the sharp-minded Sorella had “set herself to master the subject” of the
destruction her husband narrowly escaped (49). When he meets an expanded Sorella a decade
later in Jerusalem, he recognizes her fat as the embodied expression of her commitment to her
husband’s memories. Flesh is the medium of her message. Sorella’s tremendous American size is
not superfluous or laughable like the narrator’s excessive height, but a “powerful design” that
testifies to her extraordinary character (51). She has willfully grown into a “biological
monument,” like the Division Street steam-bathers of Humboldt’s Gift (65). To what does
Sorella’s flesh testify? The narrator speculates:
Maybe Sorella was trying to incorporate in fatty tissue some portion of what [her
husband] had lost—members of his family. There’s no telling what she might have been
up to. All I can say is that it (whatever it was at bottom) was accomplished with some
class or style. (60)
Sorella’s decision to carry the weight of her husband’s history places her within Aunt Rose’s
tradition, but she outclasses her predecessor. She assumes voluntarily the burden that Aunt
Rose’s “old-fashioned thighs” naturally carry. What’s more, Aunt Rose is an Old World Jew
making her way in America; Sorella is an American Jew—with all the liberties of the narrator or
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Billy Rose—who nevertheless transmogrifies Fonstein’s memories into flesh (thus: incorporate)
and wears them on her skeleton.
Sorella’s project is a physical burden. The narrator makes repeated reference to her
“small feet,” noting that she cannot stand for long periods (52); in Jerusalem, Sorella is “not built
for sight-seeing” (51). More soberly, the memory man refers to the “deformity” of her
“outrageous size” (64). But Sorella, like her husband, transforms pain and weakness into
“burnable energy.” Her mastery of this transmutation explains why she ultimately eclipses
Fonstein as the tale’s hero; when the narrator tries to locate the Fonsteins in present day, it is
Sorella’s company he longs for. (Another explanation: Bellow, concerned with American life
after the Holocaust, must display an American model for the reader’s consideration.) In the
novella’s final act, the narrator remembers her as a “superior person,” a phrase that recalls
William Einhorn (“the first superior man I knew,” says Augie). And like stately Einhorn, the
chair-bound autocrat, Sorella is regal and, therefore, “inevitably isolated” (76). The narrator
resembles Augie gushing over Einhorn when he reflects that, “[i]n this world of liars and
cowards there are people like Sorella,” people who exhibit “[g]reatness” (64). What inspires this
remark and assures the narrator of Sorella’s exceptionalism is the “candor” with which she
describes her flesh as “boundless,” an “Everest of lipoids” (64). If this admission testifies to
Sorella’s “force of personality” (64), it also demonstrates that she, like her limping husband,
transforms apparent weaknesses into strength. As the narrator writes, Sorella “accepted the
challenge of size as Houdini might have asked for tighter knots, more locks on the trunk, deeper
rivers to escape from” (51).90 The refugee’s wife makes a defiant art from burdens, restrictions,
and debility—an inversion of traditional physiognomy with deep roots in Bellow’s fiction.
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The strongest testament to Sorella’s authority is the narrative itself, which the memory
man mournfully composes upon learning of the Fonstein’s deaths some thirty years after their
Jerusalem meeting. Having finally acknowledged the limitations of his “New World version of
reality”—a reality which mere contingency left unmarred by the “merciless brutality” Jewish life
had historically been subject to—he longs to confess to Harry and Sorella. “I was a Jew of an
entirely different breed…[a]nd therefore (yes, go on, you can’t avoid it now) closer to Billy
Rose” than Fonstein or his father, men without illusions about the Jewish body’s expungibility
(81). One may include Sorella as this list’s sole American entry. Yet a final description of the
splendor of Sorella’s body points in the other direction, away from the Jewish body’s vincibility
and toward its capacity for endurance. Seated with Sorella on the terrace of the King David
Hotel, the narrator looks out toward the “medieval wall of the Old City across the valley”:
In 1959 the Israelis were shut out of [the Old City]; it was Indian country then. At the
moment, I wasn’t thinking of Jews and Jordanians, however. I was having a civilized tea
with a huge lady who was also distinctly, authoritatively dainty. The beehive [hairdo she
wore in New Jersey] was gone. Her fair hair was cropped, she wore Turkish slippers on
her small feet, which were innocently crossed under the beaten brass of the tray table.
The Vale of Hinnom, once the Ottoman reservoir, was green and blossoming. What I
have to say here is that I was aware of—I directly experienced—the beating of Sorella’s
heart as it faced the challenge of supply in so extensive an organism. This to me was a
bold operation, bigger than the Turkish waterworks. I felt my own heart signifying
admiration for hers—the extent of the project it had to face. (52)

had an intimation of the holocaust [sic] and was working out ways to escape from the death camps” (Humboldt’s
Gift 442).
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The narrator describes the “project” of Sorella’s heart with reverence, even spiritualism. Her
body—the body of “a Jewish lady from New Jersey”—is connected to the land and possesses as
much history, and so Bellow’s description slides from Sorella’s hair and footwear to the Vale of
Hinnom (52). The “bold operation” of Sorella’s heart, which eclipses the Turkish waterworks in
splendor, recasts the antiquity of Herzog’s veins in a more earnest mode. Her beating heart
reminds the narrator that the Jewish body—and by extension Jewish history—works according to
an ancient and inevitable marvel of engineering. There is no reason to fear the Jewish body’s
visibility. The body endures.
Sorella Fonstein is the culmination of Bellow’s somatological moralism, of his efforts to
re-imagine the significance of the maligned Jewish body after the Holocaust. Whereas The
Victim squeamishly approaches the idea of Jewish physical difference—an understandable
hesitancy given that book’s historical context, but which stands at odds with the narrative’s
investigations into the nature of antisemitism—Bellow’s novels beginning with Augie March
explore a “refreshed” mode of physiognomic interpretation (Clements 76).91 Looking past
physiognomy’s association with scientific racism, Bellow rejuvenates it as a mode of literary
portraiture and re-establishes the body as a site of Jewish continuity. Through precisely rendered
figures like Sorella and Harry Fonstein, Bellow creates enduring physical embodiments of
Jewish history. Each delightfully, wickedly idiosyncratic body in Bellow’s fiction becomes a
Jewish memory bank.
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But the destruction of the Jewish body in the Holocaust continues to haunt American
Jewish life. Bellow’s achievement goes unnoticed. Or, more accurately: the American Jewish
community’s desire for continuity after World War II grows pathological. The story of how the
pre-war myths of the Jewish body’s physical difference resurfaced as a fear of intermarriage—
the marital union of the Jewish and non-Jewish body—in the American safety of the postwar
years, and how Bellow’s literary acolyte, Philip Roth, wrestled in his combative fiction with the
elusive boundaries separating gentile and Jew—that is the subject of the following chapter.
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Chapter 2: A Glass or an Apple: Exogamous Fathers and their Children in the Postwar
Jewish American Imagination
“Are you calling intermarriage a Holocaust?”
In “What We Talk About When We Talk About Anne Frank,” the title story of Nathan
Englander’s 2012 short story collection, two married couples smoke marijuana and discuss the
significance of the Holocaust within secular and religious Jewish life. Each character is
American-born. The anonymous narrator and his wife, Deborah, are thoroughly secular and live
in South Florida with their teenaged son. Their guests, Mark and Laura, are baalei teshuva—
literally, “masters of repentance,” crassly, born-again Hasidim—who live in Jerusalem with their
ten daughters. Bearded, behatted Mark laments that American Jews like his hosts have developed
an “obsession with the Holocaust as a necessary sign of identity” (24); observant Jews, by
contrast, have little need for “symbolic efforts to keep [their] memories in place” (25). The son
of a Holocaust survivor, Mark belittles Deborah’s vicarious, compensatory concern over a recent
news story about Mormons who posthumously convert Jewish victims of the Shoah. “This,”
Mark asks, “is what keeps an American Jew up at night?” (23)
Why worry about the souls of the dead? The real danger to Jewish life is, as they say in
horror movies, coming from inside the house. “Your son,” Mark explains to Deborah, “he does
not...seem Jewish to me” (24-5). Mark plucks a detail from Deborah’s story to express the
gravity of her son’s attenuated Jewishness:
Our concern...is not the past Holocaust. It is the current one. The one that takes more than
fifty percent of the Jews this generation. It is the Holocaust that’s happening now. You
don’t need to be worrying about some Mormons doing hocus-pocus on the murdered six
million. You need to worry that your son marries a Jew. (26)
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Deborah speaks for Englander’s American readers when she responds with disbelief: “Are you
calling intermarriage a Holocaust?...Are you really comparing?” (26). One need not share
Deborah’s “unhealthy obsession”—her husband’s words—with Holocaust survivors to bristle at
Mark’s metaphor (9). By the late 1980s, Americans had learned to express their respect for the
Jewish dead by insisting on the Holocaust’s “uniqueness” (Novick 196-7). Comparisons, as
Deborah suggests, were “illegitimate, indeed indecent” (14).92 How could a survivor’s son, an
observant Jew in Israel—where, on Holocaust Remembrance Day, sirens halt the commotion of
daily life for two minutes of country-wide silence—equate the greatest atrocity in Jewish history
to the marriage of Jew and gentile?
In fact, Mark’s startling comparison is a late entry to a decades-long debate among
American Jews about the demographic and symbolic implications of intermarriage. The Nazi
destruction of European Jewry had made America the “dominant center of diaspora Jewish life”
(Diner 7), a fact that intimidated rather than emboldened American Jewish leaders. By the 1960s,
Jewish charitable organizations, feeling increasingly imperiled by warnings of a “new antisemitism” (Novick 171), turned their attention and resources inward to promote “distinctive
Jewish interests” (178). The American Jewish Committee, the country’s oldest Jewish advocacy
group, underwent such a transformation in this period, casting off its formerly “[a]ssimilationist”
reputation to become “one of the Jewish community’s major centers for the study of
intermarriage,” an issue it helped introduce into public discourse (Sanua 3, 9).93
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The trouble began with a series of articles on American Jewish demography published in
the American Jewish Year Book and Commentary between 1961 and 1970.94 German-born
sociologist Erich Rosenthal supplied the disheartening data: a study of Jews from Iowa and
Washington, D.C. revealed that Jewish exogamy, or marriage to non-Jews, was on the rise
among the native-born and their children. Previous measurements of intermarriage, Rosenthal
concluded, had overstated the statistical significance of an aging generation of preponderantly
endogamous Jewish immigrants—a generation impossible to replace after the Immigration Act
of 1924 stanched the flow of religious Eastern European Jews to American shores. A belowreplacement fertility rate seemed poised to exacerbate the effect of these demographic losses, and
a smaller Jewish population meant higher intermarriage rates to come (“Studies of Jewish
Intermarriage” 53).95 The American Jew, declared Look magazine on the cover of its May 1964
issue, was “vanishing.”96
The most worrisome statistic from Rosenthal’s research revealed that seventy percent of
Washington’s intermarried families raised children who did not identify as Jewish.
Intermarriage, Rosenthal insisted, “usually spells the end of belonging to the Jewish group” (53).
Rosenthal’s logic recalls the original intermarriage prohibition, articulated in Deuteronomy”:
“Do not intermarry with [other nations], giving your daughters to their sons or taking their
daughters for your sons, for that would turn away your children from following me, to serve
other gods” (Deut. 7:3-4). Postwar American life had proven far “mightier and more numerous”
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than the seven nations of Canaan (7:1), its strongest weapon the acceptance of Jews—in the
workplace, in residential neighborhoods, in social clubs, and finally, in matrimony.97 Other gods
indeed!
In response to Rosenthal’s research, Marshall Sklare, then the American Jewish
Committee’s resident sociologist—after his death, historian Jonathan D. Sarna called Sklare the
“founding father of American Jewish sociology” (“Marshall Sklare” 33)—composed two articles
for Commentary, the journal of social and cultural ideas published by the AJC. Sklare’s pieces
were firm, well-argued, anxious appeals that American Jews take seriously the demographic
threat of intermarriage, “a matter more crucial to Jewish survival than any other” (“Intermarriage
and the Jewish Future” 46).98 “To put the case badly,” Sklare writes in 1970:
there is no surplus Jewish population to cushion the impact of mixed marriage. For while
there is still a chance that the Jewish partner in a marriage will not be lost to the group,
the odds are slim that the children of the union will remain within the Jewish fold.
(“Intermarriage and Jewish Survival” 53)
Building upon Rosenthal’s data, Sklare warned that a demographic disaster was looming.
Intermarriage became a matter of life and death. American Jews had become too successful, too
accepted, too integrated. They risked assimilating themselves out of existence. 99
The intermarriage anxiety that sociologists like Rosenthal and Sklare injected into Jewish
public discourse acquired an apocalyptic hue as it passed through the rabbinical pulpit. The
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“empirical vocabulary of sociology,” writes Lila Corwin Berman in Speaking of Jews: Rabbis,
Intellectuals, and the Creation of an American Public Identity (2009), allowed mid-century
rabbis to “speak with authority about their congregants’ intimacies without appearing
meddlesome, directive, or even biased. As a language of prescription, nothing was more
powerful than a language like sociology, which, ironically, claimed only to describe” (Berman
153). But not all Jewish leaders were concerned with propriety. For Norman Lamm, a modern
Orthodox rabbi who would serve as Yeshiva University’s president from 1976 to 2013 (Berger
D8), sociological discourse provided an even-handed foundation for rhetorical recklessness. In a
1974 speech prepared for the National Convention of the Union of Orthodox Congregations,
Lamm introduces the unsavory comparison that Englander places in his fiction forty years later.
“One may legitimately interpret the data of contemporary Jewish events,” writes Lamm, as
though he had spent his seminary years studying graphs and tables instead of the Talmud, “as a
radically different Holocaust, but [a] Holocaust nonetheless” (253).100
Lamm’s indebtedness to Rosenthal and Sklare is clear: the data of what he calls
“contemporary Jewish events” are the rising “rate of intermarriage and wholesale assimilation”
and the declining fertility rate (253).101 The novelty of Lamm’s remarks comes from recasting
Sklare’s already somber warnings as an impending “preventive Holocaust”—“not the murder of
Jews already alive, but the prevention of Jews from being born” (253). The clumsy phrase
“preventive Holocaust” didn’t catch on, but the metaphorical equivalence of the children of
intermarriage with murdered Jews persisted in different forms. “[S]econd,” “quiet,” “bloodless,”
“spiritual,” and “silent” were each placed in front of Holocaust to describe the ever-present
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phenomenon of Jewish-gentile marriage in postwar America (Novick 185). Only the absence of
guilt distinguishes the initial rumblings of the so-called “intermarriage crisis”102 from its
clamoring version of the seventies and eighties (which Englander’s Mark inherits). Sklare’s grim
prognostications stop short of blaming American Jews for their demographic shortcomings. But
Lamm? Seeking, perhaps, to blunt his metaphor’s sting, he explains that this second Holocaust is
“less cruel to individuals” than the original—what a relief!—but remains “equally destructive of
the Jewish people as a whole” (253). Exogamous Jews: each an American Eichmann.

Increasing the Guilt of Israel
Long before the threat of intermarriage became the concern of American rabbis and
sociologists—before the Holocaust, before sociology, before America, before Rabbinic
Judaism—it had been the province of the biblical poets and scribes. Theirs was an irascible God,
demanding, quick on the draw. Aberrant Israelites who dared, like the Canaanites before them, to
“defile” themselves or the land God had granted them were subject to the pistols of exile and
genocide which sat smoking in their creator’s holsters (New Oxford Annotated Bible, Lev. 18:2430). Better to avoid entirely those tribes who lingered in Canaan, Moses advised. The stakes,
God had warned, couldn’t be higher. Permit your children to intermarry and “the anger of the
Lord would be kindled against you, and he would destroy you quickly” (Deut. 7:5). Thus, the
intermarriage prohibition enters the Jewish imagination alongside the threat of genocidal
destruction.
The Book of Ezra revisits the intermarriage prohibition through the story of the Jewish
people’s return from Babylonian exile. After generations of servitude, the Jews enjoy a “brief
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moment [of] favor” (Ezra 9:7) when King Cyrus of Persia issues his edict of emancipation. Two
bands of Jewish exiles return to Jerusalem, where they construct and dedicate a new temple. But
when Ezra, a “scribe skilled in the law of Moses” (Ezra 7:6), arrives years later—the reign of
Cyrus and his two successors having passed—he learns, to his horror, that Jerusalem’s people,
their leaders, even their priests, have forgotten God’s word: they had been shtupping shiksas,
mixing the “holy seed” with “the peoples of the lands” (Ezra 9:1).
Ezra weeps, rends his clothes, and tears hair from his beard and scalp. He remembers the
laws of Leviticus and Deuteronomy and knows what the Jews stand to lose. “Would you not be
angry with us,” he asks God, “until you destroy us without remnant or survivor?” (Ezra 9:10).
For Ezra, Jewish history is a series of self-inflicted misfortunes, pains brought on by his people’s
many “iniquities” (Ezra 9:6). How could the Jews break God’s commandments even now, when
he has granted them a sliver of peace, “a stake in his holy place”? (Ezra 9:8)
Before his peers Ezra plays the censorious father, a role later Jewish leaders will adopt.
“You have trespassed and married foreign women,” he cries, shaking a fistful of hair, “and so
increased the guilt of Israel” (Ezra 10:11). Jerusalem’s insouciant settlers have, like their 20thcentury American counterparts, jeopardized the survival of the group. Ezra’s condemnation
introduces the archetypes of the intermarriage crisis: the law-abiding father, the wicked son, the
gentile temptress, the foreign children.103 He also establishes the constellation of ideas that
surround intermarriage: Jewish responsibility, God’s favor, impure genealogies, and God’s
genocidal rage. Finally, Ezra sets the unforgiving precedent of resolving an intermarriage crisis
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and dodging “the fierce wrath of our God” by expelling his people’s strange wives and mongrel
children (Ezra 10:14).

And Here My Troubles Begin
I was fortunate to have been born in North Jersey and not Second Temple Jerusalem. My
father, as secular a Jew as you could find, increased the guilt of Israel when he married my
mother, his high school sweetheart, a Catholic from an Italian-American family. Two Queens
kids, my parents met when the Golds moved from urban Sunnyside to Bellerose, a quiet,
residential neighborhood on the borough’s eastern edge, so close to the city limits that my father
could hurl a baseball into Nassau County. His first job was as a paperboy, and my mother’s
house was on his route.
Who knew that straightforward, career-minded men like my dad led such destructive
lives in the imagination of other American Jews? To Norman Lamm the exogamous Jew is a
killer, a sex-addled Nazi shtupping his way to a Judenrein world. My father’s perceived double
life as consummate American success and genocidal stooge parallels the internal divisions of
American Jewry in the latter half of the 20th century. Jews had never felt so at home as they did
in America, yet religious leaders warned that outward signs of Jewish integration and influence
within American culture portended another, more insidious Holocaust.
American life also held an ironic dimension for Jews of my grandparents’ generation,
who grew up in safety and security as Hitler amassed power in Europe. In a 1981 interview for
Le Nouvel Observateur, Philip Roth (born 1933 in Newark, New Jersey) identifies a “disparity”
between the “tragic dimension of Jewish life in Europe and the actualities of our daily lives as
Jews in New Jersey,” a startling contrast that rendered Roth’s idyllic childhood “comical”
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(Reading Myself and Others 107-8). American Jewish life remained “bound up with these
ghastly events” even after the fall of the Third Reich (108).104 The Holocaust’s lingering
transatlantic relevance to a comparatively edenic American Jewish life had, Roth writes,
provided the “terrain” for his first collection, Goodbye, Columbus (1959), and his breakout
novel, Portnoy’s Complaint (1969). American anxieties about the Holocaust also explained the
Jewish uproar those biting, iconoclastic books inspired (108). “Mr. Roth, would you write the
same stories you’ve written if you were living in Nazi Germany?,” asked one of Roth’s critics in
1962 (The Facts 127). This question about literary context ironically argues for context’s
irrelevance. Writing about Jews, the speaker implies, carries the same risks in postwar America
as in Nazi Germany. The threat of Jewish destruction rises up in every generation, as the
Passover Haggadah warns. The Holocaust’s context is infinite.
In the latter half of the 20th century, the two conflicting “Jewish conditions” of Roth’s
early fiction (Reading Myself 106)—the Jew as European victim and as unassailable American—
coalesced. The American Jew who shaped his national culture through music, literature, and
film; who dominated the board room, the law office, and the surgical theater; who founded and
funded philanthropic organizations; who had earned the acceptance of all but the most hopelessly
antisemitic of his compatriots—he was both victim of an impending genocide and its ruthless
perpetrator. The story of American life and Jewish death—in other words, of Jewish American
assimilation—found its archetypal expression in the figure of the exogamous Jew. He is an antipatriarch, the father of a non-kosher line, the begetter of wicked sons. He is defined in the Jewish
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In “Roth and the Holocaust,” Michael Rothberg identifies a “series of parallels between Roth’s career and the
career of Holocaust memory in the United States” (54). Rothberg refers specifically to Roth’s being born the year
Hitler assumed power in Germany, and notes that several of Roth’s Holocaust-tangential books were published
within significant periods in the history of America’s attitudes toward the Nazi genocide; for example, The Ghost
Writer (1979) is published, writes Rothberg, “in the immediate shadow of the 1978 television mini-series Holocaust,
which marks the entry of the Shoah into mainstream American popular culture” (54).
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imagination by his quasi-Jewish children, and his children are defined by their father’s
murderous transgression.
By referring to the place that intermarriage and its participants occupy within the Jewish
American “imagination,” I mean to conjure the range of forums and disciplines through which
American Jews define themselves to both Jews and non-Jews. 105 Literature responds to and
shapes this imagination; so do the essays, articles, and lectures of sociologists, rabbis, and the
representatives of Jewish organizations and advocacy groups. I do not mean to suggest that
sociology and religious law possess the same truth value as fiction, though each discipline
involves creative interpretation. As we shall see, a project as seemingly self-evident as counting
America’s Jewish population requires social scientists to define the boundaries of Jewishness.
(Should the children of intermarriage count as Jewish, or just the ones with Jewish mothers?
What about Jews who long ago ceased practicing Judaism? What of born Jews who convert to
other faiths?) The demographic ramifications are clear: a broader or narrower definition of
Jewishness affects the tally and, by extension, the interpretation of the data. And while there is
little ambiguity in Ezra’s intermarriage prohibition, a similar act of mind-work is required to
reconcile Ezra’s restriction and the related law of matrilineal descent with the Bible’s many
examples of exogamy and patrilineal genealogies.106 Lastly, when someone labels a spate of
marriages a Holocaust, he draws on the power of metaphor. Whatever his port of departure, he
has docked in the waters of literary language and the imagination.
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I am following Berman, who argues in Speaking of Jews that Jewish rabbis and intellectuals in twentieth century
America “sought to generate a public language of Jewishness,” a task “as much about defining a collective identity
as it was about crafting an ideology about the relationship between Jews and non-Jews and the role the Jews could
play in a non-Jewish society” (2).
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Exogamous Jewish patriarchs include Abraham, Moses, David, and Solomon. For discussions of intermarriage
and patrilineal descent in biblical Judaism, see Spickard, pp. 162-165 and Gordis, pp. 212-3.
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The present chapter uses the postwar intermarriage debate to discuss the representation of
exogamous Jewish fathers and their children across three decades of Philip Roth’s career. My
focus will not be on the appeal of the shiksa to the Jewish protagonist—a subject that has been
discussed elsewhere107—but the exogamous Jewish husband’s often thwarted attempts to raise a
family. Portnoy’s Complaint (1969) provides the first significant example of an unrealized
intermarriage in Roth’s work; the story of an ill-fated Portnoy relative’s engagement to a blonde
gentile captures contemporary Jewish fears over exogamy and provides a grim model that later
Rothian intermarriages follow. In The Counterlife (1986), Roth’s alter-ego, Nathan Zuckerman,
marries an English gentile who is pregnant with his child. At the time of the novel’s publication,
fears of statistical losses to American Jewry had already raised concerns of a looming second
Holocaust, a fact that finds an eerie parallel in the sudden disappearance of Zuckerman’s wife
and unborn child from the book and Roth’s oeuvre. Finally, American Pastoral (1997) features
Roth’s first intact intermarried family, yet that family is ultimately destroyed by its maladjusted,
half-Jewish child.
I focus on Roth for a few reasons. In each of Roth’s artistic guises—scandalous comic
wunderkind, self-interrogating Jamesian critic, historically-minded realist, zany experimenter,
faithful memoirist, champion of foreign writers, dirty old man, Great American Novel-ist—he
explores the nuances of Jewish life and identity in America. Though Roth, like his idol Bellow,
hated to see the word Jewish slapped onto his preferred self-description, American writer, his
work almost always deals with Jews and often with what Zuckerman calls “the historical struggle
between the goy and the Jew” (The Counterlife 138). Not that that struggle is always a
struggle—when the non-Jew is a woman, the relation is often sexual. What distinguishes Roth
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See Sarah Blacher Cohen’s "Philip Roth's Would-Be Patriarchs and Their Shikses and Shrews,” in Studies in
American Jewish Literature 1.1 (1975): 16-22.
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from some of his contemporaries—he did not have a monopoly on shiksa-obsessed Jews—is that
his work provides some fleeting images of Jewish-gentile intermarriage.
The historical span of Roth’s life and work grants additional significance to his portraits
of interreligious romance. Much like the aforementioned parallels between Roth’s career and the
“career” of American “Holocaust memory” (Rothberg 54), there is a convenient relation between
the details of Roth’s biography and the history of Jewish American attitudes toward
intermarriage. Roth’s break-out novel Portnoy’s Complaint (1969), which features his first and
most well-known representation of Jewish shiksa-lust, appeared a year before Marshall Sklare
published “Intermarriage and Jewish Survival” in Commentary and only a few years before the
publication of the 1970 National Jewish Population Survey, which provided some of the earliest
reliable, nation-wide statistics on Jewish intermarriage. Similarly, Roth published The
Counterlife (1986), his first sustained portrait of an intermarried couple, in the years leading up
to the 1990 NJPS, which sounded another alarm about rising intermarriage rates and helped
popularize the phrase “silent Holocaust.”
The intermarriage crisis is just one facet of a half-century of American Jewish life that
historian Jonathan Sarna has labeled “bipolar” (American Judaism 366). In these fraught years,
social, cultural, and economic achievements stir existential fears raise about the boundaries of
Jewish identity and the vitality of the Jewish faith in America (American Judaism 366). Recent
histories of American Jewry emphasize the dwindling religious identification and shrinking
population of American Jews, and present the implications of these issues in their chapter titles:
“American Judaism at a Crossroads,” “In Search of Continuity,” and “The Question of
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Survival.”108 Yet the postwar years also saw American antisemitism “wane significantly”
(Dinnerstein 150). As discriminatory admissions and hiring policies were lifted, Jews “surfaced
as influential leaders” in the arts, politics, finance, and philanthropy; at the same time, the
“prominence of Jews,” writes Hasia Diner, “became increasingly less notable and noted” (305).
“By all conventional measures,” argues sociologist Paul Burstein, Jews in the second half of the
20th century were more educationally and economically successful “than any other ethnic, racial,
or religious groups in the United States” (209). In other words, Jews had become “insiders to
whom no doors to advancement were closed” (Novick 170).
The doors of American letters were no exception. Writing in 1966, the critic Alfred Kazin
declares, “it was now the thing to be Jewish.” Saul Bellow and Norman Mailer had become
“representative” American novelists, and Jewish academics and critics writing in predominantly
Jewish journals (Partisan Review, Commentary) shaped how Americans thought about both new
and canonical works of art (41). In 1976 and 1978, Saul Bellow and Isaac Bashevis Singer
received the Nobel Prize for literature, a set of “twin awards” that critic Leslie Fiedler identifies
as the canonization of the Jewish writer (Fiedler on the Roof 14).
Roth benefited from and contributed to this bloom of Jewish American thought when he
published his debut, Goodbye, Columbus (1959), and, ten years later, Portnoy’s Complaint, the
novel that made him as famous as Bellow or Mailer. Born in 1933, Roth was a child of the
Depression thirties and had grown up during the “apex” of American antisemitism (Diner
210).109 His parents were first-generation Americans—“Americans from day one,” Roth says
108

These are the final chapters of Jonathan D. Sarna’s American Judaism (2004), Hasia R. Diner’s The Jews of the
United States (2004), and Edward S. Shapiro’s A Time for Healing: American Jewry Since World War II (1992).
Each offers a sustained commentary on the demographic and religious challenges I mention above.
109
This period saw the formation of nativist groups such as the America First Committee, the United Christian
Front, and the German-American Bund as well as the rise of Father Charles Coughlin, a Catholic radio priest with
fascist sympathies, who “ranted to an estimated 30 million radio listeners about the Jewish domination of America”
(Diner 210).
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(qtd in. Roth Unbound 16). Nevertheless, Roth’s father possessed a “bitter hatred of antiSemitism,” his mother a “deeply ingrained mistrust of Christians” (Plot Against America 14).
Ever his parents’ son, Roth displays in his early work this inherited ambivalence about the
position of Jews within American life. The lustful narrator of Portnoy’s Complaint displays these
anxieties when trying to court non-Jewish women. As a teenager, Alexander Portnoy prepares
himself to woo a blonde figure-skater by selecting a fake name (“Alton Peterson”) and
rehearsing a speech in “absolutely perfect English…[n]ot a word of Jew in it” (Portnoy’s
Complaint 184-5). (For his sin of bad faith, Alex slips and breaks his leg on the frozen lake
where the skater practices.) Elsewhere, Alex perseverates about other characteristics that may
expose his Jewishness to Christian women: his nose, his hair, his name, and—my personal
favorite—his “five hundred word New Jersey vocabulary” (263).110
Roth’s later representations of his Newark childhood revise Portnoy’s doubts over his
American credentials. In The Facts: A Novelist’s Autobiography (1988), Roth wrings out every
drop of Portnoyish self-consciousness about his Jewish upbringing:
[W]e were as carefree as any kids in postwar America, and certainly felt ourselves no less
American. Discussions about Jewishness and being Jewish, which I was to hear so often
among intellectual Jews once I was an adult in Chicago and New York, were altogether
unknown...About being Jewish there was nothing more to say than there was about
having two arms and two legs...Yet, simultaneously, this intense adolescent camaraderie
was the primary means by which we were deepening our Americanness. (31)
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In “Yiddish Voices in American English,” Kathryn Hellerstein explains Portnoy’s sensitivity to his speech thus:
“Roth reduces the complex issues of cultural assimilation and language to an analogy between language and sex; the
latter is the means by which the immigrant Jew’s offspring assimilate into American culture” (193).
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To be a Newark Jew is to be American, says the Roth of the late 1980s, and to be an American
resident of the Weequahic section of Newark is to be a Jew. The fictionalized version of Roth’s
childhood in The Plot Against America (2004) reinforces this conviction. When a man arrives on
the Roth family’s doorstep seeking donations for “a Jewish national homeland in Palestine,”
seven-year-old Philip assumes his parents contribute only “so as not to hurt the feelings of a poor
old man who, from one year to the next, seemed unable to get it through his head that we’d
already had a homeland for three generations” (4).
I mention this trajectory within Roth’s oeuvre for two reasons: to demonstrate the
relevance that changing attitudes about assimilation and intermarriage bring to bear upon his
fiction and to argue that earlier scholarship on the appeal of the shiksa to Roth’s protagonists
remains regrettably stuck on lustful Portnoy.111 Little Alex provides a poor framework for
understanding the interreligious romances of Roth’s later protagonists, who no longer feel
compelled to defend their American credentials. In contrast, the present chapter aims to interpret
Roth’s representation of intermarriage within a historical model that accounts for the Jew’s
gradual acceptance within postwar American life.
Lastly, a note on language: I use “intermarriage” to describe Jewish-gentile marital
unions because it was the standard term and remains so, despite obvious disadvantages. For one,
“intermarriage” implies a categorical difference between the parties involved, an assumption that
ever-rising rates of Jewish-gentile marriage call into question.112 Similarly, the word evokes a
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Hellerstein and Cohen agree that the non-Jewish woman is the Roth protagonist’s sexual gateway to American
belonging. In “Saul Bellow, Philip Roth, and the End of Jew as Metaphor,” Vivian Gornick argues that Portnoy’s
“woman-hating” is a side-effect of his “consuming anger” at the Jewish male’s experience of being “pushed to the
margin, generation after generation” (124).
112
To speak merely from personal experience: the suggestion that my parents come from different “peoples” is
ridiculous. They had grown up in the same neighborhood, attended the same schools, spent time with the same
friends, celebrated holidays at each other’s houses. Who other than my mother is a member of my father’s tribe?
Who other than my father is a member of my mother’s?
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disagreeable contrast between itself and “marriage” per se—as though the marriage between Jew
and Christian were a marriage with reservations. But other terms fall into similar traps. “Mixed
marriage,” with its echoes of racial difference, exaggerates the aforementioned shortcomings. In
the ‘80s and ‘90s, references to “interfaith” families and organizations emerged, but this phrase
suggests a commingling of Jewish and Christian rituals, and I am more concerned with cultural
and genealogical inheritance than religious observance. Finally, what to call the offspring?
“Children of intermarriage” is accurate enough, though I occasionally use my boyhood selfidentification, “half-Jew,” as a shorthand. My mother would correct me when I used that phrase
to reconcile my inherited irreconciliables. “You can’t be half of a religion,” she’d say. (Then, the
killing blow: “If you want to be Jewish, you’ll have to start learning Hebrew.”) And while
there’s a profound illogic in declaring oneself religiously half-Jewish, the term captures the
insoluble parts that constitute my subject. A certain linguistic clumsiness is appropriate since the
half-Jew, non-entity that he is, exists between the poles of Jew and gentile, neither one nor the
other. Finally, “half-Jew” has the advantage of emphasizing the individual’s connection to
Jewish heritage (attenuated though it may be), thereby revising the connotation of loss and
disappearance that he traditionally carries in the literature of the so-called intermarriage crisis.

“If You’re Jewish, Chances Are Your Grandchildren Won’t Be”: Defection in Portnoy’s
Complaint
The stakes of the postwar intermarriage debate are on display in a neglected passage of
Portnoy’s Complaint, Philip Roth’s infamous ode to onanism, ambivalent mother-love, and
Newark Jewish life. Considering the novel’s obsession with Jewish-gentile sex, it is surprising
that Roth scholarship rarely connects his work to contemporaneous anxieties of the vanishing
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American Jew. Instead, scholars and critics emphasize the novel's fetishization of the shiksa, or
non-Jewish woman, and her role as the Jewish male’s avenue to American assimilation.113
One explanation for this oversight is that there are no half-Jews or intermarriages in
Portnoy’s Complaint. Yet the absence is the point: the children of intermarried parents enter the
American literary imagination as an uneasy whisper, which Roth plays for a cruel joke that the
critics missed, distracted as they were by naughty Alexander’s sexual misadventures. Compared
to Portnoy’s account of masturbating into a piece of beef liver, the description of his beloved
older cousin’s death sounds tame:
When Heshie was killed in the war, the only thing people could think to say to my Aunt
Clara and my uncle Hymie, to somehow console them in their grief, was “At least he
didn’t leave you with a shikse wife. At least he didn’t leave you with goyische children.”
(Portnoy’s Complaint 66)
Some context: Heshie (Harold), the star of Weequahic High School’s track team, has proposed to
Alice Dembosky, a drum majorette whom the boys call “Legs,” an “icon” of “dumb, blond
goyische beauty” (60). In his family’s eyes, he has “take[n] his young life and turn[ed] it over to
his own worst enemy” (62). When an admonishing visit from the local rabbi does nothing to alter
the boy’s course for self-destruction, his father steps in. Armed with an envelope full of twentydollar bills and a half-baked tale about his son suffering from a mysterious blood disease—the
story draws on the myths of the Jew’s foreign, illness-prone body which I discuss in chapter
one—Hymie Portnoy convinces the gullible, intimidated shiksa to disappear from the boy’s life
forever. But the family’s efforts to save Heshie are fruitless. The country is at war, the boy is
drafted, and he dies at the hands of goyim far more dangerous than Legs Dembosky.
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For example, in “Yiddish Voices in American English,” Kathryn Hellerstein writes that for Portnoy, “sex...is a
means by which the immigrant Jew’s offspring assimilate into American culture” (Hellerstein 193).
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The unfortunate story of Harold Portnoy features all the markers of Jewish self-hatred for
which Roth was famously castigated. The acknowledgment of the Jew’s inherent sickliness, the
idolization of the empty-headed shiksa as empty-headed shiksa, the stubborn, conniving father
who uses his money (of all things) to get his way, the chorus of anonymous Jewish mourners
who agrees that a dead son is better than gentile daughter-in-law and Christian grandchildren—
why didn’t these images raise as much ire as overbearing, histrionic Sophie Portnoy, her helpless
and constipated husband Jack, or their libidinous, foul-mouthed, narrating son? What’s more,
Portnoy implies that Hymie and Clara Portnoy engender their son’s destruction (65).114 By
falsely bestowing on his son an “incurable blood disease” (65), Hymie evokes the myth of the
murderous, knife-wielding Jewish father, and Harold becomes his belated infanticide.115 Why did
this litany of unsavory stereotypes go unnoticed?116
Perhaps because the mourners’ consolation smacked of truth. Portnoy’s Complaint is not
a faithful representation of Jewish life in industrial North Jersey—even a suburban half-Jew like
myself knows this—but a comedy steeped in the myths, fears, and dreams of that life. Roth’s
novel appeared in 1969, at the end of a decade in which sociologists warned of the impending
threat to Jewish survival posed by American intermarriage. These fears coalesced around a
commitment to preserving Jewish “continuity”—namely, the survival of Jewish life and culture

114

“That was his story, bad blood, make of it what you will…” writes Portnoy (65). The suggestion inside the
ellipsis is that Harold’s death is attributable not to the fictitious blood disease that his father describes, but rather the
discord (“bad blood”) sown by his engagement, his father’s lie, and the ensuing father-son brawl.
115
Critic Leslie Fiedler identifies “three essential ingredients” in this archetype: “the identification of the otherwise
anonymous Jewish villains with usury, the knife as their chosen weapon, and a small male child as their victim.” In
this case, the Jewish father’s financial crime is bribery, and the infanticide is delayed. Other literary examples of this
archetype, which is never far from the charge of blood libel, include Abraham’s binding of Isaac, Chaucer’s
“Prioress’s Tale,” and Shakespeare’s Shylock (Fiedler on the Roof 19).
116
Claudia Roth Pierpont writes that this father-son fight, which Roth calls “the pumping heart of the book,” has
been “was almost entirely overlooked” (65).
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in a world of increasing modernization, cultural integration, and assimilation.117 Compounding
this threat to America’s Jewish population were declining birth rates among Jewish women and a
dramatic decrease in Jewish immigration.118 Beginning in the 1960s, continuity emerged as the
“most pervasive theme of Jewish public discourse”: rabbis, academics, and advocacy groups
warned in conferences, pamphlets, magazines, and newspapers of the threat that unmonitored
integration posed to the “actual physical survival of the Jews” (Cohen and Fein 86). The ballast
of Jewish continuity, these voices agreed, was the Jewish family; its gravest threat, the everincreasing instances of Jewish-gentile intermarriage (86).
In the years that followed, the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds (now
called the Jewish Federations of North America) launched the 1970 National Jewish Population
Survey. The first of its kind, this nation-wide study confirmed that Jewish exogamy was indeed
on the rise, not only from generation to generation but within five year periods.119 Fearing that
America’s Jewish population would dwindle to nothing, Jewish advocacy groups, in particular
the AJC, spearheaded initiatives to assess and combat the effects of intermarriage on American
Jewish life (Sanua 9). The anxieties surrounding intermarriage are captured in the title of a 1974
New York Times advertisement from the Board of Jewish Education in Greater New York: “If
You’re Jewish, Chances Are Your Grandchildren Won’t Be” (qtd. in Speaking of Jews 165).
Hymie and Clara Portnoy share this fear, as their mourners recognize. Though the scene
Portnoy describes is set in 1943, Roth’s contemporary Jewish readers would have recognized
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Marianne Sanua credits German-born sociologist Erich Rosenthal with introducing Jewish continuity into “the
American lexicon,” and alerting American Jews to “what might be called the first Jewish continuity ‘crisis’” (Sanua
6).
118
See Rosenthal’s “Jewish Fertility in the US” (3), Sklare’s “Intermarriage and the Jewish Future” (64) and Sergio
Della Pergola’s “Patterns of American Jewish Fertility” (261).
119
For example, 5.9% of Jews who got married between 1956 and 1960 married non-Jews. Between 1961 and
1965, 17.4% married non-Jews. Between 1966 and 972 (the last years covered by the study), a startling 31.7%
married non-Jews (Masserik and Chenkin 295).
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intermarriage as a growing threat to Jewish survival and a timely source of hand-wringing. If
they hadn’t heard of the continuity crisis from their rabbis, if they didn’t subscribe to
Commentary or the annual American Jewish Year Book, they would likely recognize the 1964
Look Magazine cover story, “The Vanishing American Jew.”120 References to loss, particularly
the “loss of Jewish children,” dominate the texts that warn of intermarriage’s threat (Massarik
and Chenkin 298).121 Written in the shadow of the Holocaust, these persistent allusions to the
loss of Jews inevitably bring to mind death, a more literal and irrecoverable loss. The Jew who
strays from Judaism is as good as dead. For this reason, American Jews of the early 20th century
sat shiva—the traditional seven-day mourning ritual for the dead—for the children they had
“lost” to intermarriage (Spickard 186-9). If that practice became less widespread in the postwar
era, it retained its symbolic weight. At least one New York rabbi writing in 1967 advised the
parents of intermarried Jews to renounce their children and sit shiva (Spickard 191). Similarly,
Portnoy writes of Uncle Hymie’s scheme, “We are not a family that takes defection lightly” (64).
Might we not then take as earnest the consolation of Heshie Portnoy’s mourners? Though Hymie
and Clara Portnoy have lost their son, they are spared the frustration of accepting a shiksa widow
and goyish children, living symbols of a Jewish death.
The unrealized, hypothetical half-Jewish children of Heshie Portnoy are the backdrop
against which Roth stages his later representations of exogamous Jewish fathers and their
offspring. The stubborn adherence to Jewish in-marriage can be deadly, the novel warns.
According to Bernard Avishai, Roth’s teaching notes from a fall 1999 seminar at Bard College,
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See Thomas B. Morgan, “The Vanishing American Jew,” Look Magazine, May 5, 1964, pp. 42-46.
Fred Massarik and Alvin Chenkin, the authors of the 1970s, place the “loss of Jewish children” within quotation
marks, signaling their use of an already recognizable phrase for the statistical losses resulting from mixed marriage.
Erich Rosenthal’s earlier study reports, “children in at least 70 percent of mixed families are lost to the Jewish
group” (Rosenthal 32).
121
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led by the writer Norman Manea (8), describe the fight between Hymie and Heshie as a “key
moment in the book,” which reveals “the truly repellant at the local domestic level” (qtd. in
Avishai 17)—in this case, the repellant nature of orthodoxy and conformity. Claudia Roth
Pierpont makes the stakes of defection even clearer, writing that “mortal ruin” is the price of
Heshie’s “transgression” (Roth Unbound 66). Portnoy, like his creator, is appalled by the
viciousness and brutality of the father-son skirmish and the callousness of Heshie’s mourners.
Despite this apparent critique of the intermarriage prohibition, Jewish-gentile marriages
in Roth’s fiction remain doomed to false starts. The half-Jew exists as a threat and warning on
the edge of Roth’s work, a whisper spoken at a funeral. He occupies a position analogous to that
of the Holocaust, which Roth only indirectly, and with which the child of intermarriage and his
exogamous father become metaphorically linked in the Jewish American imagination.122

Jewish Chains of Being in The Ghost Writer and The Counterlife
“Why do you pretend to be so detached from your Jewish feelings?” The question, from
an early scene in The Counterlife (1986), is addressed to Nathan Zuckerman, Roth’s alter ego. Its
speaker is not, for once, a critic, but a friend, the Israeli journalist Shuki Elchanan; his concern
not the details of Zuckerman’s written world but of his lived experience. Zuckerman has
informed Shuki he is married to an English gentile (no surprise there), she is pregnant with his
child (getting warmer), and he has no intention, should the child be a boy, of circumcising him
(bingo!). Alarmed at his friend’s disregard for Jewish continuity, Shuki identifies a telling
discrepancy between the concerns that animate Zuckerman’s art and those that affect his life: “In
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In “The Ghost of the Holocaust in the Construction of Jewish American Literature ,” Emily Miller Budick argues
that Roth’s The Ghost Writer creates “one of the dominant tropes” of American writing on the Shoah: “the idea of
the Holocaust as a ghost,” which is to say, an eerie, haunting presence on the margins of the text (344).
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the books all you seem to be worrying about is what on earth a Jew is, while in life you pretend
that you’re content to be the last link in the Jewish chain of being” (73).
Shuki’s remarks bear the imprint of “Jewish survivalism,” a communal response to
demographic losses which had, by the late 1970s (when the events of The Counterlife are set),
become the “operative ideology of Jewish organizational life” (Woocher 291). By contrast,
Zuckerman dismisses Jewish community leaders’s imperatives as quickly as Moses’s
commandments. Though Shuki’s appeal to Jewish continuity fails, his invocation of genealogies
(“the Jewish chain of being”) in the context of Zuckerman’s fiction provides a useful framework
for analyzing the competing claims of life and art with which Zuckerman wrestles in Zuckerman
Bound, the tetralogy that precedes The Counterlife and informs its representation of
intermarriage.123 The formation of Zuckerman’s artistic identity requires that he choose between
two genealogies: the family line into which he is born, or the literary tradition he longs to join.
By emphasizing the significance of genealogies, I am arguing that the Zuckerman novels
stage an opposition between artistic and familial fealty. (In Bequest and Betrayal, Nancy K.
Miller places a similar paradox at the heart of autobiographical writing, in particular memoirs
about a parent’s death.)124 My sense of literary genealogies comes from Ross Posnock, who
presents Roth’s idiosyncratic selection of American and European literary influences as part of
his aesthetic immaturity—a word Posnock uses to signify a “principled (even moral) position”
that celebrates the “vitality won” by disobeying “socializing forces bent on exacting obedience”
(xi). Borrowing a distinction from Ralph Ellison, Posnock argues that Roth prioritized his own
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Collected as a tetralogy in 1985 with the addition of its epilogue, The Prague Orgy, Zuckerman Bound was
originally published as three individual novels which chart Zuckerman’s early years as a writer, his wild success,
and his mid-career slump: The Ghost Writer (1979), Zuckerman Unbound (1981), and The Anatomy Lesson (1983).
124
An “anxiety over betrayal,” writes Miller, is “at work in these memoirs,” and that betrayal is “tied up with the act
of disclosure itself” (13).
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eclectic mix of chosen literary “ancestors”—Henry James, Kafka, the various authors he
championed as editor of Penguin’s Writers From the Other Europe series—over the “relatives”
(ie. Jewish American writers) with which he is grouped in criticism (89). A similar process is at
work in the Zuckerman novels, though the “relatives” from whom Roth’s protagonist estranges
himself are—spoiler!—the members of his family.
“I wonder if you have any idea what it’s like to be disowned by a dying father because of
something you wrote,” Zuckerman writes to Roth in The Facts: A Novelist’s Autobiography
(163).125 Nathan’s fortunate creator did not. The furor raised by the publication of Roth’s
“Defender of the Faith” in a March 1959 issue of the New Yorker (“What is being done to silence
this man?” one incensed rabbi asked the Anti-Defamation League) or stoked by the 1969 release
of Portnoy’s Complaint—which Gershom Scholem, scholar of Jewish mysticism and friend to
Walter Benjamin, called “the book for which all anti-Semites have been praying” (qtd. in Roth
Unbound 61)—did not extend to Roth’s ever-proud, supportive parents.126 For poor Zuckerman,
however, the “charges of defection and betrayal and reckless, heinous informing” emanate from
his loving father (Zuckerman Bound 170). (Note that “defection,” referring here to Nathan’s
fiction, is the same word Portnoy uses to describe his cousin’s exogamous desires.) Nathan’s first
stories, says Dr. Victor Zuckerman, are a threat to Jews, whose Christian neighbors will see in
his son’s fiction only “[k]ikes and their love of money” (94). By the time Zuckerman publishes
Carnovsky, his Portnoy’s Complaint, Dr. Z is on his deathbed, but musters enough strength to
call Nathan a “[b]astard,” severing with his last word his genealogical ties to his first-born son
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Roth opens his autobiography by imploring Zuckerman to assess his manuscript. Zuckerman’s letter, which
concludes the book, advises Roth against publishing (161).
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Pierpont relates a charming story about how Roth placed his parents on a cruise to Israel so that they would avoid
the backlash surrounding the publication of Portnoy’s Complaint. Nevertheless, Roth’s father brought a suitcase full
of copies, which he proudly handed to other passengers, and which bore the inscription, “From Philip Roth’s father,
Herman Roth” (qtd. in Roth Unbound 68).
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(373). Henry, the younger, obedient brother, interprets their father’s condemnation as evidence
that Carnovsky had killed him (397). In the final scene of Zuckerman Unbound, Nathan
acknowledges that his art has left him “no longer any man’s son” and “no longer [his] brother’s
brother” (405).
If the Zuckerman tetralogy shows the young novelist sloughing off his family ties, its first
installment, The Ghost Writer (1979), displays Zuckerman’s wish to bind himself to another,
literary genealogy. Nathan’s overnight visit with E.I. Lonoff, an esteemed, older writer based on
Bernard Malamud, is, he admits, an attempt to become the reclusive short story master’s
“spiritual son” after his father objects to his fiction (9). (Nathan’s earlier effort to ingratiate
himself towards Felix Abravanel, a Bellow stand-in with hints of Mailer’s showmanship and
self-promotion, falls flat; Abravanel is “not in the market for a twenty-three-year-old son” [66].)
The novel resounds with Nathan’s nascent theories about literary “family resemblance”: Lonoff
and Abravanel are Isaac Babel’s “American cousin[s],” Anne Frank is “some impassioned little
sister of Kafka’s” (47, 170). Even the budding writer Zuckerman is, as Lonoff reminds his selfeffacing guest, “a New World cousin in the Babel clan” (49).127
To be a writer, a naive Zuckerman suggests, is to join a family of one’s own choosing. He
does not yet possess the knowledge an older Roth attributed to Polish poet Czesław Miłosz in a
1993 BBC documentary: “When a writer is born into a family, the family is finished” (“Philip
Roth”). Nevertheless, the seeds of that grim discovery are present in Zuckerman’s first encounter
with Lonoff’s fiction:
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“Lonoff had read my designing mind, all right,” Zuckerman admits. “[F]or when I came upon Babel’s description
of the Jewish writer as a man with autumn in his heart and spectacles on his nose, I had been inspired to add, ‘and
blood in his penis,’ and had then recorded the words like a challenge—a flaming Dedalian formula to ignite my
soul’s smithy” (49).
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[M]y own first reading through Lonoff’s canon—as an orthodox college atheist and
highbrow-in-training—had done more to make me realize how much I was still my
family’s Jewish offspring than anything I had carried forward to the University of
Chicago from childhood Hebrew lessons, or mother’s kitchen, or the discussions I used to
hear among my parents and our relatives about the perils of intermarriage, the problem of
Santa Claus, and the injustice of medical-school quotas. (Zuckerman Bound 11-2)
Not yet his father’s bastard, Zuckerman rediscovers his “feelings of kinship” for his American
family and Galician ancestors through Lonoff’s literary imagination (13). If Zuckerman’s new
master reinforces the college kid’s familial bonds (“I was still my family’s Jewish offspring”),
the reunion is short-lived, for Nathan’s ties to his newly uncovered literary ancestors inspire his
most ardent feelings of Jewish identity. Those lesser ties to Jewishness (“Hebrew lessons,”
“mother’s kitchen”) return to Nathan’s imagination as material, fodder for his developing
identity as a Jewish writer, which will subsume and replace his role as obedient Jewish son.
When Nathan compares his parents’ “pride” in the founding of the state of Israel to the feelings
that “welled up in [him]” upon first reading Lonoff, or his father’s tireless efforts to establish his
family in America to Lonoff’s “literature of such dour wit and poignancy,” he discovers a mode
of Jewish being that will clash with his family’s sense of Jewish belonging (12). Soon Nathan’s
literary imagination, though forever Jewish, will become his spiritual homeland.
Nathan tellingly lists among those weaker claims to his Jewish identity his family’s
ruminations on “the perils of intermarriage.” This is significant not only because Nathan will
prove a consummate exogamist—four shiksa wives, four divorces: a perfect record—but because
Zuckerman’s art, like intermarriage, throws a Jewish genealogy off course. To marry a gentile is
to call one’s family loyalty into question, to divert one’s biological and cultural inheritance into a
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strange, polluted mouth.128 This is also the theme of Nathan’s first story, titled “Higher
Education,” which fictionalizes his ne'er-do-well Uncle Sidney’s successful scheme to disinherit
his nephews, prospective medical students, from a substantial trust their grandmother had
squirreled away for their “higher education.”129 While technically not an exogamist, Sidney is a
womanizing adulterer with a preference for what Nathan calls “overdressed bimbo[s] not of our
persuasion,” and does, like the mythic intermarrier, betray the bonds of family by squandering
the inheritance of good Jewish boys (82).
To Dr. Zuckerman, Nathan’s story signals his alliance with the Sidneys of the world:
selfish, traitorous, dangerous to Jewish family and well-being. As Sidney was in life, so is
Nathan on the page. By airing family grievances and displaying for public consumption a story
about Jews fighting over money, Nathan has aligned himself, Dr. Zuckerman believes, with a
wicked lineage. Of course, Nathan’s true ancestor is Lonoff the monkish writer, not Sidney—but
to Nathan’s father, what’s the difference? “You are not somebody who writes this kind of story
and then pretends it’s the truth,” cries Dr. Zuckerman. Through this act of denial, the father
pleads that Nathan remain his own, obedient son and not the scion of an ambivalent Jewish
lineage (95).
But Nathan’s fealty towards his literary ancestors overshadows his family loyalty. For
this reason, the young writer’s belated wish to make peace with his father and rejoin the
responsible Zuckerman clan takes the form of narrative. The genre of Nathan’s would-be
exoneration is the same as his crime, reinforcing the divisive affirmation he utters in response to
128

See Ezra 9:11-12: “The land that you are entering to possess is a land unclean with the pollutants of the peoples
of the lands, with their abominations. They have filled it from end to end with their uncleanness. Therefore do not
give your daughters to their sons, neither take their daughters for your sons, and never seek their peace or prosperity,
so that you may be strong and eat the good of the land and leave it for an inheritance to your children forever.”
129
Writes Nathan: “Sidney proclaimed that he was not about to postpone the good life just so there could be two
more fancy doctors driving Caddies around South Orange” (81). South Orange was and remains an affluent, largely
Jewish suburb of Newark.
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his father’s pleas: “I am the kind of person who writes this kind of story!” (95). Nathan’s
restorative fiction (never put to paper except in The Ghost Writer) is, ironically, a fantasy of
endogamy, or in-marriage.130 The woman in question is Amy Bellette, Lonoff’s assistant and
former creative writing student, whom Nathan believes—during a sleepless night spent under
Lonoff’s roof—to be Anne Frank, improbably and anonymously alive in America. Zuckerman
imagines his return to Jewish continuity through what he knows is “a desecration even more
vile” than his original story:
Oh, marry me, Anne Frank, exonerate me before my outraged elders of this idiotic
indictment! Heedless of Jewish feeling? Indifferent to Jewish survival? Brutish about
their well-being? Who dares to accuse of such unthinking crimes the husband of Anne
Frank! (170-1)
No wonder Zuckerman’s father disowns him. Nathan’s fantasy of returning to his father’s
decent, responsible fold is also a fantasy of rebellion, a self-serving revival of a secular Jewish
saint whose hallowed image he defiles with his dream of procreation. (Nathan’s revenant Anne
also becomes his mouthpiece for attacking his critics when she describes her disgust at seeing the
well-off, fur-wearing Jewish women who cry over the Broadway adaptation of her diary.)131 And
since Amy Bellette (who is not Anne Frank) is also Lonoff’s lover, Zuckerman’s dreamexculpation is doubly rebellious. He swaps a biological father for a literary father, then pictures
himself oedipally kicking his new patriarch out of bed.
A bastard indeed, Zuckerman shows himself capable of forsaking both his literary
ancestors and his biological forebears. He is learning a lesson about indebtedness that he will
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This is the only example I can recall in which Zuckerman imagines himself with a Jewish wife.
For a discussion of how The Ghost Writer responds to Roth’s own “battles with the Jewish establishment”
(Cooper 184), see pp. 184-6 of Cooper’s Philip Roth and the Jews.
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eventually record in I Married a Communist: one’s “adopted parents” must also “be cast off
along with their legacy...thus making way for the orphanhood that is total, which is manhood”
(217). To reach intellectual maturity, an older Zuckerman suggests, is to be alone. Lonoff, a
shrewd judge of character, intimates Nathan’s potential for duplicitousness in the novel’s final
scene: “I’ll be curious to see how we all come out someday,” he says, predicting his appearance
in The Ghost Writer. “It could be an interesting story. You’re not so nice and polite in your
fiction” (Zuckerman Bound 180). Nor, for that matter, was Roth, whose sketch of the Bellovian
Abravanel may have cooled his budding friendship with that older writer he so admired (Roth
Unbound 113),132 and who confesses that an unforgiving essay he composed about Malamud had
led to a several year gap in their correspondence (Why Write? 28).
The relationship between Jewish identity and genealogies run amok—biological and
literary, given and chosen—returns in The Counterlife in the form of Nathan and Henry’s radical
and competing tales of self-reinvention. Competing? Yes, doubly so. As brothers each
Zuckerman is the other’s original counterpart, his double and anti-self—mon semblable, mon
frère!—a fact reinforced by the novel’s self-revising structure: each brother becomes the
Zuckerman stricken with a debilitating heart ailment and a medication regimen that leaves him
prematurely impotent; each dies undergoing the dangerous bypass operation intended to render
the medication unnecessary; and each survives to embark on a sweeping fantasy of escape. This
is not, Pierpoint argues, Roth’s foray into a fashionable postmodernism, but an elaboration of his
“fervent reali[sm]” (Roth Unbound 145), his fascination with the coincidences and
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Pierpoint writes that it is “widely rumored that the portrait of Abravanel did not bring [Bellow and Roth] any
closer” (Roth Unbound 113). Nonetheless, they rekindled their friendship in 1991 (282).
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contingencies—historical, geographical, amorous, physiological—that become the kiln in which
an individual forges his character.133
The heart of the novel finds Henry and Nathan flying head-on into their newly fashioned
counterlives—Roth’s word for a radical, fabricated existence constructed from “one’s own antimyths” (Counterlife 147).134 “[T]he kind of stories that people turn life into, the kind of lives
people turn stories into”: so thinks the novelist Nathan in Jerusalem, where his brother Henry,
formerly a mild-mannered, respectable family man, has forsaken his wife, children, and North
Jersey dental practice for a life of Jewish commitment in a West Bank settlement community, an
existence on the world-historical scale (111). Meanwhile, Nathan is in the throes of his own
fantastical reinvention, having adopted Henry’s one-time domain of family life, responsibility,
and fatherhood.
The self, especially the freshly minted self, does not exist in solitude. He needs tethers,
context, commitment. What is true for the selves populating Zuckerman’s fiction is true of the
performative selves populating the unwritten world. Reviewing The Counterlife, John Updike
maligns Roth’s choice of Zuckerman as protagonist: “Who cares what it’s like to be a writer?”
(qtd. in Roth Unbound 156). But who is more suited than a novelist to tell a tale of self-revision
and self-invention, of the cultural and geographical attachments we use to define ourselves?
Henry and Nathan’s construction of counterselves is also a story of their elective affinities, of
familial bonds broken and fixed to new, chosen families—what Zuckerman elsewhere calls “this
genealogy that isn’t genetic” (I Married a Communist 217). Henry replaces a life of local,
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Roth had mined the narrative potential of counterfactual tales in The Ghost Writer (1979) and his essay-story on
Kafka (1973) and would do so again in The Plot Against America (2004). His investigations into the role of
historical contingency on individual biography include the American Trilogy (1997-2000) and Indignation (2008).
134
The scene of Henry’s counterlife is “Judea,” Nathan’s “Christendom.” Each chapter is named for the site of the
respective Zuckerman’s reinvention: for Henry, Israel’s West Bank and for Nathan, Yuletide England.
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domestic Jewish continuity—he has, unlike his brother, married a nominally Jewish wife and
raised nominally Jewish children—with a commitment to Jewish continuity in the contested land
of the Middle East. “Here they’re making history!” Henry tells his brother (Counterlife 140).
And Nathan? As Shuki warns, the writer has neglected his “Jewish feelings” to become the
husband to a gentile wife, the father to a half-Jewish child.
The Counterlife was at the time of its publication Roth’s most ambitious work; it is also
his first novel to treat intermarriage seriously as a subject, not as erotic fantasy or punchline but
as a point of narrative conflict. Both iterations of Zuckerman’s ill-fated marriage to Maria
Freshfield leave Zuckerman unmoored from the tethers to which he had uncharacteristically
fixed himself. When Shuki asks the bastard novelist if he is content to be the “last link in the
Jewish chain of being,” the journalist doesn’t know that a later chapter of The Counterlife
(“Gloucestershire”) presents Nathan as a brutally literalized version of that very thing: a dead
man, father to no one, and a sacrifice to unrealized love. Stricken with the heart ailment and
medication-induced impotence that had been his brother’s, Nathan, overflowing with impotent
love for Maria, undergoes the dangerous bypass and dies. Zuckerman fills Cousin Heshie’s
coffin. Like his predecessor in Portnoy’s Complaint, Zuckerman is a dead Jew who leaves
behind a family line painfully broken, but preserved from goyish intrusions.
“At least he didn’t leave you with goyish children,” says no one, not even Shuki—not
only because Zuckerman’s parents are dead but because his scandalous books have orphaned
him. (Henry, still fuming over his brother’s reckless art, attends the funeral but tries to remain
anonymous.) If Zuckerman’s fate in “Gloucestershire” sounds like a Portnoyish return to shiksaworship and cruel comedy, the similarity is merely superficial.135 Zuckerman’s lust for Maria is
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The satirical death is Henry’s fate. In the novel’s opening chapter (“Basel”), Henry dies under the knife, having
risked and lost everything in the hope of restoring the potency required to receive oral sex from his dental assistant.
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unburdened by tumescence. He does not, like Portnoy, penetrate his non-Jewish lover in order to
conquer her background. The impotent writer enters nothing, falling instead for Maria’s
seductive speech, “the voice of the body I can’t possess” (Counterlife 182). What’s more,
Zuckerman's attraction to Maria stems from a decidedly un-Portnoyish “temptation by which
I’ve never before been engulfed...for family life, for fatherhood” (182). If in “Judea” Henry is
willing to die for Jewish continuity (he carries a gun as he marches through contested West Bank
villages), then in “Gloucestershire” Nathan dies for Jewish incontinuity, for interreligious love.
Unlike his precursor Heshie, Zuckerman returns from the dead. “Judea” and
“Christendom”—bookends to The Counterlife which form a sequential narrative—present
Zuckerman in the full throes of his counterlife with his pregnant wife, Maria. Nathan remains a
thwarted father, his marriage doomed by Maria’s refusal to acknowledge her family’s
antisemitism and his own refusal to see past English Jew-hatred. Their prospective son is merely
a yardstick of Jewish-gentile incompatibility—an incompatibility which, Philip Roth being
Philip Roth, manifests as a discursive battle over the fate of the unborn child’s foreskin. (The
possibility of a Zuckerman daughter vanishes from the plot, a victim to Roth’s attraction to
circumcision as a symbol of Jewish difference.) When Maria ultimately leaves Zuckerman—or
rather, leaves his “book,” convinced as she is that a bored Nathan, unsuited for domesticity, is
deliberately transforming their lives into one of his combative, argument-laden novels—their
baby also disappears (312). The half-Jewish child remains unrealized. Whether Zuckerman is
dead or alive, a father or a bachelor, he is fated to be Shuki’s last link in the Jewish chain of
being.

Henry’s death for a shiksa’s mouth is the parodic overture to Nathan’s more sustained, complex engagement with
the threats of intermarriage. The Counterlife tells its tale first as farce, then as tragedy.
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What is at stake in Zuckerman’s marriage to Maria and his thwarted chance at
fatherhood? The anxieties surrounding assimilation and Jewish-gentile intermarriage that enter
public discourse in the early ‘60s harden and intensify in the years separating Portnoy’s
Complaint and The Counterlife.136 Zuckerman encounters these fears as a chorus of outraged
voices when he meets his brother Henry in the school where he learns Hebrew with other
Americans who have made aliyah—the Hebrew word for ascent which denotes the diaspora
Jew’s return to Israel. Shuki’s concerns were just a warm-up. The class’s grievances, which
Zuckerman finds himself unsuited to contest, are a hit parade of postwar denunciations of the
American Jew: he cares not for the “survival of the Jewish people” (102), his rejection of
Zionism is an “egregious failure,” and, worst of all, he is an assimilationist and an exogamist.
The last charge is most ardently articulated:
[A]ssimilation and intermarriage...in America they are bringing about a second
Holocaust—truly, a spiritual Holocaust, and it is deadly as any threat posed by the Arabs
to the State of Israel. What Hitler couldn’t achieve with Auschwitz, American Jews are
doing to themselves in the bedroom. Sixty-five percent of American Jewish college
students marry non-Jews—sixty-five percent lost forever to the Jewish people! First there
was the hard extermination, now there is the soft extermination. And this is why young
people are learning Hebrew at Agor—to escape the Jewish oblivion, the extinction of
Jews that is coming in America, to escape those communities in your country where Jews
are committing spiritual suicide. (103)
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“The story of American Jewry since 1967,” write Cohen and Fein in 1985, “is the story of a growing
preoccupation with Jewish survival” (81). By the 1970s and ‘80s, writes historian Edward S. Shapiro, “intermarriage
[had become] a major topic of investigation” for Jewish organizations and sociologists (237). See also Peter
Novick’s The Holocaust in American Life, p. 184.
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There it is, the second Holocaust: the haymaker of Jewish responsibility in all its argumentending glory hurtling toward the temple. Even Zuckerman is speechless when faced with this
knockout punch, the charge that he is a Nazi collaborator. Particularly noteworthy is the
equivalence of Zuckerman’s connubial bed and the gas chamber, a comparison that brutally
extends the metaphorical linking of intermarriage and death that Roth presents in Portnoy’s
Complaint. Heshie Portnoy’s short-lived engagement to Alice Dembosky was, his mourners
suggest, a self-slaughter of the soul, but Zuckerman’s intermarriage is an act of genocide, his
marriage bed a death factory for the Jewish masses.
Though the words of Zuckerman’s impassioned interlocutor are ruthlessly damning, even
cruelly hyperbolic—cruel to both Zuckerman and the Jewish dead—this is not, for once,
attributable to Roth’s comic exaggeration. For decades, Roth’s brain overflowed with Jewish
heresies—he imagined Anne Frank alive and repulsed by the Broadway adaptation of her diary
(The Ghost Writer), he asked Jews to shove their suffering up their ass (Portnoy’s Complaint), he
created a Jew who demands Israel close its Holocaust museum, Yad Vashem, so that Jews may
“FORGET REMEMBERING” (The Counterlife 165), another who tours Israel promoting
“Diasporism,” the fakakta idea that Israel’s Jews should resettle Mitteleuropa to avoid a different
“Second Holocaust” at the hands of the Palestinians (Operation Shylock 44)—but the symbolic
equivalence of intermarriage and the Shoah was beyond the reaches of even his pugnacious
imagination.
The prehistory of the silent Holocaust begins, as we have seen, with Moses and Ezra,
who recognized the relation between intermarriage and genocide: if the Jews disobeyed God’s
prohibition, he would destroy them. Though Ezra maintains that the Jews are ultimately to blame
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for their own misfortune137—an antisemite might be as grateful for Ezra’s characterization of
Jewish “iniquities” as any detail from Portnoy’s Complaint—they are not yet their own
hangmen. That argument comes later. In its biblical iteration, the performance of Jewish
suffering is a duet. Jews sin and God punishes.
Who is responsible for injecting the “second” or “silent” Holocaust into American Jewish
life? In The Jews of the United States, historian Hasia R. Diner presents “the silent Holocaust” as
an orphan, born into the American imagination filthy, motherless, and howling, the result of
historical proximity. “[T]he phenomenon of intermarriage was discussed in historical terms,”
Diner writes, showcasing a staggering talent for understatement. She continues:
The image that surfaced most frequently was of the Holocaust. The Jewish people
sustained the loss of 6 million people...Of them, 2 million had been children, the girls and
boys who should have grown up, married, and borne the next generation of Jews. Hitler
had wiped them out and in the process destroyed the Jewish people’s ability to regenerate
naturally. By intermarrying, the sermons, speeches, pamphlets, conferences, and
symposia noted, American Jews were compounding a tragedy whose demographic
implications still reverberated. (308)
Following Diner’s reasoning, one might argue that the Nazis, those murderous tallymen, had
imprinted the Jewish psyche with their vile numbers game.138 Postwar American Jews,
increasingly reliant on sociology as the language of their collective identity, found themselves
compulsively counting (Speaking of Jews 2), and intermarriage thinned the ranks. As sociologists
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“From the days of our ancestors to this day we have been deep in guilt, and for our iniquities we, our kings, and
our priests have been handed over to the kings of the lands, to the sword, to captivity, to plundering, and to utter
shame, as is now the case” (Ezra 9:7).
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“At the dawn of the 21st century,” writes Sarna in 2004, “no religious group in America is more numberconscious than Jews” (American Judaism 356).
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like Rosenthal and Sklare warned of a demographic triple-threat to Jewish survival—rising
intermarriage, falling birth rates and Jewish immigration—the presiding metaphors for American
Jewish life slouched (inevitably?) towards the death camps.
A summary of rabbinical statements on American intermarriage reveals a more detailed
history of the silent Holocaust. As I discuss in the introduction, the earliest iteration of this
phrase comes from Norman Lamm, who in a 1974 speech denounces intermarriage as a
“preventive Holocaust,” which refers “not the murder of Jews already alive, but the prevention of
Jews from being born” (253). This “radically different form of Holocaust,” Lamm explains, is
“less cruel to individuals,” but “equally destructive of the Jewish people as a whole” (253). This
last phrase undercuts Lamm’s weak efforts to distinguish the American Holocaust from its Nazi
predecessor and emphasizes the exogamist’s culpability in the shrinking population of American
Jewry.
Two sections from Robert Gordis’s 1978 Love and Sex: A Modern Jewish Perspective
offer a less censorious, but equally telling example of intermarriage-as-Holocaust. A
Conservative rabbi and professor at the Jewish Theological Seminary, Gordis names two
“demographic threat[s] to Jewish survival” in the 20th century: the “decimation of the Jewish
population in the Nazi Holocaust” and the “mass defection of Jews from Judaism...through
countless forms of alienation,” including intermarriage (135). Blame is absent from this
statement of the problem; in fact, Gordis emphasizes that intermarriage is “only one” form of
alienation plaguing the American Jewish community (135). More importantly, in this instance
Gordis does not describe Jewish defection as a Holocaust, but emphasizes that the Shoah and
postwar American assimilation are contiguous historical events that contribute to Jewry’s
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dwindling population. The relation between intermarriage and the Holocaust is a matter of
metonymy—substituting one idea for another, related idea—rather than metaphor.
But metaphor enters in a later section of Love and Sex. Describing the fate of Germany’s
Jews in the 20th century, Gordis writes that Hitler’s Holocaust “replaced” the “gradual process
of automatic and ‘impersonal’ assimilation” that German-Jewish intermarriage had initiated
(220). Though Gordis is describing the succession of historical events, his notion of
“replacement” suggests that assimilation and the Nazi genocide bear a metaphorical
resemblance. He also erases any doubt that this equation applies to American Jews. “In the
United States,” he writes, “the same phenomena”—namely, the rise of intermarriage—“have
been in evidence” (220).
Lamm and Gordis set the stage for Sol Roth—modern Orthodox rabbi, Yeshiva
University professor, and president of the Rabbinical Council of America from 1980 to 1982—to
turn the threat of Jewish destruction inward by labeling intermarriage a “Holocaust of our own
making” in 1980 (qtd. in Freedman 74). What began as a historically determined comparison had
transformed into a moral equivalence. As Sol Roth’s phrase became “shortened” and
“coarsened” to the “silent Holocaust” (qtd. in 74), the out-marrying Jew became a Nazi-comelately. By the 1980s and early 90s, the rhetoric of intermarriage had crystallized as a matter of
Jewish life and death.
In the context of this discursive assault on the intermarried and their offspring, how does
one interpret the fate of Nathan Zuckerman and Cousin Heshie, both felled by their reproductive
transgressions? Get thee to a cemetery, Roth instructs his unfortunate exogamists; why wouldst
thou be a breeder of half-Jews? Simply stated, Roth assimilates the language of the intermarriage
debate in order to ironize it. The deaths of Heshie and Nathan are a reductio ad absurdum, a stark
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literalization of the equivalence between intermarriage and death that materialized in the written
world of Jewish debate while outside, in the unwritten world of America, Jews found more
acceptance and prosperity—not to mention the legal rights American Jews had long enjoyed—
than their European ancestors could have ever imagined.
But for the survivalist rabbis and demographers, who considered professional success and
social tolerance threats to American Jewry, intermarriage emerged as a poignant symbol of
assimilation gone awry. What accounts for the distance between the security of Jewish American
reality and the threats running rampant through its imagination? Roth’s 1963 essay “Writing
About Jews,” composed in response to the charges of Jewish self-hatred that his first stories
inspired, offers an unforgiving explanation:
The cry 'Watch out for the goyim!' at times seems more the expression of an unconscious
wish than of a warning: Oh that they were out there, so that we could be together here! A
rumor of persecution, a taste of exile, might even bring with it the old world of feelings
and habits—something to replace the new world of social accessibility and moral
indifference, the world which tempts all our promiscuous instincts, and where one cannot
always figure out what a Jew is that a Christian is not. (Reading Myself 207-8)
Though he does allude to the silent Holocaust—its components as yet unconnected—Roth
describes a fear of assimilation that is the precursor to the intermarriage crisis, and which finds
ironic relief in denying the security of American Jewish life. Yet Roth, an adamant
assimilationist who, like his idol Bellow, lamented being called a Jewish writer, provides an
equally reductive response to the question of the Jewish position within American life. “The
rhetoric of assimilation,” writes scholar Michael Kramer, “often confounds rational discussion”
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(“Art of Assimilation” 313).139 Assimilation is reduced to a dichotomy; it spells either the death
of Jewish American life or its radical rebirth—“[a]s if,” Kramer writes, “it could not be both”
(314).
Zuckerman finds an alternative to this dichotomy when he insists on the importance of
circumcising his unborn son in the final pages of The Counterlife. Earlier, Zuckerman disavows
his connection to this foundational Jewish ritual, but his encounters with English antisemitism
“reactivate” a “strong sense of difference” inside him. “England’s made a Jew of me,”
Zuckerman tells Maria (324). The “difference” Zuckerman rediscovers is, in part, physical, a
matter of his Jewish body. In one galling scene, a drunken restaurant-goer, appalled at the sight
of the Zuckermans dining together, hollers about Nathan’s peculiar Jewish “stink” (292).
Similarly, Maria’s patrician mother disparages Zuckerman’s “Mediterranean” appearance
(305).140 Zuckerman’s decision to circumcise his unborn child is, therefore, more than a
“counterattack” (Maria’s word) against Mrs. Freshfield’s insistence on a christening (314); it is a
physical means of asserting his son’s Jewishness. Taking a lesson from Harkavy in Bellow’s The
Victim,141 Zuckerman exaggerates his Jewish qualities when placed under the antisemite’s
scrutiny.
Nevertheless, Zuckerman’s sudden embrace of circumcision does not portend the
prodigal son’s hangdog return to Jewish responsibility. He doesn’t fantasize, like Henry, about a
life of Jewish commitment which may undo his erstwhile assimilationism. Nor does a guiltridden Zuckerman fret over the complaints of the ulpan student who called his connubial bed a
139

Similarly, historian Jonathan Sarna writes that assimilation has, “through the years...become so freighted with
different meanings, modifiers, and cultural associations that for analytical purposes it has become virtually
meaningless” (American Judaism xix).
140
Zuckerman correctly identifies the “stink” as a “racial insult,” in this case, an allusion to the myth of the foetor
judaicus (291). By calling Zuckerman “Mediterranean,” Mrs. Freshfield is participating in what Jacobson calls
“racial likening.”
141
See pp. 42-4, above.
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gas chamber.142 On the contrary, Zuckerman recognizes the faulty dichotomy he encounters in
Israel, which positions a broken genealogy as the alternative to biological and religious
continuity. Nathan’s return to Jewish ritual transposes the covenant of circumcision onto a new
dichotomy, drawn not from the intersection of sociology and rabbinic law, but from literature:
namely, the opposition between the pastoral and reality.143 The pastoral, as Zuckerman recalls
from his undergraduate English courses, is the genre, beginning with Virgil’s Eclogues, that
celebrates the idyllic, prelapsarian lives of shepherds who exist in harmony with nature. No
discord, no strife penetrates the pastoral vision, not even as labor. The farmer’s or herder’s tasks
perform themselves, leaving the fair-haired youths free to strum lyres, toot wooden fifes, or
wallow in sun-kissed languor.
“The pastoral is not your genre,” writes Maria in a letter to her husband at the end of The
Counterlife. An amateur fiction writer and a woman of well-bred “pastoral origins,” Maria
names the concept against which Zuckerman rebels, which she enlarges to encompass both
literature and life (317).144 Above all, Maria longs for an “amiable” existence. The pastoral is the
standard against which she measures both the natural world and her human interactions; thus, she
values the “mists” and “meadows” of the English countryside and yearns for a marriage in which
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Zuckerman does, however, recall his exchange on circumcision with Shuki, who offers a more measured
argument for Jewish continuity than his counterpart in the ulpan. Yet there is an irony in Shuki’s suggestion that
Nathan has become the “last link in the Jewish chain of being.” A writer and journalist himself, Shuki is a thorough
enough reader of Zuckerman’s work to recognize the well of “Jewish feelings” beneath the surface of its satire (a
detail lost on Maria, who interprets Zuckerman’s comic portrayal of Jewish feeling as outright rejection), but he
ignores that fiction’s potential as a link in the imperiled Jewish chain of being. Zuckerman’s art is his progeny, a
repository of his Jewish memories told aslant as fiction. One last turn of the side-curl: if anyone can raise a halfJewish son who recognizes his place in Jewish history, might it not be the writer who perseverates over “what on
Earth a Jew is”? And might not raising such a son deepen Zuckerman’s understanding of the questions that ignite his
novels?
143
That reality will bend and strain to accommodate one’s own demands is a major theme of Nathan’s and Henry’s
misadventures; nonetheless, Zuckerman makes a firm distinction between the pastoral and other, less self-deluding
modes of story-telling.
144
Maria’s pastoral origins, which are also the subject of her fiction, her genre in life and art, are spelled out in her
surname. Freshfield, as Pierpont notes, recalls the final lines of Milton’s Lycidas: “Tomorrow to fresh woods, and
pastures new” (Roth Unbound 154).
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“every last thing” is not “invested with urgent meaning” (317). The latter is impossible for hotheaded Zuckerman, who is quick to “reproach” her for “things outside [her] control,” such as the
casual English Jew-hatred she refuses to acknowledge (317). Zuckerman, like the unrelenting
characters in his “argumentative books” (Maria’s words), maniacally rages against a
geographical and characterological pastoral, until even he wonders whether he suffers from the
Jewish paranoia that he calls a “classic psychosemitic ailment” (319, 307). Maria recognizes that
all of “her mildness” inspires Zuckerman to long for “a collision, a clash” (316).
The collision Maria predicts is between her own pastoral sensibility and Nathan’s
commitment to its opposite: historicized reality, which he associates with circumcision (323).
The idyllic fantasy of fatherhood and marriage, Nathan realizes, is only a counterlife, as alien to
his existence as armed Zionist commitment is to Henry’s. Zuckerman, who early in the novel
contrasts the coarse, slipshod construction of Israel’s Negev Hills with the English picturesque,
extends the boundaries of the mendacious pastoral to include Maria’s womb. The womb is “the
pastoral par excellence,” the original scene of a “sanitized, confusionless life” (322). In light of
his forays into innocent, comic falseness—the marriage, the move to England, even the child,
whom Nathan admits he had imagined as his “little redeemer” (323)—Zuckerman reassesses the
Jewish rite he had dismissed in Israel:
The pastoral stops here and it stops with circumcision. That delicate surgery should be
performed upon the penis of a brand-new boy seems to you the very cornerstone of
human irrationality, and maybe it is...Circumcision is startling all right, particularly when
performed by a garlicked old man upon the glory of the newborn body, but then maybe
that’s what the Jews had in mind and what makes the act seem quintessentially Jewish
and the mark of their reality. Circumcision makes clear as can be that you are here and
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not there, that you are out and not in—also that you’re mine and not theirs. There is no
way around it: you enter history through my history and me. (323)
Zuckerman’s apologia for circumcision appropriates and upends the myth of the knife-wielding
Jewish father. The mohel’s cut ensures the end of goyish, pastoral fantasy, “the womb-dream of
life in the beautiful state of innocent prehistory” (323). The pastoral’s opposite, what Zuckerman
later calls the “counterpastoral” (American Pastoral 86), is a violent, unforgiving realism, a scar
upon the body that marks one’s transition from myth to history—a “quintessentially Jewish”
history of pain, persecution, and endurance. The removal of the foreskin becomes the child’s first
aching lesson in the Jewish body’s difference.
The circumcision scar simultaneously lays claim to the unborn Zuckerman’s ambiguous
ethnic identity. Since Nathan is, in his own words, “not one of those Jews who want to hook
themselves up to the patriarchs” (Counterlife 323), he espouses a deviant theory of Jewish
genealogy. Disowned by his father, Zuckerman becomes his own patriarch and passes on to his
son a Jewishness that defies rabbinical law. Matrilineality being the halakhic standard,
Zuckerman defies Judaism’s patriarchs by asserting the primacy of his own paternity.
Zuckerman père and fils remain unhooked, Jews from the line of wicked sons.145 Zuckerman
does not deny his tethers to Jewishness, but reimagines them. “Circumcision confirms there’s an
us, and an us that isn’t solely him and me,” he writes, placing himself and his son within a
broader Jewish peoplehood defined by its rude, iconoclastic attitude to traditional genealogies
(324). The wicked son whose transgressions throw Jewish continuity off-course establishes his
own family ties, his own ancestors and progeny.
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In fact, the year before The Counterlife’s publication, the Central Conference of American Rabbis passed a
resolution that effectively accepted into Reform Judaism the children of Jewish fathers and non-Jewish mothers,
provided the child grew up to perform “public and formal acts of identification with the Jewish faith and people”
(“Status of Children of Mixed Marriages”).
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On the final page of The Counterlife, Zuckerman offers two descriptions of himself that I
wish to consider as counter-images of the exogamous father and the half-Jewish child, those
maligned symbols of Jewish decline in America. Zuckerman provides the first as an explanation
for his sudden reversal on circumcision and his swerve away from an English counterlife. Nathan
is, he realizes, a “Jew among Gentiles and a Gentile among Jews.” Beyond stating (unwittingly, I
concede) with perfect concision the experience of the half-Jew as I know it, this phrase reveals
the contingency of Nathan’s Jewishness—not the contingency of matrilineality that has been a
necessary condition of Jewish identity since the development of the Mishna, but of the mutable,
permeable self. This is an appropriately flexible sense of identity, Jewish or not, for a writer who
describes himself as “a theater and nothing but a theater” (321). Later, Zuckerman elaborates on
his idiosyncratic, rude Jewishness. He describes himself thus:
A Jew without Jews, without Judaism, without Zionism, without Jewishness, without a
temple or an army or even a pistol, a Jew clearly without a home, just the object itself,
like a glass or an apple. (324)
These lines would terrify the rabbis and demographers whose rhetoric constitutes one context in
which The Counterlife may be understood.146 Yet Zuckerman’s self-characterization is not as
lonely as it sounds. The contingent Jew, Zuckerman suggests, remains a Jew when divested of
his usual trappings, for he possesses an irreducibly Jewish core. Zuckerman’s description of a
“Jew without Jews,” which I am applying to the exogamous father and his child, also provides an
answer to that question about Jewish belonging that Kafka (who else?) asks himself in his
diaries: “What have I in common with Jews? I have hardly anything in common with myself, and
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Worship habits and identification with Israel are omnipresent categories in population surveys (see the 1970 and
1990 NJPS, as well as the 2013 Pew Center report), viewed as useful measurements of the health of American
Jewish life. The decline of unilateral support for Israel among American Jews, especially those in intermarried
families, has caused particular consternation among Jewish leaders (“AJC Statement on Intermarriage” 68-9).
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should stand very quietly in a corner, content that I can breathe” (252). But Franz, that’s
precisely what qualifies you for candidacy. Come, join us! There are corners enough for
everyone.
The apparent loneliness of Zuckerman’s Jew without Jews looks ahead to that genealogy
that isn’t genetic, and thereby softens into a more manageable solitude. Even one’s chosen
ancestors, Zuckerman will write, must “be cast off along with their legacy,” must “disappear,
thus making way for the orphanhood that is total, which is manhood” (I Married a Communist
217). Forget manhood—the writer, the intellect, the thinking adult must finally stand as an
orphan. So, too, must the half-Jew, that other bastard who fits Zuckerman’s description. What is
a half-Jew but a Jew utterly denuded? Solitude need not mean privation. Free of the strictures
imposed by context, the half-Jew lives unimagined and unburdened by metaphors that
preposterously link him to Nazi crimes. He is something simpler, lighter than that: the object
itself. For who, gentile or Jew or neither, wouldn’t wish to be as painlessly straightforward as a
glass or an apple?

The Vanishing American Jew’s Vanishing Literature: Critical Responses to Postwar Success; Or,
The Critic as Alter Koker
Rabbis and sociologists were not the only stern gatekeepers of American Jewish life and
culture in the postwar period, nor the only Jews concerned with the demographic and cultural
ramifications of unfettered American assimilation. Prominent Jewish literary critics, those who
had written, beginning in the late 1930s, for the taste-making Partisan Review, a paragon of midcentury Jewish American thought; who in the late forties and fifties had applauded the
emergence of a crop of Jewish writers including Saul Bellow, Bernard Malamud, and Philip
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Roth; who had rediscovered and reintroduced to American readers the Depression-Era
masterpieces of Henry Roth, Daniel Fuchs, and Nathanael West—several of these same critics
began in the 1970s to doubt Jewish American literature’s permanence as a distinct, vital voice in
the American imagination.
Writing in 1966, mere years before pessimism befell his colleagues, Alfred Kazin argued
that the American Jew’s ambivalence—his “passionate relations” with the cultures of both
religion and modernity (39), his embrace of high art and “the language of the street,” his
“typicality” contrasted with his otherness (38)—made him the ideal modern American writer. “In
a time of intoxicating prosperity,” Kazin writes in “The Jew as Modern Writer,” “it has been
natural for the Jewish writer to see how superficial society can be, how pretentious, atrocious,
unstable—and comic” (41). In other words, the Jewish American writer possessed the ideal
sensibility and aesthetic for representing his time.147
But if the particularity of the Jewish writer’s art drew upon his social identity, what could
come of that art as his identity changed? How could the American Jew ironize a culture in which
he found increasing social and economic opportunities? Could affluent, well-integrated, sociallyaccepted Jews write engaging books? The most fully articulated, infamous statement of this
question comes from the critic Irving Howe, whose oft-cited introduction to Jewish-American
Stories (1977) declares the end of the period Kazin describes:
Can we expect a new generation of writers to appear who will contribute to American
literature a distinctive sensibility and style derived from the Jewish experience in this
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An earlier version of this argument appears in Isaac Rosenfeld’s “The Situation of the Jewish Writer.” Writing in
1944, Rosenfeld anticipates the Jewish American writer’s break into the literary mainstream, arguing that the Jews’
status as “marginal men” gives them “a critical advantage” in representing American society: they “observe much
that is hidden to the more accustomed native eye” (122). Note, however, that Rosenfeld implies that a Jewish
perspective is non-native. Alexander Portnoy, ten years old during the period Rosenfeld describes, carries this
assumption into adulthood.
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country?...My own view is that American Jewish fiction has probably moved past its high
point. Insofar as this body of writing draws heavily from the immigrant experience, it
must suffer a depletion of sources, a thinning-out of materials and memories...The sense
of an overpowering subject, the sense that this subject imposes itself upon their
imaginations—this grows weaker, necessarily, with the passing of the years. (16)
Though Howe reiterates many of Kazin’s premises about the “Jewish American style,” in
particular its fusion of “gutter vividness with university refinement, street energy with highculture rhetoric” (15), he argues that the strength of this sensibility depends on its proximity to
immigrant life. The origin of Howe’s genealogy of Jewish American literature is the Lower East
Side or Brownsville tenement, New World shtetls that nurture the imaginations of America’s
Isaac Babels and Sholem Aleichems. (Howe’s inclusion of Aleichem’s “On Account of a Hat,”
Babel’s “The Story of My Dovecot,” and Isaac Bashevis Singer’s “Gimpel the Fool” at the
beginning of Jewish-American Stories emphasizes his belief in the continuity of Yiddishkeit
within the Jewish American literary family tree.) Younger generations of Jewish writers,
necessarily remote from these experiences, are left out of Howe’s schema. What, no Yiddish? No
tenements? Nu, these may be stories, but they aren’t my Jewish American stories!148
Howe reserves a special skepticism for post-immigrant literature about American Jews’
“involvements and confusions with Jewishness” (17). Zuckerman’s books about “what on Earth
a Jew is” surely emerge from this barren ground; so do the works of Bernard Malamud, who
famously quipped that all men are Jews. Questions about Jewish identity in modern America—
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To his credit, Howe acknowledges the boundaries he places around Jewish American literature: “Younger Jewish
writers grow impatient and irritated with the view I have expressed above. They suspect that people like me are
trying to monopolize American Jewish writing for the experience of my generation and the one before it” (17). In
fact, scholar Michael Kramer argues in “Acts of Assimilation” that Howe’s emphasis on the late-19th and early-20th
century Eastern European origins of Jewish American literature also excludes the literature of Jewish Americans that
preceded him, such as the work of Emma Lazarus, Mordecai Noah, and Isaac Mayer Wise (“Acts” 563).
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about how one defines oneself as Jewish in the absence of religious practice, or how an
American-born Jew reckons with the Holocaust it was his happy fate to avoid—are for Howe
mere thought experiments, lacking the “thick...sediment of felt life” necessary to produce a
literary subject (16). Equally stunting to imaginative literature are the “suburbs” and “middleclass urban neighborhoods” that became home for many American Jews in the postwar years
(17). Howe’s disdain for the suburbs, on full display in his historical tome, World of Our Fathers
(1976)—he characterizes Jewish suburbanites as bland, confused, vulgar, torn between their
reckless flight from the parochialism of tenement life and their hopeless longing for lives of
Jewish meaning149—is inseparable from the generational chauvinism of his tendentious
introduction. Fittingly, the only aspect of Philip Roth’s early stories that Howe sees fit to praise
in World of Our Fathers is the younger writer’s apparent critique of “middle-class vulgarity” in
Goodbye, Columbus (596).
Indeed, Howe’s dismissal of “these younger writers” elaborates on his famous hatchetjob “Philip Roth Reconsidered,” published in the December 1972 issue of Commentary. Though
Howe had praised Roth’s debut collection, Goodbye, Columbus (1959) at the time of its
publication,150 his post-Portnoy reassessment dismisses Roth’s stories as the product of a “thin
personal culture,” of arriving “at the end of a tradition which can no longer nourish his
imagination” (“Roth Reconsidered” 73). Roth’s “thin personal culture” becomes, in the ‘77
introduction, the post-immigrant writer’s “thinning-out of materials and memories”
(“Introduction” 16). In a mirage of equanimity, Howe’s introduction supplies a brief counter-

149

See “The Suburbs: New Ways to Live” in World of Our Fathers (613-621). For example, Howe writes: “The
suburban Jews had come upon the scene at the moment when Jewish culture in America no longer possessed its
earlier assurance and vigor; they lived with whatever remnants of their youthful experience they could salvage; and
‘bagels and lox’ (not to be sneered at in their own right!) were part of what they still had left, tokens of the past to
which they clung partly because it reminded them of all that was gone” (620).
150
See Howe, “The Suburbs of Babylon,” New Republic, June 15, 1959, p. 17.
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argument to his own critique of younger Jewish writers, though he dismisses these with a rush of
rhetorical questions: “Does [post-immigrant] experience go deep enough into the lives of the
younger, ‘Americanized’ Jews? Does it form the very marrow of their being? Does it provide
images of conflict, memories of exaltation and suffering, such as enable the creating of stories?”
(17). Howe’s answer is undoubtedly no.151
Howe’s generational chauvinism, his insistence on post-immigrant Jewish life’s failure to
nourish imaginative literature, is the literary critic’s version of the postwar anxiety over the
vanishing American Jew. Like the rabbis and sociologists who launched a campaign against
intermarriage—those other alter kokers152—Howe fears a younger generation of American Jews
will dilute the Jewish experience in America as he knows it. He rushes to turn off the tap:
anything else that drips out isn’t Jewish American literature, but its dregs. A more appropriate
metaphor may draw on the physicality implied by Howe’s evocation of thinness, “marrow,” and
weakness: both Howe and his rabbinical-sociological counterparts fear that the postwar
American Jew is malnourished; without the proper Jewish sustenance, the American Jew and the
American Jewish writer may wither away like Kafka’s hunger artist. Fearing this possibility,
Howe disowns Roth and his ilk—his aberrant Jewish sons, born not to gentile mothers but to
suburban, monolingual homes—in order to preserve his own sense of Jewish American literary
historiography, a tradition steeped in heartier stock.
Nor is Howe alone in declaring the 1970s the end of the Jewish American Renaissance.
In 1971, scholar Allen Guttman anticipated Howe’s eulogy, arguing in The Jewish Writer in
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It’s worth noting the metaphorical dichotomy between superficiality (thinness) and depth that Howe employs in
his critique of both Roth and other post-immigrant writers. To be thin is to be weak and undernourished; Jewish
American writing, Howe implies, can only be hardy, thick, and therefore capable of depth, if it is connected to the
richness of the immigrant experience. That alone reaches a Jewish writer’s “marrow.” As the word “marrow”
implies, Howe’s understanding of Jewish-American assimilation draws upon bodily, physical metaphors.
152
Literally “old shitter,” the Yiddish phrase alter koker denotes an ineffectual old man.
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America: Assimilation and the Crisis of Identity that the “phenomenal creativity” of Jewish
American literature, which had already “nearly run its course,” would dissipate as Jews grew
increasingly at ease in America (226). The final chapter of Guttman’s study, “The End of the
Jewish People?,” emphasizes how communal assimilation anxiety shapes literary opinion.
Guttman’s precis of the issues facing American Jews in the latter half of the 20th century—
including apostasy, low fertility rates, and, of course, intermarriage—makes frequent reference
to Jewish “survival,” a term he transposes from its demographic context and applies to Jewish
literature. The “survival in America of a significant and identifiably Jewish literature,” Guttman
writes, “depends upon the unlikely conversion to Judaism of a stiff-necked, intractable,
irreverent, attractive generation that no longer chooses to be chosen” (227). This is the same
unreliable, un-Jewish generation from which Howe distances himself. Of these younger Jewish
writers, Howe and Guttman can only paraphrase Aunt Gladys of Roth’s Goodbye, Columbus:
“They couldn’t be real Jews believe me” (Goodbye, Columbus 58).153
Writer and critic Leslie Fiedler offers a more complex, though less discussed, case of
intergenerational disavowal. A contemporary of Howe and Kazin whom Roth called one of the
“four tigers of American Jewish literature” in the decades after World War II (qtd. in Roth
Unbound 14)—the fourth was Bellow—Fiedler is better remembered today for the essay “Come
Back to the Raft Ag’in, Huck Honey!” and the book-length Love and Death in the American
Novel, which argued that the American novel contained at its core a suggestive myth of
interracial, homoerotic love as a respite from the corruptions of society. Yet from the 1950s to
the early 70s Fiedler was also a prolific critic of Jewish American writing. The author of the first
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In Goodbye, Columbus Neil Klugman’s Old World aunt, who still lives in Newark, uses this phrase to dismiss the
Jewish credentials of the affluent, assimilated, suburban Patimkin family.
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monograph of Jewish American fiction,154 Fiedler published criticism in the same Jewish-minded
cultural journals as his peers Howe and Kazin—for example, Partisan Review, Commentary,
Encounter, and Midstream. Writing in 1991, Fiedler scoffs at being “unfairly linked” with those
New York Intellectuals (Fiedler on the Roof xiv), yet he too spent the postwar years reviving the
reputations of forgotten Jewish American writers of the ‘30s and introducing readers to the
emerging talents of the ‘50s and ‘60s (ix-x).
What further connects Fiedler to his critical contemporaries is his assertion in the 1970s
of Jewish American literature’s waning vitality and importance. In the introduction to the second
volume of his Collected Essays (1972), Fiedler instructs readers to treat his essays on Jewish
writers as “valedictory.” The section blithely titled “To the Gentiles” is, Fiedler insists, “my
farewell to a subject...which seems to me at the moment exhausted” (Collected Essays xi).
Anticipating Howe, Fiedler writes that younger Jews “no longer find in Jewish experience viable
images of their own character and fate” (xii). American experience is what ignites this younger,
assimilated generation’s imagination.155 Doubtful that Jewish life will “remain...distinguishable
from the larger”—read: goyish—“community around it,” Fiedler predicts an ensuing decline in
American Jewish literary art and its readership (3). Such a pessimistic view conjures an
alternative interpretation of the section’s cheeky title: “To the Gentiles” describes both Fiedler’s
imagined readers and his envisioned trajectory of American literary innovation.
In 1972, a middle-aged Fiedler plays the censorious father, dismissing Jewish American
literature as an infertile critical terrain. His valediction was premature. In 1991 Fiedler publishes
Fiedler on the Roof, a collection of essays on the bonded subjects of assimilation and Jewish
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The Jew in the American Novel, published in 1959.
Or so I assume based on the subjects of the collection’s second section, titled “Unfinished Business,” which
includes essays on Mark Twain, Herman Melville, Ernest Hemingway, John Barth, and John Hawkes (vi). The only
Jewish subject in this section is Henry Roth.
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American literature; approaching eighty, Fiedler revisits his forsaken territory as a selfflagellating wicked son. Jewish demographic prognostications had grown more pessimistic in the
intervening decades. The initial findings of a second National Jewish Population Survey in 1990
were even more dire than the first. Intermarriage rates continued to climb: between 1985 and
1990, 52 percent of Jewish marriages included a non-Jew (Kosmin 1).156 Similarly, Fiedler’s
outlook on Jewish American life had darkened during the seventies and eighties as the
dissolution of Jewish cultural difference he foresaw had come to pass.
While revisiting these subjects, Fiedler grows remorseful about his own contributions to
the American Jew’s vanishing literature. The collection’s title declares his culpability. Fiedler on
the Roof is, like “To the Gentiles,” a self-mocking allusion to its author’s decades explaining
Jewish literature to goyish readers and academic audiences. Uncomfortable in his time-worn role
of “representative, token Jew,” Fiedler writes these later essays from a position of
epistemological and rhetorical doubt over his fitness to perform the role of Jewish literary
authority (Fiedler on the Roof xviii). What does Fiedler, an assimilationist in a period of growing
uncertainty about Jewish survival in America, mean when he calls himself a Jew? As he writes in
the preface:
I do not mean that I doubted for a moment (despite my rhetorical strategies in a couple
[essays]) that I was in some ultimate sense a Jew; Hitler had decided that once and for all.
I was, however, more and more confused about what a Jew is—in light of the fact that I
can still call myself by that once tribal, sectarian name, though I have abandoned the
traditional religion, almost completely lost the traditional culture and no longer speak the
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In Double or Nothing?: Jewish Families and Mixed Marriage, historian Sylvia Barach Fishman notes that
discrepancies in “who [should be] counted as a Jew”—that perennial question—lead to disagreements among
demographers about the exact rate of intermarriage (6). For example, Sidney Goldstein’s full report on the 1990
NJPS, published in 1992, lists the intermarriage rate of that period at forty-three percent (Goldstein 126).
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languages traditionally associated with Jewishness. I am consequently...a Jew only in
retrospect, in memory; a memory that persists not in my heart or in my head but in my
blood. (xvii)
Fiedler on the Roof is its author’s belated reckoning with his own tenuous Jewishness, an
identity, like Zuckerman’s at the end of The Counterlife, defined by its missing parts. Despite
Fiedler’s earlier, Howesque attempts to erect walls around a (supposedly) weakening Jewish
American literature, he remains the wicked son par excellence—for unlike Zuckerman, the
exogamous Fiedler witnesses his half-Jewish children grow into adulthood and marry nonJewish partners of their own (181). Nevertheless, Fiedler retains an irreducible core of
Jewishness rooted in his body, for he connects his Jewish blood-memory to his circumcision and
the mohel’s words during that rite, which serve as the book’s epigraph: “In blood, in blood thou
shalt remember” (xvii). As atheistic as Roth/Zuckerman, Fiedler similarly affirms his Jewish
identity through the tell-tale scar on his genitals.
Fiedler on the Roof places its author beyond the scope of The Counterlife and even the
themes of “literature and Jewish identity” evoked in the collection’s subtitle. The subject of
Fiedler’s final last word on Jewish matters concerns not only these familiar subjects of his early
essays, but also a contemporary Jewish figure, that pariah of the Jewish American imagination
whom Howe deems unworthy of literary consideration, and whom Fiedler calls by many names:
the vestigial Jew, the ex-Jew, the post-Jew.157
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Fiedler uses these phrases interchangeably. For the sake of clarity, I will use “post-Jew” to describe Jews such as
Fiedler and Zuckerman who have abandoned the traditional religious and linguistic signifiers of Jewishness and
disregarded the prohibition against intermarriage. I choose this term because “post-Jewish” strikes me as an accurate
and relatively neutral label for an individual or family who remains Jewish in name only. An “ex-Jew,” by contrast,
puts me in mind of conversion and the morally-charged accusation of apostasy.
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The most memorable essay in Fiedler on the Roof is “In Every Generation: a Meditation
on the Two Holocausts.” Originally composed for the anthology Testimony: Contemporary
Writers Make the Holocaust Personal (1989), Fiedler’s autobiographical lamentation is an
ambivalent work of self-censure that mourns Jewish American “assimilation into [a]
homogenized, postethnic society,” even as it replaces the Old World distinction of gentile and
Jew with a modern, Zuckermanian theory of Jewish identity’s mutability (118). How should a
Newark-born writer, Jewish though he may be, personalize the Holocaust?158 Fiedler complicates
this question from the outset, declaring his own Jewishness and that of Hitler’s victims an
“enigma” and a “minor mystery” (160). Implicit within Fiedler’s confusion—“I am at least
allegedly Jewish,” he writes (159)—is an irony that I encounter repeatedly in my reading on
Jewish identity: the only people who possess unshakeable certainty about who is a Jew are Jewhaters and strict observers of rabbinic law.159 Being neither, Fiedler’s claims to Jewishness
require an act of genealogical “chutzpah” (xviii). To declare “I am a Jew” is to let out a barbaric
yawp, a Whitmanesque communion between an engorged self and an ancient history.160
But since a meditation is no occasion for yawping, Fiedler’s text abounds with his
attenuated claims to Jewishness—his paltry religious education, his shiksa wives and goyish
children, his decision to fight in World War Two on the Pacific rather than the European stage,
his lousy Hebrew (“I still read the Holy Tongue like a Cossack”), his (in his grandfather’s
estimation) goyisher kopf (166). A telling ambivalence: what is more Jewish than bearing your
grandfather’s insult that you have a gentile’s brutish head? And what was more typically Jewish
158

Born in 1915, Fiedler is about twenty years older than Roth, with whom he shares a hometown. Roth answers this
same question with fiction in The Plot Against America and the Amy Bellette/Anne Frank section of The Ghost
Writer.
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Fishman writes that difficulties in collecting and interpreting population data stem from discrepancies in who to
count as a Jew. “Sociologists,” she notes, “argue over these categorizations at least as much as rabbis do” (6).
160
Similarly, in Operation Shylock Roth describes the “antic audacity” with which his friend, the Israeli writer
Aharon Appelfeld, declares Jewish a woman of disputable ancestry (53).
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for a budding intellectual in the Depression thirties than adopting as his “Holy Books” first Das
Kapital and What Is To Be Done? then The Waste Land and The Golden Bough (178)?161 Jewish
life in any period navigates between tradition and the contemporary moment, and what first
emerges as an aberration later resembles, in the hindsight of history, an adaptation or
inevitability. Such is the secular Jewishness of Fiedler and the New York Intellectuals with
whom he shares a common origin.
Rather than exploit his alleged kinship with Hitler’s victims, Fiedler addresses the Shoah
by emphasizing his own participation as “victimizer” in what American Jews had already come
to call the silent Holocaust (160). In the essay’s most widely (though incompletely) quoted
passage, Fiedler directs toward himself the accusations that Roth’s combative Israeli student
levels at Zuckerman:
[N]ot a single one of my own eight children has at the present moment a Jewish mate;
nor, for that matter, do I. Most of those kids, it is true, still think of themselves as in some
vestigial sense Jews. But of my six grandsons only three have been circumcised...In any
case, there is no one to say kaddish for me when I die. I am, in short, not just as I have
long known, a minimal Jew—my Judaism nearly nonexistent—but, as I have only
recently become aware, a terminal one as well, the last of a four-thousand-year line. Yet
whatever regrets I may feel, I cannot deny that I have wanted this, worked for it. From
childhood on, I dreamed a world without ethnic or religious divisions, though I knew that
this meant a world without Jews. (179, emphasis mine)
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The replacement of rabbinical wisdom with the secular wisdoms of socialism and literary modernism was the
trajectory of Henry Roth, Irving Howe, and any number of Partisan Review writers, as well as the subject of much
of Delmore Schwartz’s fiction.
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The passage’s novelty rests in Fiedler’s confession of guilt: an exogamist has finally turned
himself in to the authorities. No need for Shuki Elchanan to burst forth from The Counterlife and
remind Fiedler he is the last link in the Jewish chain of being; the critic is already well aware.
Nevertheless, Fiedler’s confession falls back on the utopianism of his youth (“a world without
ethnic or religious divisions”) and is therefore incomplete.162 The seeds of self-exoneration,
planted above, bloom within Fiedler’s later claim that the “freely chosen” American “Holocaust”
is the result of overabundant Jewish love “for all humanity, including those who have long
persecuted us” (180).163
An irony within Fiedler’s imperfection admission of complicity in the so-called silent
Holocaust: readers have ignored Fiedler’s later dismissal of the “silent Holocaust” as a
“hyperbolic” phrase, a “pejorative epithet [he] can’t help resenting” (180).164 For despite
Fiedler’s efforts to distance himself from the metaphor with a caustic, verbal stiff-arm of his
own, he soon became an unlikely spokesman for the silent Holocaust. The cause of this oversight
is clear enough. When demographer Sidney Goldstein published the complete findings of the
1990 National Jewish Population Survey, he quoted the aforementioned Fiedler passage (“not a
single one of my eight children”) in his introduction (Goldstein 77). It is worth noting that
Goldstein—who appears, based on his footnote, to have read only a review of Fiedler’s book—
does not mention that the silent Holocaust predates Fiedler’s essay, nor does he include the
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Fiedler attributes a similarly quasi-Marxist, post-religious dream to Henry Roth, author of the Depression-era
masterpiece Call It Sleep: “I feel that among the great boons Jews have already conferred upon humanity, Jews in
America might add this last and greatest one: of orienting themselves toward ceasing to be Jews” (qtd. in 164). I do
not have the utopian fantasies or dingy yeshiva memories necessary to concur with this older Roth, whose remark
fills me with the same hot-headed confusion as the metaphor of the silent Holocaust.
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Summarizing the late-twentieth century fears of intermarriage, Fishman inverts the direction of Fiedler’s allconsuming love: “Will the blessings of American openness cause Jewish culture to be virtually loved out of
existence in twenty-first-century America?” (9).
164
Fiedler also takes pains to attribute the noxious expression to “those observant Jews who, though a majority, feel
threatened and defensive” and speak of assimilated Jews such as himself with “deliberate malice” (180).
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sentence about Fiedler’s children’s lingering Jewishness that I have placed in italics and which
undermines the purposed equivalence between intermarriage and a Judenrein America.
Nevertheless, Fiedler unwittingly provides the overture to that infamous study and its panicinducing results, and the overstated association between Fiedler and the silent Holocaust persists
today.165
In fact, Fiedler’s meditation on the two Holocausts is more complex—both more
damning and more optimistic. Though Fiedler’s own culpability in the statistical hit to Jewish
continuity inspires the essay’s most poignant passage, this is not the focus of his remorseful selfinterrogation. Instead, Fiedler reserves his most bitter vitriol for his younger self, the critic who
wrote To the Gentiles and “shamelessly played the role” of representative Jew despite his own
doubts about his Jewishness. 166 Ever a provocateur,167 Fiedler may be courting controversy when
he alleges that the postwar flowering of Jewish thought in publishing and academia was the
result of gentiles “seeking to make amends for the Holocaust,” or claims to have “profited from a
philo-Semitism as undiscriminating as the anti-Semitism” which preceded it (177). Morris
Dickstein, for one, finds it “difficult to gauge [Fiedler’s] sincerity” in this passage and dismisses
his apocalyptic thinking as rhetorical showmanship (3).168 Yet as we have seen, Fiedler was not
alone in his conviction that assimilation spelled the dissolution of Jewish life and literature in
America, nor was he the only American Jew who expressed this view recklessly. Had Fiedler
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In 2019, the metaphor resurfaced in some Jewish publications following reports that Israeli education minister
Rafi Peretz had called intermarriage within the Diaspora a “second Holocaust” which had claimed the lives of a
second six million. An article in the Times of Israel cites Fiedler as an example of a secular, American Jew who
employed the term in the early ‘90s (Lebovic).
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Originally published in Fiedler’s Collected Essays, To the Gentiles was also released as a separate book in 1972.
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See the reviews of Fiedler on the Roof by Dickstein and Lehmann-Haupt, as well as his obituary in the New York
Times.
168
Considering Fiedler’s claim to be “the Last Jew,” Dickstein writes, “Surely he knows that the return to ethnicity,
tribalism, even fundamentalism is a driving force in the world today, even within American Judaism” (3).
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wished to say kaddish for American Jewry in 1991, he could have easily rounded up a minyan of
like-minded mourners.
Alongside his expressions of remorse, Fiedler provides an unexpected blueprint for a
self-anointing manner of Jewish being. Fiedler’s “fervent assimilationism” is, as Dickstein
recognizes, “belied by the book itself,” which locates Jewishness in decidedly goyish works of
literature (3). Must this mean that Fiedler’s text is marred by insincerity? On the contrary, the
essays that precede “In Every Generation” foreshadow Fiedler’s adoption of a self-taught
Jewishness by locating a Jewish literary genealogy within unlikely texts. Under Fielder’s
scrutiny, the legend of the Holy Grail becomes a Passover story, its knights Perceval and
Galahad, Jewish; Joyce’s Leopold Bloom (whose mother is a gentile) becomes “the first
archetypal modern Jew,”169 through whom Joyce reveals “the sober Jew” who “lives within
every drunken Irishman” (48); even the original Ulysses transforms into a “Semitic prototype”
(38). Fiedler’s counter-genealogy assimilates gentile texts into a Jewish tradition. Reciprocally,
he emphasizes the appeal of Christian mythology, predominantly the story of the Grail Knight, to
Jewish American writers such as Malamud (The Natural) and Bellow (Henderson the Rain
King).170 Because his Grail Knight is a Jew, Fiedler’s argument does not erase the Jewish aspects
of Henderson or The Natural so much as it emphasizes a buried Jewishness within these Jewish
writers’ untypically Jewless books. 171
“In Every Generation” applies this logic to Fiedler himself, who, for all his apocalyptic
claims of being the “Last Jew” (180), finds Jewishness in everything he discusses, including his
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Fiedler defines the archetypal modern Jew as an “emancipated, secularized yid, his knowledge of his own
ancestral tradition approaching degree zero without diminishing his Jewish identity” (48), a description of the postJew which Fiedler himself approaches in his autobiographical essay on the silent Holocaust.
170
See “The Christian-ness of the Jewish-American Writer” (59-71).
171
For a convincing argument about Henderson’s coded Jewishness, see Sutherland’s “Jewish Poetics in Henderson
the Rain King.”
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own minimally Jewish life. Though he laments being the last of a line, Fiedler presents an
alternate model of Jewish continuity rooted in autodidacticism. Describing his decision to study
Hebrew after serving in World War Two, Fiedler writes that he aimed to “rediscover—or, more
accurately, invent for the first time—[his] Jewishness” (165). The essay’s self-flagellating
somberness fades as Fiedler describes his adoption of Jewish ritual as a faculty member at
Montana State University: “[I]n Missoula, Montana, I organized the first seder I had ever
attended: a communal celebration for a handful of Jewish exiles, most of them also teachers in
the State University and, predictably enough, almost none of them married to Jewish women”
(165). Imagine: a group of post-Jews in the goyish West refuses to vanish, choosing instead to
rediscover or invent its Jewish identity. Anecdotal, to be sure, lacking the rigor and
comprehensiveness of the Jewish population surveys that shaped American opinion on
assimilation and intermarriage—surveys designed by sociologists who from the looks of it were
no more capable of defining Jewishness than Fiedler or Roth—this scene nonetheless provides a
counter-narrative to the myth of the silent Holocaust.
The same is true of the essay’s final paragraph, which presents an image of an interfaith
family that collapses the distinctions between Jew and gentile, a task parallel to Fiedler’s critical
project in Fiedler on the Roof. “I cannot resist confessing,” Fiedler writes:
that each autumn, though I do not, of course, go to shul, I dutifully observe the fast of
Yom Kippur. So, too, each winter, I light the lights of Chanukah, more often than not
beside an already lighted Christmas tree. And each spring, after dyeing Easter eggs, I
gather my family together for a Passover seder—crying out to the God in whom I do not
think I believe, “Pour out your wrath upon the goyim…” My children somehow do not
ever ask me why, perhaps because they are sure they already know. If they did ask,
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however, I would say to them, as my grandfather said to me, sneaking me off to some
storefront synagogue on the High Holy Days, “Not because I believe, but so you should
remember.” (181)
Remember: which is to say, allow this knowledge to circulate as your blood. What Fiedler
describes is a heretical continuity, the observant Jew’s nightmare-vision. But I am not in
agreement with the authors of the 1970 and 1990 National Jewish Population Surveys that the
introduction of a Christian element necessarily erases an individual’s or family’s Jewishness.
Why confirm the gentile’s self-serving teleology, in which the Jew is nothing more than an
inchoate Christian? Again Fiedler puts me in mind of Whitman: the Jew is large, he contains
multitudes—as does his post-Jewish family, who dyes Easter eggs before praying that God smite
those lousy gentiles. The tolerance of contradiction is a prerequisite for post- or half-Jewish life.
And so Fiedler’s second valediction to Jewish American life, unlike the hasty, premature
goodbye of his middle age, is also a greeting—not to the utopian, postethnic world he had
envisioned in his youth, but to the unfairly maligned half-Jew, reimagined as a courier of ideas,
shuttling between cultures in perpetual contestation. This is a role the author of To the Gentiles
knows well, had known early as 1959, when in The Jew in the American Novel he argued
controversially, preposterously, fallaciously, that the first Jewish American novel was penned by
a gentile (“Acts of Assimilation” 566).172 Who needs origins when you can make your own
genealogy?
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Michael Kramer notes that Fiedler, ignoring earlier fictions by Nathan Mayer and Isaac Mayer Wise, “attributes
the invention” of the Jewish American novel, “in his characteristically impish way, to a non-Jew, the slippery Henry
Harland, who published a series of Jewish-themed novels under the Semitic-sounding pseudonym Sidney Luska”
(“Acts of Assimilation” 566).
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“Nothing good will come of it”: Imagining the Children of Intermarriage
But what of the children? Won’t somebody, asks the schoolmarm, please think of the
children? Although Roth and Fiedler create new Jewish genealogies that undermine the dominant
postwar conception of continuity; although they affirm the place of the exogamous wicked son
within Jewish tradition; although they leave open the possibility of the half-Jew’s Jewishness,
Roth and Fiedler stop short of imagining the interiority of the next, patrilineally Jewish
generation. Roth leaves Zuckerman childless, and Fiedler, hinting that his children “still think of
themselves as in some vestigial sense Jews” (Fiedler on the Roof 179), does not elaborate on the
nature of that attenuated identification. (His family places a menorah beside its Christmas tree,
but that says no more about his children’s Jewish identities than those electric menorahs with
their flaming bulbs of orange plastic say about the store windows and building lobbies where,
throughout the holiday season, they sit unnoticed.)
The Counterlife and Fiedler on the Roof offer no better assessment of half-Jewish
experience than the population studies which regard children of intermarriage as troublesome
statistics. Is the fate of the half-Jew to be so weakly drawn within the American imagination?
Must he be inflated into a preposterous metaphor or reduced to a cipher? How can one person be
both a non-entity and a threat to the Jewish people?
The same irony manifests in the “rejectionist” attitude institutional Judaism takes toward
intermarried families through the 1950s (Mayer 173). Until that time, writes sociologist Egon
Mayer, the Christian partner’s conversion was “not only discouraged, but, in fact, virtually
unacceptable” within Orthodox and Conservative Judaism (174). These policies became “highly
hazardous” in the wake of rising intermarriage rates and “more or less ensured” the exogamous
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Jew’s flight from the Jewish community and into Christendom.173 The intermarried family is
already a Christian family, ran the argument—for better or worse. The health of the Jewish
American body was at stake; best to treat the intermarrying family as a putrefying limb and
amputate.
Unsurprisingly, the literature of the intermarriage wars, more focused on the vitality of
American Jewry as a whole than on its straying members, rarely makes reference to the fate of
the children themselves. In Mixed Blood: Intermarriage and Ethnic Identity in TwentiethCentury America, historian Paul R. Spickard identifies several sources from the first decades of
the twentieth century that speculate about the “criminality,” “physical deterioration,” and sterility
of half-Jewish children (225), but this quackery, a discourse of its time, does not resurface after
World War II. Nonetheless, Jewish leaders agreed that intermarriage was a “dreadful dilemma”
for a child, as Reconstructionist rabbi Ira Eisenstein wrote in 1964 (qtd. in Spickard 191).
Frequently this dilemma was linked to the claim that intermarriages were more likely to end in
divorce, a method of dissuading perspective exogamists that Marshall Sklare called the “discord
approach” (“Intermarriage and Jewish Survival” 53). But by 1970, Sklare writes, examples of
fruitful, contented intermarriages within American Jewish communities belied the once-accepted
belief that “the wages of intermarriage are unhappiness” (53). In fact, later writers as well as one
Sklare contemporary dispute that there was data to back up this claim.174
Postwar sociologists and rabbis are not alone in questioning the ramifications of this
“dreadful dilemma” upon a child’s psychological and existential well-being. Between 1952 and
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Spickard describes American Jews and Jewish institutions recognizing the dangers of rejectionism in the 1970s
(227).
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For a contemporary challenge to the belief that intermarriages had higher divorce rates than inmariages, see
Schwartz’s “Intermarriage in the US” (113). For historical reassessments of this claim, see Spickard (223-4) and
Berman (153-4).
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1953, Commentary magazine published two personal narratives on this theme by individuals
from intermarried families. A confused longing defines these testimonials, which interrogate the
half-Jewish child’s ability to fit into a culture that views Judaism and Christianity as separate and
exclusive. “Where do our children belong?” asks Eleanor K. Felder, the Presbyterian mother of a
half-Jewish son, in her September 1952 article, “My Child: Jew or Christian?” (231). In Felder’s
case, the complexity of this question stems from the fact that she and her husband are Protestant
and Jewish “by name rather than conviction.” What plagues the Felders is not an interfamilial
clash, but the perceived burden that answering the inevitable question, “What are you?,” will
have on their child. Their boy, Felder writes, “can’t say, ‘My father’s Jewish and my mother’s
Presbyterian.’ The world demands a more precise answer” (231). When Felder seeks opinions—
from rabbis, ministers, child psychologists, friends and family—the necessity for a “precise
answer” to the question of her son’s identity dominates. If Felder introduces her child to both
religions, one voice warns, he will develop a “split personality” (233). If she and her husband
forego giving their son a religious education, he will “drift”—a word that appears several times
in Felder’s piece and which implies a lonely, wandering existence (233). Pick either religion,
both rabbis and ministers advise, otherwise the child will “grow up in a vacuum” (233). At the
end of the piece, the Felders have taken this advice to heart, but are still mulling over which faith
to choose.175
Richard Goldhurst’s “Growing Up Between Two Worlds: Reflections of the Child of a
Mixed Marriage,” published in the July 1953 issue of Commentary, offers a darker portrait of an
intermarried family. The child of a Jewish father and an Irish Catholic mother,176 Goldhurst
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For a brief discussion of this and the following Commentary testimonial, see Berman’s Soeaking of Jews, pp.
154-5.
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In fact, Goldhurst’s father is the writer Harry Golden, author of the essay collection For 2 Cents Plain (Hartnett
42).
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describes a divided and quarrelsome upbringing. Both his mother’s and his father’s families
oppose the union, and each directs their resentment toward Goldhurst and his two brothers. As
the family faces money troubles, Goldhurst’s parents vent their unhappiness through bitter
tribalism: his mother, Jenny, derides Jews as “cheap,” and his father, Harry, explains to his sons
that they have “betrayed him” by going to Catholic mass (32-3). As a result of this family
dysfunction, Goldhurst’s religious and ethnic identity becomes a battleground.
Goldhurst’s experience exemplifies the “discord” that opponents of intermarriage
associate with Jewish-gentile unions (Speaking of Jews 154-5). As his piece’s title suggests,
Goldhurst is neither fully gentile nor Jew. Though as a child he attends Catholic church and
makes communion, Goldhurst writes that he and his brothers “grew up as Jews” because “society
at large understood us best as Jews.” His mother’s “efforts to make Catholics of us,” he explains,
“failed completely” (32). Yet since Goldhurst is the child of a Catholic mother and has received
no Jewish religious instruction, he lacks “an inner belonging” to the Jewish group with which he
is (erroneously?) associated (34). In other words, Goldhurst and his brothers “drift”—a fear that
Felder associates with children raised in a religious vacuum.
Together, Felder and Goldhurst provide consistent images of the difficulties the halfJewish child may encounter. (For example, Felder acknowledges the risk that the gentile partner
of an intermarriage may express antisemitic sentiments through the child, or that the child may
grow to “become ashamed of his Jewishness” [235].) Conversely, each testimonial admits the
possible benefits of the half-Jewish child’s dual heritage. “Ideally,” writes Felder, “instead of
feeling himself to be ‘nothing,’ [her son] would feel that he had the advantages of both
Christianity and Judaism.” Felder’s phrase is significant for presenting “the best of both worlds”
as the alternative to an ethno-religious void. Being the child of intermarriage is a high risk-high
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reward gamble (235). Goldhurst, too, ends his piece with a reflection on the “positive side” of
the half-Jewish child’s story, which includes the heightened “sensibility” that comes from
growing up between worlds (34):177
The child of mixed marriage may identify himself with Jewishness if only to keep society
quiet—but from then on he is on his own, and must pick and choose for himself. No path
is open except metaphysical skepticism, naturalism, heroic secularism. Yet this is
peculiarly American. The Catholic-Jew is America in miniature, he is a child without
tradition and much of his energies must be spent in testing hypotheses on the way to the
discovery or creation of a tradition of his own...Out of his unhappiness, the child of
mixed marriage can find a way of life that is no compromise. The adjustment to a
religious community may not be made, but the adjustment to an American tradition may.
(35)
Goldhurst’s description of the half-Jew as a self-creating, romantic American product is the
obverse of the “tears and homelessness” of his childhood (34). He anticipates both Zuckerman at
the end of The Counterlife and Fiedler at the conclusion of “In Every Generation.” The
distinction between the exogamous Jewish father and his half-Jewish child continues to diminish:
both figures are without tradition and must therefore “go at things...free-style,” as Augie March
says (383). The half-Jewish child’s realization that he is “on his own” anticipates Zuckerman’s
characterization of adulthood as an all-encompassing orphanhood. Ultimately, Goldhurst’s
misery-laden testimonial affords a resolution that Felder’s cannot, trapped as she is within the
mistaken belief that choosing a single religion for her son will smooth out his rough edges.
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This description of the half-Jew’s advantages recalls Kazin’s and Rosenfeld’s earlier expressions of the Jewish
writer’s privileged position in American society.
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Goldhurst’s fleeting vision of the half-Jew as “pioneer” does not stick in the Jewish
American imagination (35). The reason is simple: the half-Jew’s existential quandaries were not
the Jewish social scientist’s primary concern.178 Nevertheless, testimonies such as Felder’s and
Goldhurst’s added an “emotional percussiveness,” writes Berman, to an otherwise theologicalsociological debate (154). Though the American child of intermarriage was not believed to
possess the physical and moral deficiencies attributed to his German counterpart, the Mischling,
he risked spiritual and existential deformity for the sake of his American uniqueness. This belief
remained alive and relevant long enough for Mayer to ask, in his 1983 AJC-funded study of
children of intermarriage, whether these children “experience any significant insecurity about
themselves—a feeling, perhaps, that they do not quite belong anywhere” (251). Though Mayer
emphasizes the preliminary nature of his findings—his intermarriage research appears more
even-handed, less fear-addled than his colleagues’ work—he concludes that most children of
intermarriage are “unperturbed by their dual heritage” (277).
A similar discrepancy exists between the fear of intermarriage that pervades Jewish
institutions beginning in the sixties and American Jewry’s growing acceptance of exogamy as
part of their reality. The 1970 NJPS found that while about seventy percent of Jewish
respondents reported that their parents had opposed interdating, only half of those same
respondents disagreed with the statement, “it is all right for Jews to marry non-Jews” (Massarik
and Chenkin 303-4). The 1990 NJPS demonstrated a continuation of this trend toward
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a fleeting reference to the threat intermarriage poses to “the ability of family members to identify with one another,”
with no specific reference to children (“Jewish Survival” 53).
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acceptance; only twenty-two percent of “Jews by religion” and four percent of “secular Jews”
claimed they would oppose their child’s marriage to a non-Jew (Goldstein 128).179
And so I repeat, what of the children? Specifically, how do the children of intermarriage
speak of their experience? Reviewing the texts of the so-called intermarriage wars, those
impassioned arguments against my quiet existence, I recall a sublime passage from Delmore
Schwartz’s finest story, “In Dreams Begin Responsibilities.” The scene does not concern
intermarriage, but nonetheless voices the survivalist’s protestation against the exogamous couple.
“Don’t do it,” warns Schwartz’s narrator. He shouts at a movie screen in a dream-theater, which
plays the moment his father proposes to his mother. “It’s not too late to change your minds, both
of you. Nothing good will come of it, only remorse, hatred, scandal, and two children whose
characters are monstrous” (9).
This lamentation for my squandered birthright is what the survivalists wish for me to
shout. Too bad for them. I’m not shouting.

Merry Levov: a Mischling by Any Other Name
That lamentation could also pass for the words of Lou Levov, the aging patriarch and
founder of the successful Newark Maid leather glove factory, whose exceptional son Seymour,
nicknamed “the Swede” for his blond good looks and goyish athleticism, is the protagonist of
Roth’s American Pastoral (1997), and the first of Roth’s exogamous fathers to raise a child. A
paragon of American assimilation from his days as Weequahic High School’s star athlete,
Seymour begins his young adulthood by informing his father of his plan to marry Dawn Dwyer,
an Irish Catholic beauty queen from the neighboring city of Elizabeth. The young couple is in
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love, Seymour explains, and Lou, a man of his time (the year is no later than 1950), objects like
Schwartz’s movie-goer: “‘In love,’ what does that mean? What is ‘in love’ going to do for you
when you have a child? How are you going to raise a child? As a Catholic? As a Jew? No, you
are going to raise a child who won’t be one thing or the other—all because you are ‘in love’”
(386).
What’s love got to do with it? Neither man of faith nor hater of gentiles, Lou is a tireless,
hard-headed American son of Galician Jewish immigrants, a child of Newark’s ghetto who holds
on to the Old World security of making a life among other Jews. He is, in short, typical of the
American-born Jews of his era, whose children make up the first significant wave of postwar
Jewish-gentile intermarriage; in the intergenerational battle over intermarriage that was also a
dispute between the dueling claims of “love and tradition” (Mayer 12), Lou stands by tradition.
He clings to family unity at a time when Americans were beginning to view marriage as a union
of “two individuals rather than two families” (“Jewish Future” 51).180
What distinguishes Lou from his more religiously-committed peers is that he seeks to
maintain familial continuity rather than Jewish continuity. The greater hazard for Lou’s
grandchild is not being raised Catholic, but growing up without ethno-religious ties. And though
Lou later bargains with his daughter-in-law to impose limits on his grandchild’s exposure to
Catholicism—an arrangement Dawn breaks almost immediately, baptizing her newborn in
secret—Lou’s concern remains fixed on his granddaughter’s identity. Christian rituals and
iconography, “sore subjects” for Lou, (387), are not pernicious to his granddaughter because they
are Christian, but because they will confuse the child’s sense of self: they are, Lou laments to his
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For contemporary arguments connecting exogamy to shifting attitudes about marriage, see Sklare’s
“Intermarriage and the Jewish Future” (51) and Gordis’s Love and Sex (218-9). For a more recent version, see
Berman’s Speaking of Jews (157).
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wife, “enough for that poor kid never to know who she [is]” (389). In this way, Lou’s fears more
closely approximate the existential anxieties described in the Felder and Goldhurst testimonies
than the demographic warnings voiced by Sklare and his colleagues.
And who is Meredith Levov, besides the child of Seymour Levov and Dawn Dwyer?
Who is this first child of intermarriage to crawl out of the swamp of Roth’s imagination and walk
on the dry land of the page? As a girl, she is an admirer of Audrey Hepburn and, to Lou Levov’s
chagrin, a sometime Catholic—the result of her bond with her maternal grandmother. She is,
most noticeably, a stutterer, her “impediment” a source of anxiety and stress and hours of speech
therapy, until she learns to wield her stutter like a “machete” as a politically radicalized high
schooler (100). And at sixteen, she is a killer of three people, each the victim of bombs she built
to protest American involvement in Vietnam by bringing “the war home to Lyndon Johnson”
(68).
Incredible! Roth finally lets a half-Jew escape the womb and she becomes a murderer.
The ironies are confounding. Viewed within the context of her grandfather’s anxieties, Merry’s
actions seem like an argument against intermarriage. Is Merry nothing more than an expression
of Roth’s belated wish to return to the Jewish fold?181 On the other hand, Merry’s deviance (and
its potential connection to her dual heritage) may also be said to confirm the Nazi conception of
the degenerate Mischling. Why are Roth’s children of intermarriage doomed to misery or nonexistence? What is Roth’s problem with half-Jews?
Better to ask, what is Nathan Zuckerman’s problem with half-Jews? Roth exhumes his
departed stand-in to serve as his narrator and “mediating intelligence” in American Pastoral
(1997), I Married a Communist (1998), and The Human Stain (2000), the late-career
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masterpieces that make up Roth’s American Trilogy (McGrath 8). Though each book is, in
Posnock’s phrase, Zuckerman’s “meditative reconstruction of an American life”—his narrative
predecessor is Conrad’s Charles Marlow—American Pastoral remains “unique in the trilogy” for
being its narrator’s “evocative guesswork” rather than a purely “realistic chronicle” (Posnock
104). Only the book’s first ninety pages, which describe how Zuckerman adopts the Swede as his
subject, present a true history; the rest is Zuckerman’s “speculative fiction” on the Swede’s life
(109). “The whole book,” writes Stanley Crouch, “is [Zuckerman’s]” (32). Zuckerman is
American Pastoral’s ghostwriter. The effect of this narrative sleight-of-hand—which, Crouch
notes, fooled “many critics” (32)—is that the character Zuckerman transforms into an authorial
Zuckerman, whose representation of Merry Levov is scarred by his own aborted foray into
intermarriage and fatherhood.
The range of Zuckerman’s experience has shrunk since he acted as character-narrator in
The Counterlife. Sixty-two years old and childless, American Pastoral’s Zuckerman lives and
works in the solitude of a two-room cabin in western Massachusetts. He has swapped emotional
and erotic entanglements for an ascetic devotion to his craft. Zuckerman’s divorce from the
clamoring body is symbolized and ensured by a botched surgical procedure that leaves him
impotent and incontinent. No more throbbing, tightening, or engorging—only slackness and
leaky repose. What burns for Zuckerman is his imagination, and that imagination’s old
obsessions persist: the fate of his childhood Newark, the unbreachable gulfs between generations
that alienate even loving families, the boundaries erected by a too-strict adherence to the
categories of gentile and Jew—each shapes Zuckerman’s characterization of Seymour Levov and
his maladjusted daughter Merry.
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Early in the novel, the aging, melancholy bachelor attends his forty-fifth high school
reunion, where he learns Swede Levov has died of prostate cancer. The aftershocks of
Zuckerman’s failed marriage—his childlessness, his bachelorhood, his abstemiousness—darken
his interactions with former classmates, including the Swede’s younger brother, Jerry Levov.
Jerry provides the novel’s only allusion to Maria. “I read somewhere,” he tells Zuckerman, “you
were living in England with an aristocrat.” Zuckerman demurs (“I live in New England now,
without an aristocrat”), explaining that he lives with nothing more than his work (63). What,
Jerry wonders, is Zuckerman avoiding? The writer’s justification for his self-imposed exile, for
foregoing the “wear and tear of life” (64), recalls the conflict in The Counterlife:
The picture we have of one another. Layers and layers of misunderstanding. The picture
we have of ourselves. Useless. Presumptuous. Completely cocked-up. Only we go ahead
and live by these pictures. (64)
An enervating human imbroglio, laden with errors of perception, interpretation, and selffashioning: this is how a younger Zuckerman categorized his brother’s flight to Israel and his
own fantasy of marriage and fatherhood in England. By chaining himself to his desk, an older
Zuckerman confines his misunderstandings to the page. Or so Zuckerman hopes.
If Zuckerman’s monkish commitment to art is a reaction to his last, ego-shaking forays
into the unwritten world, so, too, is his childlessness—a fact he confronts while conversing with
his old friends, now the matriarchs and patriarchs of their own families. These men and women
define themselves by their progeny.182 By contrast, Zuckerman is a genealogical dead-end, the
Jewish demographer’s greatest fear turned reality; his impotent, dour loneliness clashes with the

182

The names of Zuckerman’s old friends are qualified by the fruit of their loins: “Marshall Goldstein (‘Children 39,
37. Grandchildren, 8, 6’),” “Stanley Wernikoff (‘Children 39, 38. Grandchildren 5, 2, 8 mo.’)” (American Pastoral
52-3).
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vitality of his fellow reunion-goers. When the reunion’s MC—“Erwin Levine, Children 43, 41,
38, 31. Grandchildren 9, 8, 3, 1, 6 weeks”—asks Zuckerman to say a few words, he provides a
blackly comic personal history: “I have neither child nor grandchild but I did, ten years ago, have
a quintuple bypass operation of which I am proud” (62). Zuckerman can’t kvell over children,
just his medical history—a legacy befitting a famed satirist of the body’s pains and pleasures.183
Zuckerman’s pitiable childlessness, that hold-over from The Counterlife, spurs his desire
to write about the Swede. Thanks to Jerry, Zuckerman learns that Seymour, too, had been
tortured by his familial legacy. In the summer of 1968, Jerry informs Zuckerman, the Swede’s
daughter, Merry Levov, had planted a bomb in a village post office outside of Morristown, New
Jersey, killing a man (68). Upon learning of Merry’s unlikely crime and the destruction it
wrought upon the Swede, Zuckerman drifts into the realm of imagination—but not before
including the following among his reasons for effacing himself with fiction: “I seemed alone in
having wound up with no children [or] grandchildren” (85). Still plagued by his own botched
ambitions of fatherhood, Zuckerman births a fictionalized life of Seymour Levov that refracts his
own obsession with thwarted genealogies.
The undoing of the Levov family by their irascible, disgruntled daughter allows
Zuckerman to explore the misunderstandings that animate him. For misunderstandings are at the
heart of his newest project, as they were in The Counterlife. “The fact remains that getting people
right is not what living is all about anyway,” writes Zuckerman in American Pastoral. “It’s
getting them wrong that is living, getting them wrong and wrong and wrong and then, on careful
reconsideration, getting them wrong again” (35). Getting people wrong is also the writer’s job;
thus, Zuckerman admits that the Swede of his manuscript is “not the primary Swede,” but rather
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Roth expanded on this idea in Everyman (2006), a novel “formulated out of a medical history,” in which the
“narrative line” was an account of his protagonist’s ailments (“Philip Roth Discusses ‘Everyman’”).

180
a Swede “expunged” of “things I was ignorant of or I didn’t want” (76). Nor is Merry the
primary Merry. Instead, Zuckerman’s Merry is little more than the “little murderer,” the
“monster daughter” that Jerry blames for his brother’s decades of unhappiness (67)—an
interpretation of the half-Jewish child that Zuckerman, aching from his own marital failures,
accepts without question.
Ignorant of the true Swede and the true Merry, Zuckerman is free to employ the story of
the Levovs as a vehicle for his own concerns. In fact, the Swede’s tale bridges the traditional
Zuckerman subjects—the absurd, self-righteous battles between parent and child, the question of
what constitutes Jewishness in American life—with his inchoate theme in the American Trilogy
of how well-meaning men can become “history’s plaything[s]” (87). Zuckerman’s Swede is a
symbol of assimilation in its positive sense, as the shedding of “pre-American insecurities” in
order to “live unapologetically as an equal among equals” (34). The Swede’s goyish appearance,
athleticism, and confidence make him a case of phenotypic exceptionalism, an example of
Jewish continuity that diverges from the degrading stereotypes associated with the Jewish body.
Like earlier Zuckerman heroes, the Swede is a “Jew who got away,”184 though the means of
Seymour’s escape is distinct for being physical. The star athlete’s bodily assimilation is his
avenue to American acceptance:
The Jewishness that he wore so lightly as one of the tall, blonde, athletic winners must
have spoken to us too—in our idolizing the Swede and his unconscious oneness with
America, I suppose there was a tinge of shame and self-rejection. Conflicting Jewish
184

Zuckerman uses “the Jew who got away” to describe E.I. Lonoff In The Ghost Writer (50). The phrase refers to
the Russian-born Lonoff’s good fortune of coming to America as a child, thereby avoiding the destruction of his
European counterparts such as Isaac Babel. The expression also evokes Lonoff’s choice to isolate himself from
literary life in the woods of western Massachusetts, a self-distancing Zuckerman imitates. The Ghost Writer provides
yet another variation on this theme when Zuckerman imagines Lonoff’s young assistant to be Anne Frank,
miraculously alive and well. One might also add that Roth’s 1973 essay on Kafka (“I Always Wanted You to
Admire My Fasting”) anticipates this theme by imagining Kafka alive and teaching Hebrew school in Newark.
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desires awakened by the sight of him were simultaneously becalmed by him; the
contradiction in Jews who want to fit in and want to stand out, who insist they are
different and insist they are no different, resolved itself in the triumphant spectacle of this
Swede who was actually only another of our neighborhood Seymours whose forebears
has been Solomons and Sauls and who would themselves beget Stephens who would in
turn beget Shawns. (20)
As Zuckerman’s mock-biblical genealogy makes clear, Seymour Levov is only one actor in the
Weequahic Jewish community’s march toward unfettered Americanism. (Note that this
genealogy ends with Shawns, which is to say goyim.) Yet the Swede also strikes up the band,
hastening their march. His dominance on the sports field permits the families of Weequahic to
feel, Zuckerman writes, “almost like Gentiles (as they imagined Gentiles)”: carefree, celebratory,
unburdened by collective memories of expulsion, forced conversion, scapegoating, and pogroms
(3-4).
The Swede’s whole life, including his marriage to a former Miss New Jersey—“A shiksa.
Dawn Dwyer. He’d done it,” recalls Zuckerman, demonstrating a vicarious pride befitting the
author of Carnovsky (15)—had been an effort to ensure the Levov family’s “oneness with
America.” Then what to make of Merry, Seymour’s half-Jewish child? A violent critic of
American life, she cannot be a wholesome, American Shawn; a Catholic’s daughter, she cannot
perpetuate the Jewish chain of being. Instead she becomes, in Zuckerman’s mind, a case of “the
ritual postimmigrant struggle for success turning pathological” (86).
What is the source of this pathology? Is it Merry’s dual heritage? That is one hypothesis
the novel raises, but the sin seems to fall on the Swede himself. Having married a beauty queen
and inherited his father’s profitable leather glove factory, the Swede moves, over his father’s
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protestations, out of city—not to Maplewood or South Orange, immediate suburbs of Newark
with established Jewish populations, but further west to Old Rimrock, a quaint slice of
Americana on the outskirts of Morristown—coincidentally, my hometown, where my
intermarried parents moved and raised their children—some thirty-odd miles beyond Newark
and a world away.
The Swede’s relocation west signals his march past assimilation into what Zuckerman
calls the pastoral, a concept he carries over from The Counterlife. In that novel, Zuckerman’s
own pure, idyllic, and untenable dream had gestated within Maria’s womb; in American
Pastoral, the false womb transforms into the Levovs’ 18th-century stone house, where Dawn
raises cows and the Swede plays “gentleman farmer” (86). To move out of a turbulent, rioting
Newark in the sixties and settle in Jewish suburbs is to be part of a historical trend; to move to
the most rural part of Morris County—what Seymour’s father calls “the sticks”—is to dive
headlong into myth (310).185 Out in the boondocks, the Swede imagines himself as a
“frontiersman of old...settling Revolutionary New Jersey for the first time” (310).186 Yet the
enduring appeal to the Swede is in the prehistoric promise of the village’s name: Old Rimrock,
the ageless, foundational stone beneath his feet. Who needs George Washington or Alexander
Hamilton (who both spent time in Morristown)? Instead, the Swede styles himself as Johnny
Appleseed, whom he imagines as naively free of ethnic and religious claims: “Wasn’t a Jew,
wasn’t an Irish Catholic, wasn’t a Protestant Christian—nope, Johnny Appleseed was just a
happy American” (316). That the Swede’s characterization of Johnny Appleseed differs from the
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The Swede’s trajectory runs opposite to Zuckerman’s at the end of The Counterlife. Through circumcision,
Nathan writes, a Jew “enters history.” Seymour’s flight into myth, by contrast, restores the foreskin of his soul.
186
“Welcome to Historic Morristown” read the signs that greet drivers at the town’s boundaries. During the
Revolutionary War, nearby Jockey Hollow, then a family estate, served as the Continental Army’s winter
encampment, and George Washington himself suffered through the bitter winter of 1779-80 on its grounds.
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reality of the historical John Chapman, who had no connection to New Jersey and was, in fact, a
Christian missionary, is precisely the point. Old Rimrock is where the Swede travels to extricate
himself from sullied history and its burdens.
But this is Zuckerman’s pastoral, not Virgil’s—not even Milton’s, which evokes the
genre to mourn the prematurely fallen Lycidas—and its comforts are illusory. The Swede’s move
to Old Rimrock, like Oedipus’s flight from Corinth, ensures his undoing; what frees him from
his own demanding father propels his daughter to rebel. No amount of bedtime stories about
Johnny Appleseed and his family, Dawn and Merry Appleseed (316), can prevent the bitter
knowledge of the pastoral’s lie from blooming within Merry.
As in The Counterlife, the trio trapped in the pastoral is an intermarried couple and their
child, but here the child, not the parent, shatters the womb-dream of strifeless unity.
Zuckerman’s first characterization of Merry, which follows his conversation with Jerry, is as
“the daughter who transports [the Swede] out of the longed-for American pastoral and into
everything that is its antithesis and its enemy, into the fury, the violence, and the desperation of
the counterpastoral—into the indigenous American berserk” (86). Merry’s violence, he suggests,
is a reaction to the bucolic upbringing the Swede had imposed upon her—a theory stained with
Jerry’s cynicism, but which emphasizes the continuity of the Swede’s misfortunes and
Zuckerman’s earlier misadventures. Both Zuckerman and his subject seek to realize a fantasy by
marrying a gentile and fathering a post-Jewish child. In each case an act of violence—
circumcision for Nathan, “little Merry’s darling bomb” for the Swede (68)—ends the
intermarried family’s pastoral dream. Even the notion of a “counterpastoral” smacks of The
Counterlife’s concerns with the creation of alternative, anti-lives that emerge as fantasies of
escape.
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Zuckerman’s revised counterpastoral finds its source not in Jewish ritual but within “the
indigenous American berserk.” What sets off Merry’s bomb, destroying her father’s pastoral
fantasy, is not the lingering Jewish commitment the Swede had fled, but an autochthonous
American blood-lust—the urge to destroy that would, in the same year, claim the lives of Martin
Luther King and Robert F. Kennedy and had, the previous summer, ravaged American cities
such as the Swede’s native Newark. The Swede’s dream of becoming fully, irreversibly
American ignores the violence and absurdity at the heart of American experience.187 The
foundation evoked in the name Old Rimrock is not one of cold, quiet stone, but of blood and
shrieks.
Nevertheless, Merry Levov’s muddled ancestry repeatedly emerges as an explanation for
her maladjusted radicalism and eventual terrorism. This line of reasoning enters the novel
through Rita Cohen, one of Merry’s co-conspirators who appears at the Swede’s factory after
Merry plants the bomb and goes into hiding. According to Rita, Merry’s violence is a response to
Dawn Levov’s disappointment in her daughter’s appearance—unkempt, overweight, and
carrying the visual markers of her father’s Jewishness. 188 The former beauty queen, argues Rita,
despises Merry for being the Swede’s daughter: “It’s all fine and well for Miss New Jersey to
marry a Jew,” she says—especially, one might add, a Jew whose blond good looks earn him the
nickname Swede—“But raise a Jew? That’s a whole other bag of tricks. You have a shiksa wife,
Swede, but you didn’t get a shiksa daughter” (138). Rita’s accusation, which echoes Richard
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About Old Rimrock, the Swede reflects, “What was Mars to his father was America to him” (310). This contrast
recalls Howe’s dismissal of suburban Jewish life.
188
Rita Cohen’s caricature of Dawn’s mothering focuses specifically on Merry’s hair and nose, traditional signifiers
of ethnic difference generally and Jewish difference in particular. “I’m surprised she didn’t get a nose job,” Rita
quips, recalling Roth’s earlier jabs at rhinoplasty in The Ghost Writer and Goodbye, Columbus (136).
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Goldhurst’s description of his own Irish Catholic mother, has Zuckerman’s fingerprints all over
it.
Has Merry actually inherited some of her father’s attenuated Jewishness? Or is
Zuckerman, whose brother calls him a “poor bastard” with “Jew on the brain” (Counterlife 228),
merely transforming her into another Zuckerman character for his “speculative fiction” (Posnock
109)?189 This is almost impossible to determine, since American Pastoral offers no picture of an
unmediated Merry. She occupies a similar position to Caddy Compson in The Sound and the
Fury or Percival in The Waves: a void at the center of the novel, an absence filled by narrative.
But Faulkner and Woolf tell the tales of their missing person with multiple narrative voices. Each
speaker (Caddy’s brothers, Percival’s friends) offers only a fragment; no narrator is authoritative.
In contrast, the chorus of voices that explains where Merry Levov went astray—Merry’s father,
her psychiatrist, Rita Cohen—is ventriloquized by Zuckerman.
The one exception is Jerry Levov, whose initial description of Merry as “chaos itself”
inspires Zuckerman to write the Swede’s story and which, striated with Zuckerman’s pet themes,
produces the Merry of American Pastoral (231). In fact, Zuckerman’s statement of the novel’s
subject—the intrusion of the berserk into the Swede’s pastoral myth of Old Rimrock—merely
polishes Jerry’s cruder formulation: “Seymour was into quaint Americana,” he tells Zuckerman
at their reunion, “[b]ut the kid wasn’t...My brother thought he could take his family out of human
confusion and into Old Rimrock, but she put them right back in” (68). Reciprocally, the
fictionalized Jerry whom Zuckerman later depicts battering Big Swede with tough love displays
his author’s eye for sociological specificity. When Seymour reveals to his brother that he has
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“Why can’t Jews with their Jewish problems be human beings with their human problems?” Henry asks himself
after discovering a manuscript of The Counterlife in his deceased brother’s apartment (228). Nathan’s propensity for
turning the details of his family history into “Jew-engrossed, Jew-engorged pages” is what precipitates his
estrangement from his brother (230).
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found Merry, destitute and living as a Jain in a dilapidated Newark flophouse,190 Jerry identifies
Seymour’s dream of Old Rimrock as the source of his daughter’s anger:
Out there with Miss America, dumbing down and dulling out. Out there playing at being
Wasps, a little Mick girl from the Elizabeth docks and a Jewboy from Weequahic High.
The cows. Cow society. Colonial old America. And you thought all that façade was going
to come without cost. Genteel and innocent. But that costs, too, Seymour. I would have
thrown a bomb. I would become a Jain and live in Newark. That Wasp bullshit! (280)191
A subtler social critic than Rita Cohen, Zuckerman’s Jerry recognizes that Seymour’s and
Dawn’s pretensions to an idyllic, rural life belie their shared origins in industrial port cities as the
children of religious minorities loathed by America’s first Protestant settlers.192 (By contrast,
Rita Cohen fallaciously associates Dawn with the aristocracy, labeling her “Lady Dawn” [137]).
Jerry’s tirade against Merry’s quaint, deracinated upbringing in Old Rimrock is an elaboration of
Zuckerman’s critique of the disingenuous pastoral. Having grown up in a paradise of bad faith,
Merry returns to that heart of the American berserk, post-riot Newark, a setting Zuckerman
introduces in Zuckerman Unbound, alludes to in The Anatomy Lesson, The Counterlife, and
Patrimony, but finally explores through the life of Seymour Levov. In matters of argument,
theme, character development, and setting, the buck of American Pastoral stops not with
Seymour Levov, but with Zuckerman.
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Merry’s brand of Jainism involves her adoption of a radical philosophy of non-violence that includes foregoing
bathing for fear it would harm the microorganisms that live in water. She constructs this counterlife to purge herself
of her earlier acts of terrorism (232, 243-6).
191
Newark and Elizabeth are a mere five miles apart. If the Swede were to walk through Weequahic Park, which
marks his neighborhood’s western boundary, he could exit to the south and find himself in Elizabeth.
192
One might add that the charges American Protestants traditionally directed at Catholics—their purported
clannishness, their apparent loyalty to a foreign state (the Vatican), their racial inferiority (as Irish and Italians) to
the English, Dutch, and French who settled America—share much with later expressions of antisemitism.
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Zuckerman remains a theater and nothing but a theater, and the reader is left to wonder
how Merry Levov would speak if she were permitted to write her own lines. How would she
respond, for example, to her father’s doleful confession, late in the novel, that Lou Levov had
been right to fear for his half-Jewish grandchild’s identity? “They had raised a child who was
neither Catholic nor Jew,” Seymour laments, “who instead was first a stutterer, then a killer, then
a Jain,” each new identity a rebellion against the one preceding (386). Though Zuckerman uses
Merry’s stutter as a symbol of her perennial dysfunction, a mark of her irrepressible anger,193
another interpretation presents itself: her halting, broken speech evokes the voicelessness of the
children of intermarriage within Roth’s imagination.
Finally alive—not just alive, but “blessed,” with “a logical mind and a high IQ and an
adultlike sense of humor,” as well as “truly stupendous strength” (95, 101)—Roth’s most
fleshed-out child of intermarriage nevertheless remains verbally blocked. In this way, Merry
remains part of the continuum of Roth’s unrealized half-Jewish characters. At the same time,
Merry’s speech impediment, as well as her parents’ tireless efforts to alleviate it through
psychiatry and speech therapy, bring to mind the Jewish voice’s significance as a marker of
difference and site of antisemitic caricature. The Jew’s speech, argues Gilman in The Jew’s
Body, is an object of derision, an argument against his belonging inside a particular national
culture (20); the Jew speaks too loudly, too energetically, with an accent and a litany of
impediments, including a tell-tale lisp (12).194 The Jew’s language, Gilman writes, is “marked by
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Says Jerry: “Ever since she was a kid, every word she spoke was a bomb” (279).
In fact, Gilman argues that the “fear of sounding different, sounding too Jewish…haunts Roth’s work” (Jew’s
Body 11). Roth himself reveals sensitivity to the stereotype of the lisping Jew in the following description of the
actor Charles Macklin’s performance as Shylock: “We are told that Mr. Macklin would mouth the two th’s and two
s’s in ‘Three thousand ducats’ with such oiliness that he instantaneously aroused, with just those three words, all of
the audience’s hatred of Shylock’s race” (Operation Shylock 275). Bellow, too, includes the lisp when describing
how English Prime Minister David Lloyd George mocked a Jewish diplomat while negotiating the Treaty of
Versailles: “One of the German negotiators was a Jew. Lloyd George, losing his temper, turned on this man: he did
194
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the corruption of being a Jew” (Jew’s Body 11).195 If the Jew could speak the national language
flawlessly, all the worse—that was evidence of his ability to shape-shift, his intention to hide and
plot and undermine (32, Franz Kafka 24).
I am not suggesting that Merry’s stutter is a function of her Jewishness—have I become
the poor bastard with Jew on his brain?—but that the labored stop-and-start of her stammer
parallels the half-Jew’s stifled voice within both Jewish American literature and public
discourse. If Merry may be regarded as an emblematic American child of intermarriage, then her
voicelessness and dual heritage recall older, European models of partial Jewishness. The first is
the Mischling, or German half-Jew, considered a degenerate and subject to varying degrees of
legal restrictions depending on her exact degree of Jewish blood; the boundary-flouting
Mischling, writes Gilman, “magnified the most egregious aspects of both ‘races’” (Franz Kafka
14).196 Merry’s relation to the Mischling enters the novel through her grandfather’s fears that the
source of her troubles, from the colic of her infanthood to her stuttering and violence, may be
explained by her muddled religious and ethnic identity (American Pastoral 390). Lou Levov,
like Eleanor Felder of “My Child: Jew or Christian?,” worries that Merry’s dual heritage will
raise unanswerable questions about her identity and that she will, as Felder warns, “drift.”197
Merry’s indefatigable grandfather also plays a part in her resemblance to another figure
from European Jewish history—the converso, or “New Christian,” the Sephardic Jew who
adopted Christianity under pressure of the Inquisition (Gerber 120). Merry, like Adrienne Rich,

an astonishing kike number on him, crouching, hunching, limping, spitting, zizzing his esses, sticking out his
backside, doing a splayfoot parody of a Jew-walk” (Ravelstein 8).
195
See chapter one of Gilman’s The Jew’s Body, “The Jewish Voice: Chicken Soup, or the Penalties of Sounding
Too Jewish.”
196
In his study of Kafka, Gilman connects Kafka’s anxieties about his mauscheln, or Jewish speech, to his
discomfort with the mischling, or half-Jew (18-19, 32).
197
The fact that Merry does indeed become a spiritual drifter does not mean Lou shares any of the eugenicist’s
concerns about racial impurities that are inherent to the Nazi idea of the Mischling.
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enters a family “split at the root”: before she is born, before her parents are even married, Lou
and Merry’s mother contentiously negotiate the terms of her religious upbringing. The scene is
an inverted Inquisition, with Lou performing as Jewish Torquemada,198 plying Dawn for the
details of her Catholic commitment—her church attendance, the number of crosses in her home,
her parents’ opinions of Jews—and the significance of Catholic sacraments. Though Lou agrees
that the child can celebrate Christmas and Easter in exchange for foregoing baptism or
communion—“[M]y grandchild is not going to eat Jesus,” he insists (396)—Dawn, who is made
of sterner stuff than her predecessor Alice Dembosky, secretly baptizes the child in contradiction
of their agreement.
There were two categories of conversos in Catholic Spain, and Merry shares qualities
with both. The first, larger category, whom practicing Jews called anusim, or “the forced ones,”
adopted Christianity with varying levels of enthusiasm (120). Such is the role Merry plays in
girlhood, a “Catholic phase” instigated by her maternal grandmother who, flouting the terms of
Lou’s contract, takes Merry to Sunday mass and fills her room with what the Swede calls
“Catholic trinkets” (American Pastoral 93). Yet Merry also possesses qualities of a minority
category of conversos derisively labeled marranos—the term, meaning “swine” or “turncoat,”
has been replaced in scholarship by the phrase crypto-Jew—who continued practicing Jewish
customs in secret (Gerber 121). If Merry becomes a converso for her mother, she becomes a
crypto-Jew for her father, who insists she remove the Christian iconography from her room
before her Levov grandparents visit Old Rimrock so as to preserve the secret of her baptism.
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Roth encourages this association by using “inquisition” in its uncapitalized form to describe Lou’s interrogation
(391). Lou’s role as inquisitor is reinforced by the scene’s typeface: like a play, the sequence contains only dialogue,
with Dawn’s rendered as expected and Lou’s uniformly capitalized, as though his were the voice of an angry God.
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Poor Merry Levov: gentile and Jew, Mischling and converso, New Christian and crytoJew. She grasps at fragments of identity. She is not merely “between two worlds,” as Richard
Goldhurst describes himself, but between two in-between worlds. Her stutter is merely the
manifestation of these endless divisions of the self, her silence in the American pastoral a
corollary to the paltry documentation of partially Jewish experience in Europe.199
Nonetheless, it is hard to argue that American Pastoral constitutes Roth’s attempt to
return to the fold of Jewish good behavior. If any voice in the novel associates the Swede’s
downfall with his marriage to a gentile, that voice is Zuckerman’s—and Zuckerman is a novelist,
beholden to his imagination over his experience in The Counterlife. And yet, how disappointing
that Zuckerman’s imagination (or Roth’s?) fails to offer a more refined depiction of the half-Jew
than the rabbis and demographers who raged against her existence.

Coda: Bringing Up Bellow
Two of Saul Bellow’s ambiguously Jewish characters offer a useful point of comparison
for Merry, who seems doomed to cliché even when rendered through Roth’s vibrant prose.
Neither of Bellow’s inventions is in fact a child of intermarriage; however, as Jews raised in
Christian environments, or modern conversos, they approach the half-Jew’s sense of selfdivision. The first, Shula Sammler of Mr. Sammler’s Planet (1970), anticipates Roth’s
representation of Merry. Shula is the daughter of the titular Artur Sammler, Bellow’s protagonist,
a staid, scholarly Holocaust survivor who regards Shula as a disheveled nuisance. A Polish Jew
by birth like her father, Shula was hidden as a child in a Catholic nunnery to protect her from the
Nazis. As an adult, Shula oscillates between Jewish and Christian observance, a confusion she
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“Crypto-Judaism, by its nature, eludes the eye of the historian and escapes all written records” (Gerber 121).
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wears on her person. On Ash Wednesday, Sammler notes, Shula “[comes] into clear focus”: the
“smudge between [her] eyes'' clashes with the “little Jewish twists of kinky hair” that fall from
her wig, itself suggestive of Orthodox Judaism. She is, like Merry Levov, a creature of
irreconciliables, of “[t]hings that ought but failed actually to connect”—one of Felder’s drifters.
Both Merry and Shula make a “life-claim” out of living between two worlds, but the affirmation
of their “right to be whatever” ultimately proves destructive (18).
Shula’s flamboyant eccentricity overtakes the novel when she steals a manuscript she
believes will aid her father’s research. Shula’s recklessness unsettles Sammler, who fears the
ramifications of the theft. Her crime and its effect on Sammler are a miniaturized predecessor to
Merry’s bombs. In fact, Merry’s bombing and the events of Mr. Sammler’s Planet are set in the
same time (‘68 or ‘69) and place (New York City and its suburbs); when, before the bombing,
Merry makes weekly trips to New York to protest the Vietnam war, it is Sammler’s city she
visits. Drastically different in tone and structure, published nearly thirty years apart, Mr.
Sammler’s Planet and American Pastoral nonetheless share a concern with the fate of America
following the rise of so-called youth culture and its emphasis on political activism and sexual
liberation; but where Roth’s novel presents these complaints through Merry’s endearing, if
stubborn grandfather, who bemoans the Newark riots and the elevation of Deep Throat to a
subject of respectable dinner conversation (American Pastoral 344-5), Bellow’s Sammler is,
despite his erudition, a stuffy old fart, whose “piercing observation” of a crime and sex-addled
New York City is far more engaging than his antique moralizing (Mr. Sammler’s Planet 34).200
Within the context of Mr. Sammler’s Planet, Shula’s flighty impulses provide a sympathetic
form of chaos—no such luck for Merry, whose bomb redeems nothing. More to the point:
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“Who had raised the diaper flag? Who had made shit a sacrament?” asks Sammler, seemingly unaware that the
diaper flag inspires his richest observations (35).
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Shula’s internal contradictions, like Sammler’s apocalyptic melancholia, stem from the trauma of
her personal history. Her confusion has an objective correlative; Merry’s seems credible only in
the context of Zuckerman’s theory of the pastoral.
By contrast, Woody Selbst, another Bellovian converso and the protagonist of “A Silver
Dish” (1978), maintains his identification with his Jewish father without falling into crime or
moral turpitude. This is particularly remarkable since Selbst’s father, Morris, is a conman, an
old-fashioned goniff. The story’s frame finds Woody, a successful contractor at sixty, mourning
Morris’s death. Woody recalls a memory from his teen years, in which his father uses him in a
scheme to rip off a wealthy Christian widow, Mrs. Skoglund, who has taken an interest in
Woody’s spiritual development. The widow, a friend of Woody’s maternal family, has paid for
Woody to attend a Christian seminary and Morris, smelling an easy mark, asks her for a loan he
has no plan of repaying. When Mrs. Skoglund retreats to pray over whether to lend him the
money, Morris steals the titular dish as “insurance” (Collected Stories 27); she returns bearing a
check cut with God’s approval, and Morris doubles his score. The only Selbst to suffer from this
scheme is Woody, who is expelled when the widow uncovers the ruse.
In the context of Shula Sammler and Roth’s stunted half-Jews, “A Silver Dish” stands out
for being focalized through Woody, so that the reader receives his impressions, thoughts, and
speech without the mediation of a Sammler or Zuckerman. Equally noteworthy is that Selbst,
unlike his Rothian counterparts, remains whole and unscarred despite his conflicting heritages.
His name, German for “self,” declares his ego intact. Yet Selbst’s upbringing is nearly as
complicated as Shula’s:
[Woody] had had some connections with bells and churches. He was, after all, something
of a Christian. Born a Jew, he was a Jew facially, with a hint of Iroquois or Cherokee, but
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his mother had been converted more than fifty years ago by her brother-in-law, the
Reverend Doctor Kovner. Kovner, a rabbinical student who had left the Hebrew Union
College in Cincinnati to become a minister and establish a mission, had given Woody a
partly Christian upbringing. (15)
This short history reveals that Woody, whose father’s “most Jewish characteristic was that
Yiddish was the only language he could read a paper in” (24), comes from a family of modernday New Christians. But unlike his mother, his two sisters, and his uncle, Woody, an incomplete
converso, remains tethered to his Jewishness. Bellow, that master of Dickensian physiognomy,
places Woody’s Jewishness on his face—but what to make of the hint of Iroquois or Cherokee?
In addition to hinting at the Jew’s purported ancientness and exoticism, Bellow may be alluding
to Philip Rahv’s essay “Paleface and Redskin” (1939), an unfortunately titled classic of the
Partisan Review set, which divides American letters into a cloistered, highbrow tradition and a
“literature of the lowlife world of the frontier and of the big cities,” with city-dwelling Jewish
writers like Rahv and his contemporaries falling into the latter category (Rahv 251). At the same
time, Woody’s Jewishly indigenous face—his indigenously Jewish face?—gestures to the
complexity of his Jewish identity, which is composed of non-Jewish elements. 201
There is little evidence that Woody’s dual heritage constitutes anything like the dilemma
that Jewish leaders or the writers of the Commentary testimonials associated with the children of
intermarriage. On the contrary, Woody is an example of what Egon Mayer, in his study of
Jewish-gentile marriage, calls the “tenacity of Jewishness” (151), though the Selbsts cease to be
a Jewish family when he is a child. To be precise: the Selbsts cease being Jewish and cease being
a family—the latter when Morris Selbst abandons his “Christian wife and his converted son and
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By contrast, Woody describes his mother, also a born Jew, as having “plump wrists and a faded Queen Victoria
face” (17), an appearance that matches her adopted faith.
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his small daughters” for a born gentile named Halina (Collected Stories 15). The Selbsts become
almost entirely deracinated, as Bellow writes: “Pop was with Polish Halina, and Mother was with
Jesus Christ, and Woody ate uncooked bacon from the flitch. Still, now and then he had a Jewish
impression” (24). A Jewish impression is not the same as a commitment to Jewish continuity.
Nevertheless, a lingering Jewishness persists in Woody, the bacon-eating son of a converted
mother and shiksa-chasing father.
Though Woody describes himself as “agnostic” (14), though he becomes an honest
businessman and not a grifter, he remains his father’s son, in part because Morris’s scheme
abruptly ends his Christian education. What rabbinical student-turned-Reverend Kovner and his
mission had wanted from Woody, Pop reminds him, was for him to proselytize, to aid in the
conversion of the Jews. “And what a time to bother the Jews,” an older Woody reflects, recalling
those Depression days when Hitler was consolidating power in Europe. “At least I didn’t bug
them,” he continues, relieved (31). If intermarriage developed into a silent Holocaust within the
Jewish American imagination, what does that make an ex-Jew like Kovner, who makes apostates
of the needy Jews who eat from his mission’s food pantry?
Instead of embracing Christianity, Woody establishes a different kind of Jewish
continuity: he financially supports his mother and sisters, he takes his father to the hospital, and
climbs into the stubborn old man’s deathbed to comfort him. That hospital bed becomes a “crib,”
and Woody becomes the Jewish patriarch to his dying father (33). Whatever its intended
purpose, Morris’s scheme “had carried [Woody] back to his side of the line” (31), had made a
Jew of him.
What is the significance of Woody Selbst, Bellow’s patrilineal Jew? He is, to borrow
Zuckerman’s self-description, a “Jew without Jews, without Judaism, without Zionism, without
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Jewishness…just the object itself, like a glass or an apple.” His Jewishness persists,
inexpugnable, despite the efforts of Reverend Kovner and “wealthy fundamentalists” to “speed
up the Second Coming by converting all the Jews” (Collected Stories 15). Woody retains his
Jewish face, his proclivity for “Jewish observations” and “Jewish impression[s]” (24). Yet this is
a form of Jewish continuity without religion or progeny; after all, Woody, like his father, “didn’t
like being entirely within the law” (13). Neither did Bellow, who—like Roth, his own wicked
offspring—creates Jewish characters evocative of the same Jewish stereotypes they ultimately
defy. Within the context of the myth of the vanishing American Jew, “A Silver Dish” is impishly
noteworthy for presenting Morris, a conman and a thief, as a modern-day Ezra, an upholder of
Jewish genealogies.
Why don’t figures like Woody or Morris Selbst exist in Roth’s fiction? What, finally, is
Roth’s position on the so-called intermarriage crisis? The death of Cousin Heshie in Portnoy’s
Complaint marks Roth’s first satirical exploration into this postwar anxiety (“At least he didn’t
leave you with goyische children”); in The Counterlife, Roth stops short of imagining
Zuckerman’s half-Jewish offspring, though he hypothesizes a Jewish continuity rooted in the
exogamous father’s sense of history (violent, unromantic, anti-pastoral); what to make, then, of
Merry Levov’s murderous defiance? Can Roth even be said to have a position on the
intermarriage crisis? Safer to make a more anemic claim: the fear of intermarriage which plagued
American Jews in the postwar period—part of a greater fear of assimilation which also
manifested, ironically, in the hoary literary-critical impulse to dismiss as thin and malnourished
the Jewishness of Roth’s generation of writers—enters Roth’s fiction first as satire, then as
grounds for philosophical speculation, then as tragedy. Roth does not take a stance so much as he
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captures from multiple angles the moment of anxiety and tension when American Jews called
their coreligionists Nazis.
“What on earth,” asks Zuckerman at the end of American Pastoral, “is less reprehensible
than the life of the Levovs?” (423). Which is to say: why has this decent, suburban family
suffered so? I can’t resist reframing Zuckerman’s question as a critique of the intermarriage
crisis. What was so reprehensible about the lives of exogamous Jews? What was so
reprehensible—oh, who am I kidding, after all these pages!—about the lives of the Golds? In
light of all the disasters that befell twentieth-century Jewry, I can only look at those fear-stricken,
fear-mongering men who perpetuated the myth of the silent Holocaust and quote Woody Selbst:
“What a time to bother the Jews.” I’m glad I didn’t bug them.
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